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Africa

(Sub-Sahara)

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IDB To Finance ECOWAS \$1.7 Billion Recovery Program

34000581 *Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English*
11 Apr 88 p 16

[Article: "IDB—ECOWAS Fund Agrees on Lending Conditions"]

[Text] The favourable lending conditions of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) was the major factor that led to the recently concluded co-operation agreement between the Bank and the ECOWAS Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development (FCCD).

The BUSINESS TIMES learnt that the Fund is desperately looking for capital to finance the 7.1 billion naira ECOWAS Recovery programme (ERP); to this end, it has considered other sources of loans such as the IMF, OPEC, and EEC but had found that none has conditionalities as favourable as the IDB.

While Northern financial institutions impose such conditions as high interests, trade liberalisations, reduction in government expenditure and currency devaluation, the IDB (a southern institution) gives interest-free loans. The bank operates in accordance with the Islamic trade law as contained in the Sharia and does not charge interest on the loans it gives out neither does it pay any on the capital it borrows.

The bank only contends itself with sharing profits with the recipient of the loan but in case of loans, the burden is borne solely by the bank.

The direct implication of this is that if it had been possible for our countries in the sub-region to obtain their past loans from institutions such as the IDB, their debts would not have risen as high as they are now. West African countries now owe \$43 billion (i.e. 172 billion naira) to the outside world and this continues to rise every day because of interest charges which are directly proportional to time.

/12223

ECOWAS Plans Solar Village To Conserve Energy

34000600a *Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English*
18 Apr 88 p 9

[Text] The dream of a solar village or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is soon to be translated into reality. This is part of the integrated and comprehensive energy policy instrument approved in 1982 by the Community's Authority of Heads of State and Government by decision No A/DEC. 3/5/82.

Already, necessary technical and logistics arrangements have been worked out and the greenlight for its implementation is expected soon. It was gathered that the Energy Department of the Community is optimistic of a possible assistance from Italy in the execution of the project.

It was also learnt that the Italians have so far expressed considerable interest in the project and that negotiations have been made and working agreements likely to be signed soon.

The main target in the implementation of the energy programme which has been centered mostly on synthesising donor and technical institutions is also said to be yielding good result.

So far, an energy data bank in Dakar, Senegal has been established in co-operation with UNESCO. The central objective of this bank is to make available the most recent research and information on energy development.

On how the solar project was to be financed, it was gathered, that the Community's fund for development and compensation is charged with the responsibility of mobilising all required resources. Encouraging response from member states in respect of payment of dues and contributions is also being received by the secretariat. It was also disclosed that discussions were presently going on with member states who were yet to pay up their arrears.

Asked how the secretariat has been coping with the long standing problem of manpower, it was disclosed that the problem of staff has now been resolved.

For instance, until recently, the energy department had had to contend with just two qualified professional staff but with the present drive, an increase was inevitable.

/9274

Senegal Leads Member States in ECOWAS' Link Roads

34000600b *Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English*
18 Apr 88 p 24

[Article by Mulero Seidi]

[Text] Senegal is so far ahead of other ECOWAS member-states, having completed a total of 1,143.6 km of roads at a cost of 137.05 billion FCFA (i.e. 359.71 million dollars) out of her portion of the Trans-West African Highway Network.

The BUSINESS TIMES learnt that out of a total of 3429.7 km of roads completed along the transcostal axis (linking Lagos to Nouakchott), Senegal built 551.6 km. She also constructed 592 km out of a total of 4,320 km so far completed along the trans-Sahelian axis linking Nouakchott to N'Djamena.

Nigeria comes second with a total of 1,045 km of completed roads; out of these, 65 km (i.e. Lagos—Seme Border) are along the transcostal while the remaining 970 km linking the Niger/Nigeria border to Kano and Maidiguri are, of course along the Trans-Sahelian.

Mauritania comes third with a total of 1,017 km out of which 203 fall within the Transcostal and 814 km along the Trans-Sahelian.

Niger, Cote d'Ivoire, Bukina Fasso, Ghana and Liberia come fourth, fifth, six and eighth respectively with 824 km, 756 km, 695 km and 625.1 km in that order. The others are Mali (370 km), Sierra Leone (292 km), Guinea (211 km), Benin (172 km), Guinea Bissau (169 km), the Gambia (76 km) and Togo (50 km).

The sixteenth state, Cape Verde, is an island off the Coast of West Africa; it falls beyond the scope of the on-going highway network project.

It is to be noted that though Nigeria came second she was done perfectly well because she has already finished her portions of the highways. She also helped Benin by constructing the Seme-Poji to Seme-Krake portion of the Transcostal. The 25 km from Idiroko to Porto-Novo which represents a link between the Transcostal and the interior was also constructed by Nigeria. Other states having finished their portions are Niger and the Gambia.

The other 12 states are now looking for sources of capital to finance the remaining sections of their portions. The aggregate of the remaining portions for the whole sub-region is 2,436.5 km, the total cost of which is estimated at \$924.03 million (i.e. about 3.7 billion naira).

Out of this, 1,671 km fall within the trans-Sahelian axis while the remaining 1,265.5 km are, of course, within the trans-Coastal. Out of this, 1,840 km are scheduled to be completed between now and 1992 at the cost of \$724.5 million.

/9274

Islamic Council Federation Holds Annual Conference in Maputo

34420129 Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
31 Mar 88 p 8

[Text] The Second Annual Conference of the Federation of Islamic Councils in the eastern, central and southern parts of Africa will begin in Maputo tomorrow. It is being held simultaneously with the First Muslim Youth Conference.

Both gatherings will last 5 days, during which the delegates from the 22 countries represented in this federation will discuss issues connected with the propagation of the Islamic religion in these three regions of Africa.

The participants in the conference will discuss the subject of religious reforms within the Muslim environment, and at the conclusion of the work of the conference, the deputy secretary general of the Federation of Islamic Councils will be elected.

The conference of Islamic youth, for its part, will discuss two subjects—the role of youth within the federation, and the role of women in that same interregional organization.

According to information provided to our reporters by the secretary general of the Islamic Council of Mozambique, Sheikh Abubacar Mussa Ismael, this is the first time a gathering of this sort has been held in the People's Republic of Mozambique.

This federation held its first conference in Gaborone, Botswana, in March of 1986. At that meeting, it was decided to establish a federation with the Islamic councils of the eastern, central and southern parts of Africa as its members.

The nations represented in the federation are Mozambique, Mauritius, Madagascar, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, Seychelles, Reunion, Namibia, South Africa, Comoros, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Zaire and Angola.

According to the secretary general of the Islamic Council of Mozambique, who is a member of the executive committee, the headquarters of this organization is currently situated in Uganda.

As of yesterday, the delegations from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda and Libya had already arrived in the capital of Mozambique. It is expected that the other delegations will arrive in the course of today.

Representatives of the Muslim communities in the provinces of Gaza, Inhambane, Zambezia, Nampula and Cabo Delgado have also come to Maputo to participate in the conference.

5157

MPLA Internal Struggle Viewed

34420135a Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese
16 Apr 88 p 31

[Article by Carlos da Matta]

[Text] Luanda—In the view of many observers, the constantly altering balance within the MPLA and the lack of decisions are reflections of an internal struggle which will only be aggravated by the prospect of Cuban withdrawal. The possibility of a coup d'etat in the medium time range cannot be excluded.

The hot season is nearing its end, but Luanda (and almost all of Angola) is still experiencing considerable heat. Despite the continuing rainfall, Angolan agriculture is still without the other conditions which would enable it to put an end to hunger in the country. These factors include confidence on the part of the peasantry in the goals and the competence of the decisionmaking centers, suitable marketing conditions, adequate technical support and peace.

It is the capital which is suffering most from shortages of all kinds. Everything is lacking, from sanitation to food, and a continuing lack of calm is to be seen as a result not only of the uncertainties created by the situation, but also because of the prevailing arbitrary atmosphere. The state commands everything here in stifling fashion, and the ordinary citizen is always subject to the whim (or the interests) of the petty chiefs who dictate their lives, whether it is be question of food, lodging, travel, etc. For those without influence, without gifts to offer or a means of recourse to the black market, life is impossible.

Limited to quiet protests out of fear of denunciation, Luanda is a nervous city which views its undeniable potholes and the mountains of garbage in the streets with displeasure. It is a city in which a large proportion of the people do not know whether or not they will have something to eat on the morrow, or if in case of illness, they will be able to obtain aid. It is a city in which a mere discussion, even within the family, can cause a Makarov, an AK-47 or even grenades to be brought forth.

Powerfully defended against attack from outside, this city is nonetheless exploding from within. All that is needed is a spark or a provocation.

The cost of living continues to rise and the official prices have become ridiculous, since at those prices there is practically nothing to buy, except for gasoline and products for those who have the privilege of government supply. The announcement of the intention to "effect economic and financial reorganization," while no change has been made in the production indices, has thus far only led to an increase in prices on the black market, which today incorporates the greater part of the distribution circuits. Where durable goods are concerned, the increase has quintupled [lines missing from text of original here].

"Individual" Errors

The recent dismissal of two SEF officials was due to the high level MPLA-PT decision to block any analysis which might reveal the responsibility borne by the system. The mistakes, the government says, were solely those of individuals. On the other hand, this may have had some counterpart relation to the imposition of heavy fines on "security" officers who sought to use the information they had gathered to exert pressure on and blackmail political leaders. Some people in the ultrarepressive sectors, which have never looked favorably on the "excesses and deviations" of certain SEF technicians, sympathize with the individuals fined.

Many people are wondering about the role of President Jose Eduardo, and when his supporters stress that the chief of state is surrounded by incompetent and ambitious individuals who hinder his actions, no one can help but reflect that it was he who appointed them. The same thing occurs in connection with the continuing balancing act in various sectors, which appears to be a maneuver to exclude those who displease him, and which "will in the end force the president and his closest associates into isolation."

In the view of others, this balancing act is the result of the continuing struggle within the single party, and the lack of decisions which are urgently needed reflects a lack of real power and vacillating action.

With the prospect of the Cuban troop withdrawal, the leaders of the RPA will find themselves lacking a factor which to date has limited the scope of internal differences and prevented them from going to extremes. The departure of Castro's troops may eliminate the inhibitions of certain forces in the party and the military apparatus, creating a situation which will perhaps be more of a threat to the regime than the UNITA.

In any case, the possibility of a coup d'etat in the medium time range cannot be excluded if the paralysis, the dance of personal ambitions and the deafness to the immediate desires of the people continue, above all at a time when the Soviet authorities seem to be showing a real will for peace.

In this connection, a high CPSU official met with the representatives of the media in Luanda and urged those present to devote every effort to the problem of peace. This caused perplexity among his hearers, who have received no instructions along these lines.

Flexibility Urged

The very visit paid by the Soviet vice minister of foreign affairs to the Angolan president, because of its abnormal length (about 2 hours), and because of the information leaked from Futungo de Belas, is being interpreted as a

meeting at which the Kremlin sought to make its ally understand that the time has come for greater flexibility, and that the day for silencing the guns is not far off.

The question is as to how this can be brought about. The withdrawal of the foreign troops is the first step, but the end of the war will depend on an internal agreement, whether it involves sharing power between the belligerent parties or the establishment of a transition structure with the armed parties and the other opinion groups, or division of the country.

The idea circulating in a number of belligerent sectors, to the effect that the withdrawal of the opposing foreign troops will suffice to make military victory possible, is mere illusion. To insist on this can only result in more victims, and will further reduce the support base of those who take responsibility for such a venture. With or without foreign troops, the war in Angola is unpopular, and it has reached an impasse. The majority of Angolan citizens believe that political legitimacy today is not achieved, as was the case in 1974 and 1975, by going about weapons in hand. It is obtained by showing respect for the will of the people and the capacity to resolve their basic problems.

However simplistic this observation may seem, as we frequently hear it said, it is essential if the future conditions for stability are to be created.

5157

Nerve Gas Traces Found in UNITA Soldiers
34000592c Durban *THE ARGUS in English*
24 Mar 88 p 27

[Article: "Gas Horror in Angola"]

[Text] Allegations of chemical warfare against Unita in Angola have been investigated by a team of Belgian physicians who found traces of nerve gas in some rebel soldiers.

Blood and urine samples collected from eight patients were analysed on February 16 in the laboratory of a Unita field hospital at Mavinga.

The physicians, led by Professor Aubain Heyndrickx, head of the toxicology department at Gent University in Belgium, found traces of nerve gases (or war gases) in the patients examined.

According to Professor Heyndrickx's report, the samples from two patients indicated that they had been affected by nerve gases such as Soman, Sarin and Tabun. There were also traces of arsenic in their urine samples.

Russian

Kits for the detection of toxic gases, seized in Cuito Cuanavale from captured Cuban soldiers, were handed to the investigating team by Unita soldiers. The kits were of Russian origin, according to the report.

In October, 1986, a battalion of 600 Unita soldiers was allegedly gassed in the Luanda province, Professor Heyndrickx was told.

Celestino Muhongo, 40, who could walk only with the aid of sticks, claimed 31 of the 600 men developed symptoms similar to his. Although the attack happened in a heavily populated area, Muhongo told the doctors that only Unita soldiers were affected.

Resting

Muhongo said he had no idea how the "enemy" could have caused his illness.

Severino Arao, a 25-year-old Unita soldier, alleged that he had been gassed on August 8, 1986. Arao told the team he was in a group of soldiers who were resting in the bush close to enemy, positions 100km south of Luanda, the report said.

He did not see the explosion but remembered it was strange because there was no shrapnel. He was told by his colleagues that dark smoke had drifted over them.

Arao told the investigators he became confused over the next two hours and had difficulty remembering what happened. He did remember pains in his chest caused by difficulty in breathing, severe vomiting which lasted about two hours and weak, unco-ordinated lower limbs.

He recollected waking up two hours later after his colleagues had carried him from the spot.

Five members of his group were exposed to the smoke. Three started vomiting and experienced weakness of the lower limbs. One of the men died later that day, the report said.

Antonion Carvalho, 32, was allegedly gassed in November, 1986, in east Angola.

'No shrapnel, but a cloud of red smoke'

He told the investigators that his group were lying on the ground waiting for a flank force to attack when there was an explosion about 20m away. There was no shrapnel but a cloud of red smoke drifted over them, Carvalho said.

The smoke smelt similar to insecticides used on farms.

Carvalho said he did not remember what happened after the explosion but said he became disorientated, confused and had difficulty breathing. His lower limbs became weak and he had not been able to walk since.

He said one of the men in his group died.

Carvalho told the physicians that for three days after the attack he could not close his eyes and his lower limb paralysis was rapidly progressive.

He became incontinent and developed speech problems.

/12223

Massive Military Recruitment Under Way
34420132d Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in
Portuguese 4 Mar 88 p 3

[Excerpts] Recruitment in the National Army is proceeding successfully in all of the country's provinces. In fact, very young recruits are showing up en masse and with great enthusiasm to strengthen the defense of the country and revolution in order to prevent the realization of the Machiavellian objectives of the racist invading enemy and his henchmen.

For example, Tuesday the youth of military age in Benguela Province began to present themselves at the local recruitment and mobilization center.

Capt Antonio Betencurt, Benguela's deputy provincial commissioner for the ODP and territorial troops, presided at a cultural policy ceremony marking the beginning of the process of military recruitment which is to extended until 30 March.

In his speech at the ceremony, Antonio Betencurt began by stressing the importance of enlisting the country's youth in the Armed Forces; he then went on to say that the Angolan people need peace to rebuild their country but that the aggression of South Africa's racist regime is forcing the country to divert much of its resources to support the war.

"It is not the desire of the Angolan people to make war, for war is an evil for humanity," one reads in the message of the Angolan Women's Organization to the young enlistees.

"We waged a just war in defense of our revolutionary achievements and the territorial integrity of the land of Agostinho Neto," the message concluded.

Military leaders connected with the command of the Seventh Military Region, representatives of the government, people's organizations and social groups, Cuban advisers and other persons of note attended the solemn rite opening the second recruitment round for 1987-1988.

First Lt Agostinho Gaspar, head of the provincial recruitment and mobilization center, considered the number of young men who presented themselves for military service in Menongue, Kuando Kubango, unusually high.

Gaspar said that the number of enlistees is exceeding that of previous years, which, according to him, is an indication that the country's youth is taking the aggression of the South African Army very seriously.

People's and social organizations, particularly the JMPLA-Party Youth, are initiating promotional campaigns directed toward the youth about to enter the Armed Forces.

08568

Country's Naval Force Described
34420132b Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese
24 Mar 88 p 22

[Text] London—The most important task—and perhaps the most curious—which exists on the part of the Angolan Armed Forces is to be a member of the embryonic navy which the Soviets are organizing for their Marxist allies. Just like the antiaerial missiles which protect Luanda from UNITA's hypothetical planes [hypothetical, since they do not exist], the fleet is supposed to protect Angola's coast from the Navy which UNITA does not have. In addition to the fact that the Angolan Navy is not very useful in a country torn by guerrilla warfare, that Navy, like the Air Defense Force, is part of a strategic defense plan devised in Moscow rather than in Luanda.

The Angolan Navy, pompously called the People's Navy of Angola, consists of about 30 warships, more than the combined fleets of Benin, Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cameroon and Cape Verde. Most African countries have only a limited number of patrol boats in service, mainly to detect and thwart smuggling operations or other criminal activity.

There are only three navies in Sub-Saharan Africa which have more men and more firepower than the Angolan Fleet: those of South Africa, Ethiopia and Nigeria, all of which possess a certain number of frigates which add to their prestige. Nevertheless, Angola now has more vessels than any one of those countries, even though Angola has less than one-third of the population of the smallest of the three. But unlike the other countries mentioned, Angola has almost no merchant marine, since it has only 59 ships with a modest total of 91,602 tons.

The Modern Angolan Navy

The curious Angolan Navy is also one of the most modern navies in Africa. The original fleet consisted of a collection of coastal patrol boats of the Argos, Jupiter and Bellatrix category, all of them rigged in Portugal

between 1961 and 1965 for colonial service. The Jupiters and Bellarmixes [sic] are equipped with only one 20-mm machine gun, and the five Argoses, relatively large, have 40-mm machine guns.

However, the "new" Angolan Navy is now equipped with more weaponry than that contained on this rusty collection of old vessels. The pride of the fleet is the six Soviet OSAA warships. Considered rapid-attack ships, they are equipped with four 30-mm two-barreled machine guns and four Soviet SS-N-2 missiles. With three diesel motors, the OSA's can reach 30 knots for 1,200 km and a battle speed of 40 knots.

Even the best of the old Portuguese vessels would have difficulty achieving half of that speed. Luanda acquired these ships in three different deliveries: in September and December 1982 and in November 1983.

At the end of 1983 the Luanda squadron also received the Shershen vessels. Like the OSA's, the Shershens are of Soviet construction and are equipped with the same motors, although there is a slight difference in the design which enables them to reach a speed of 47 knots. These ships are also equipped with 30-mm machine guns, but in addition, they have four torpedo-launching tubes (52.5-cm torpedoes) and radar equipment for detection and firing control. Designed for torpedo launching, these four rapid-attack ships, together with the six OSA's, give Angola a surprising amount of power which only a combat navy—and not a mere coastal patrol-boat service—would be proud to have.

The Angolan Navy also acquired a Chinese attack ship from China. With four diesel motors, this ship is equivalent to the Soviet attack ships and, moreover, is equipped with eight machine guns, four 37-mm and four 25-mm; it can also carry a maximum of 10 mines. It serves as a complement to the other attack ships, thus giving Angola a formidable light-battle squadron.

The traditional coastal patrol-boat force has also been strengthened by two Soviet Poluchats and one Soviet Zhuk warship. Each of these has two 14.5-mm heavy machine guns and exceeds the old ships both in sphere of action and speed.

To complete the picture, the Navy put 3 Soviet ships of the Polnochy class and 4 ships of the T-4 class into service and restored one of the 10 Portuguese patrol boats. Each of these vessels can transport from 20 to 40 combat troops. The Polnochys are also equipped with 100-mm missile launchers and four 30-mm machine guns, all of this equipment being tied in with firing-control radar located on deck.

The Soviets have trained 1,500 Angolans to maintain this modest fleet, including particularly a naval-infantry force of 100 elite soldiers. Most of the officers were trained in the USSR and further trained by the former heads of the coast-guard staff, themselves having been

trained in Portugal and Nigeria. Most of the maintenance is handled by Soviet and Cuban technicians who direct the Luanda Navy's principal operations, although most of the vessels are located at the Lobito, Mocamedes and Porto Aboim bases and at ports on the Zaire River at Soyo and Pedra de Feitico. Although the general headquarters is located on Luanda Island, the Luanda base is more frequently used by Soviet ships and submarines. Soviet radar equipment was built at the Namibe naval base. Although it is under the nominal control of the Angolan Navy, this base has become an essential port for Soviet and Cuban ships.

The main objective of the Angolan Navy seems to be that of a local supplementary force designed to protect Soviet supplies coming to Angola. Whereas other nations are using their patrol boats to prevent infringements of the fishing rights in their waters, the Angolans are protecting the Soviet trawlers, even though they accuse the Soviets of abusing the fishing rights of Angolan waters established by mutual agreement between the two countries.

08568

Government Version of RSA Attack on Cuito Cuanavale

34420135b Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 30 Mar 88 p 3

[Article by Jose Miguel]

[Text] Two weeks ago, Cuito Cuanavale (in the Angolan province of Kwando-Kubango) was expecting one of the most important attacks ever by the South African Army on the FAPLA positions established there. Giving the lie to the newspaper predictions concerning the talks and negotiations under way on the matter in South Africa, the men in Pretoria launched one of their heaviest military offensives against the defensive lines of the FAPLA in that locality on 23 March of this year.

But whatever the resources and troop strength the South African general staff might employ, the officers of the Angolan Army had stated that their units were ready to repel any enemy attack. And that was what happened.

In an artillery and armored vehicle clash which lasted more than 15 hours, the South African Army units were forced to flee in disarray, leaving behind five tanks destroyed in the field, infantry weapons, and an undetermined number of dead and wounded, including two UNITA bands. Foreign and national journalists who visited the site last Monday, including representatives of a national television network in the United States and newsmen from Zimbabwe, were able to observe what happened there, in the midst of South African artillery fire which was still continuing.

The battle began at about 0300 hours, and ended at about 1700 hours that same day. The enemy was halted some 400 to 600 meters from the first FAPLA defensive lines, despite the fact that Pretoria announced that the first line of the Angolan Army defenses in Cuito Cuanavale had been destroyed.

The South Africans tried to break through the minefields, using sophisticated modern 40-ton tanks (Centurions, manufactured in England) equipped with a mechanism for detonating the mines to allow them to advance. The intensive barrage from the FAPLA artillery and tanks frustrated this attempt, and the enemy was forced to withdraw in confusion, its retreating tanks crushing the bodies of the members of the puppet force who had been perched on top of them.

One fact which should be noted is that throughout these years of aggression against Angola, the South African Government has consistently tried to leave evidence of its destructive efforts, attributing them up to a certain point to the puppet force. Even today, when it openly admits its intervention in Angola, it always takes great care to leave no evidence (material or human) which might reduce its maneuvering room.

We should say that the enemy's military units must first of all make preparations before undertaking any action, so as to leave nothing in the field which could serve as a base for accusations. This same maneuver was attempted in this battle, except that this time it had little success.

The tanks themselves are prepared for removal in the event that they are damaged. They are equipped with mechanisms which launch something like smoke cartridges or grenades to block our view of the enemy. It is then that the crews are evacuated, and as each tank is provided with a cable for the purpose, they try to drag them away.

The South Africans used this same method in this battle. They rescued the crews, but they could not tow away all of the tanks (it is presumed that the number of those hit was very high), not only because of the concentrated FAPLA fire, but also because they were operating in mined and sandy terrain.

Even so, apart from the tanks and infantry weapons, the South Africans left behind further evidence of their involvement in this battle. The identity card of a soldier, Sean Colin, of the 82nd Brigade of the Presidential Regiment, based in Pretoria, was found along with other documents belonging to him in one of the tanks captured.

The nature of this soldier's military unit points in fact to the ever-changing level of the war in the southern part of Angola. It is no longer a matter of simple Army units from Pretoria, for its elite units, duly trained and equipped, are gradually being introduced into the battles with the FAPLA. On the other hand, the participation of

this military unit, which is a part of the South African Presidential Regiment, seems to reflect the despair which prevails in the Boer general staff as a result of the firm stand taken by the Angolan military units stationed in Cuito Cuanavale.

In addition to the minor battles, the South Africans launched two major military offensives against this locality, on 25 January and 1 March. They resulted in failure. On 23 March, they seemed to have been too optimistic (in exposing themselves to such an extent in terrain within the firing range of the FAPLA). Perhaps they were counting on these elite units.

According to Lieutenant Colonel N'Gueto, the commander of the Sixth Military Region (Kwando-Kubango), the South African Army Command mobilized three mechanized columns for the attack on this occasion, as well as two UNITA puppet units, with a troop strength of up to 9,000 men. According to the information provided to us 2 weeks ago during an interview with the president of the Regional Military Council, Colonel "Battle of Angola," South African Army Battalions 61, 101, 91, 04, 450, 09 and 15 were readied for the attack, not to mention the terrorist bands of the UNITA.

Since Battalion 91 is a tank unit, it is presumed that Pretoria attacked Cuito Cuanavale on 23 March with two tank battalions (including that of Presidential Regiment Brigade 82), as well as seven regular battalions, although four were mixed units (04, 450, 09 and 15).

With this attack, the South African Government seriously compromised its efforts to persuade the international public that it is interested in a peaceful solution to the problems in southern Africa. How is it possible to believe in the good intentions of South Africa when, far from withdrawing its troops from Angolan territory, it is trying at all costs to occupy the locality of Cuito Cuanavale by force?

The Angolan Government has stated a number of times that it would be prepared to withdraw the Cuban troops from Angola (although this is a national sovereignty issue) if South Africa were to withdraw from its territory, to cease to support the terrorists bands of the UNITA, and to comply with the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 on the independence of Namibia.

However, despite the peace propaganda the South African Government puts out, the facts point in the opposite direction. Its insistence on taking Cuito Cuanavale, an indication that Pretoria is not willing to withdraw its troops from Angola, puts yet another obstacle in the path of finding a peaceful and just solution to the problems of this region of the continent. It seems difficult for the South African government to understand the futility of its choice of force for the resolution of the problems

which underlie the conflict in southern Africa. Cuito Cuanavale serves as an example, but it continues to be poorly understood by those who have placed their faith in confrontation.

5157

New Telecommunications System

34420132e Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 6 Mar 88 p 3

[Text] Brazzaville—Angola's capital, Luanda, will now be linked with eight other African cities through a system of aeronautical telecommunications by satellite, Brazzaville (Congo) being the principal connecting wing, according to information received by ANGOP in the Congolese capital.

Congo's Council of Ministers, meeting a few days ago, indicated in its report that this new system will make it possible to link the cities of Luanda (Angola), Brazzaville (Congo), Kano (Nigeria), Kinshasa (Zaire), N'Djamena (Chad), Bangui (CAR), Douala (Cameroon), Libreville (Gabon) and Sao Tome (Sao Tome and Principe).

The subregional project of aerial navigation will replace the present system of high-frequency "decromatic waves," largely obsolete. The new system is also aimed at improving the inter-regional telecommunications networks.

08568

Namibe Fishing Industry Expanded

34420132f Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 4 Mar 88 p 3

[Article by Jesus Silva]

[Text] Namibe—Last year this province caught about 30,400 tons of fish, 18,800 of which were caught by the new fleet acquired by the People's Republic of Angola from the Kingdom of Spain, although the fleet operated with only one-half of its vessels (seven), since the other seven did not reach the province until the end of the year.

According to Vasco Souza Martinho, provincial delegate for fishing, this catch permitted the province's fishing sector to receive an overall income of 2,352,337,500 kwanzas and process 7,300 tons of dried fish, 3,000 of half-cured fish and 2,000 tons to be frozen.

In 1987 the province also produced 540 tons of fish meal and 34,300 tons of salt, the production of canned fish being very low and of no significant value due to a lack of tinplate, the raw material used in marketing the product, which did not arrive until the end of the year.

With regard to distribution at the national level, the following was routed to various provinces in the country: about 18,800 tons of fresh and frozen fish, 9,000 of dried and half-cured fish and 25,000 tons of salt, according to Vasco Martinho.

As for the current year, the Provincial Fishing Delegation expects to maintain the level of the catch with the present fleet and double that of the newly acquired fleet, which in turn will be reflected in the overall production, the processing of dried, half-cured and frozen fish as well as in the distribution. There are also plans to produce 2,000 tons of canned fish, 40,000 of salt and 1,000 of fish meal.

Project With the EEC

Projects with the EEC will continue in the area of technical assistance, protection of the refrigeration complex, repair of the Somar wharf bridge, technical supply of materiel for the entire province, restoration of the second assembly line of the N'gola Kiluanji plant and studies pertaining to technical assistance and the operation of equipment at the Namibe shipyard.

Again working with the EEC, there is to be a supply of equipment and technical assistance for the Empromar Kalahari as well as the construction of a provincial refrigerated warehouse and small municipal warehouses in Huila Province.

Italian and Soviet Cooperation

Projects with the Italian Government, begun this month, contemplate the construction of new buildings in Empromar Tombua, increased production capacity, new equipment supply and technical assistance, all of which will extend over a period of 2 years. There is also to be expansion of the salt works with the respective equipment and the establishment of a new fish-meal factory in Tombua. It should be stressed that all of the above projects are in the form of donations to be made by the countries in question, any repayments to be made by the People's Republic of Angola over the short, medium or long term.

In like manner, cooperation with the Soviet Union calls for a continuation of studies and plans for the construction of a fishing port at Tombua, valued at \$15 million; restoration of the refrigeration complex at the Lucira commune to be carried out by the Kingdom of Spain at a sum of \$500,000; and the construction of a wharf bridge at Lucira to be backed by the Arab Development Bank at the sum of \$1.5 million.

With further reference to the projects, plans are under way for the restoration of a fish-meal plant in Tombua to be carried out by Portugal and estimated to cost \$300,000; this is in addition to the acquisition of a

700-ton fishing barge and another vessel for the Helder Neto Medio Institute of Oceanography to be financed by the Bapea-Kowait Fund. These vessels have a total value of \$5.5 million.

Agricultural and Cattle-Raising Exposition

An agricultural and cattle-raising exposition will be held on 6 and 7 March in Namibe as part of the People's Oceanographic Festival under way since 26 February.

The exposition will be inaugurated by Agriculture Minister Faustino Muteka and will also be attended by Andre Petroff, secretary of the Central Committee for Agrarian Policy.

The cattle-raising exposition will display various breeds of cattle: Schwitz, Africander, Zebu, Dutch, Tchimbolelo crossbreed and other regional breeds.

A cattle auction is to be held covering the sale of 80 head of cattle, 30 hogs and 64 goats and sheep. There will also be six drawings for cattle and goats with awards for the first three classified.

The agricultural exposition will include displays by 10 firms which will present grains, horticultural products, fruits and flowers as well as products used in marketing the produce.

08568

Plans To Restore Lomaum Dam Discussed

34420132a Lisbon TEMPC/ECONOMICO in Portuguese 30 Mar 88 p 28

[Text] Prior to 1973 the consumption of electrical power in the central area of Angola (Benguela, Huambo and Bie) doubled every 4 years. This rate exceeded that of Sao Paulo (Brazil's most industrialized city) at the level of overall distribution. Stated in another way, the cost per kilowatt hour was 29 times less than what is currently paid for the power supplied by any thermal power plant. This situation was made possible by the existence of the Lomaum Dam, located at about 20 km from the municipal headquarters of Cubal, in Benguela Province. We are speaking of the utilization of hydroelectric energy capable of supplying all the power needed in the area in question. The restoration of this complex, which about 4

years ago was damaged by guerrilla warfare, is just one of the important tasks of the Program of Economic and Financial Restoration (SEF) which got underway in that country in January.

The apparent objective is to restore the industrial park (Huambo and Benguela) which has been operating less than 30 percent of its installed capacity and enable the country's central region to share in the economic recovery program.

Once the Lomaum power plant is in full swing, its capacity will be 30 MW in October 1989 and 65 MW in November 1990. According to the ENE, the organization responsible for the dam's restoration project, two contracts have already been drawn up: Contract A, signed during the visit of the Angolan head of state to Portugal, and Contract B which is being negotiated through the banks of the two countries.

Contract A, which provided for the restoration of just groups four and five at the time of its signing (1981), was never carried out due to the civil war. Contract B calls for the restoration of the damage inflicted on the Lomaum power plant during the first and second acts of sabotage.

Financing

The total financing involved in the project comes to \$11 million furnished by the USA (Contract A) plus \$42 million and 5.3 million German marks. The German contribution will be arranged by Voith (FRG) and will be devoted to the purchase of turbines; additional expenditures are contemplated in national currency amounting to 450 million kwanzas (approximately \$15 million).

With the first contract already financially settled, steps are being taken to provide financing for Contract B; it is expected that this arrangement will be concluded at least 2 months prior to the completion of Contract A. In carrying out this work, ENE is counting on the support of the Portuguese organizations, EDP and Teixeira Duarte, which have promised guidance, coordination and supervision. These same organizations, together with SORE-FAME (from Angola), are sharing in the construction of the infrastructures and are contributing to the project with structural-metal materiel.

Meanwhile, steps are being taken to pave the Cubal highway which will connect the municipality of Cubal with the dam.

08568

France Awards Gift of 135 Million Francs for Rural Development

Abidjan FRATERNITE MATIN in French
27 April 88 p9

[Text] Two financial agreements amounting to a gift of 2.7 million French francs (135 million CFA) from France to the Congo were signed last Thursday in Brazzaville. Some 100 million francs (2 million FF) are intended for a rural development project in Lekana (Northern Congo) to operate "village centers" and 35 million francs (700 thousand French francs) were given to the Ministry of Planning & Financing for the National Center of Statistics and Economic Studies. The "village centers" foresee an organization of the rural community on the basis of self-managed social and economic activities for the purpose of improving the living conditions of the people while also increasing their productivity.

The French Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC) has provided financial support since 1982 and has participated significantly in their education.

New Medical Laboratory Dedicated

Abidjan FRATERNITE MATIN in French
25 Apr 88 p 5

[Text] Place de la Republic Medical Research Laboratory is the name of the newest Ivory Coast medical facility. A real jewel of modern medical technology, this laboratory which was recently dedicated by the Minister of Industry Bernard Ehui Koutoua will cost about 225 million francs according to pharmacist-biologist Sangare Assana. The new laboratory covering an area of 160 square meters offers its clientele diverse services from serological testing to bacterial analysis, including screening for AIDS. Sangare Assana has every reason to be proud of this achievement. In that regard she confides, "it's a student's dream come true."

Finance Minister Indicates Greater Privatization
34190074a Antananarivo MADAGASCAR MATIN in French 14 Mar 88 pp 1, 6

[Article by Franck Raharison]

[Text] It took a little less than three and a half hours to try to change the look of the Malagasy economy. Indeed, the rather optimistic comments of the minister of finance and economy, Pascal Rakotomavo, last Friday at Ambohitsimeloka, in effect removed the last obstacle on the road to a real new start, the watchword for which is "cohabitation" between the state and the private sector.

This is to be a new start propelled by liberalization and by all our economic capacity and potential, the short term goal of which is an increase in the growth rate. All the ingredients needed to make our economic growth rate increase slightly more than the population growth rate have been put in place and made ready, Finance Minister Rakotomavo seems to be saying. What is now essential is finding the best recipe, the right mixture, so that the result achieved may not turn sour. Let's hope that "cohabitation" will be a success, and not a marriage of convenience that could end in divorce, forcing each party to return home—in other words to the death, the failure, of liberalization.

In any case, Mr Rakotomavo's initiative has certainly exorcised the Malagasy (economic) evil—an evil which might be called monopoly, or even "oligopoly," to quote here the very words used by the minister of finance. One of the high points of this press conference concerned, as a matter of fact, this "new deal," so long awaited by the local private sector.

This is a new situation which concerns the banking sector as well as industry, commerce, and other interests. Leaving aside, obviously, its strategic direction, Mr Rakotomavo did not, to say the least, clearly define the rules of the game for this "new deal," but that doesn't matter—he gets credit for innovating, and hence for showing some life.

Regarding the fourth financial institution, the minister disclosed that it would be majority-owned by the "private" sector. The financial and technical requirements for its creation remain, however, to be found. As regards raising the necessary capital, Mr Rakotomavo more or less advanced the idea that it will consist of launching a "public subscription." The example of France at the time of the recent privatization of its large banks ought to give this country's monetary authorities some ideas. Will this "other" bank become their central focus likewise? According to current speculation, good progress is being made toward creation of this financial institution, which, they say, may well take the spotlight away from the other three (BNI, BFV, BTM) [respectively, National Bank for Industrial Development, another bank not further identified, and National Bank for Rural Development], all of which are in need, in any

event, of fundamental restructuring if they hope to be more competitive. With regard to this we are, in the present circumstances and for what lies ahead, waiting for some sign from them of change in the direction of coming (some day) to a decision. It is high time for the various persons in charge of our banking establishments to stop acting like ordinary bankers and to start being financial partners in the broad sense of the term. Nevertheless, some things have already been accomplished. Mr Rakotomavo indicates that interest rates have come down somewhat. At present, he stated, only unsecured credit is at 23 percent, while on loans for productive purposes subsidized rates of from 15 to 17 percent are applied.

Bank reforms, as well as reform of the whole economy, are needed, because as long as interest rates are higher than profit margins, it is logical that businesses will prefer to pay off their debts rather than to invest.

When all is said and done, economy activity cannot thrive without sustained consumption. In essence, the success of all the reforms thus far announced depends ultimately on the strength of the purchasing power of Malagasy consumers. As to this demand "solvency," widely commented upon since the press conference at Ambohitsimeloka, Mr Rakotomavo limited himself to cautious statements. In this regard he indicated that a reallocation of resources is necessary to maintain growth in production.

In an inflationary climate where the economic panorama is tinted for the moment with the grey colors of austerity, our efforts have got to be based on strengthening purchasing power, and doing that by favoring various possible social improvements. In a real sense, demand policy determines all the rest.

The most dangerous element in the medium term is unemployment. The minister was completely aware of this at Ambohitsimeloka. Beyond the establishment of free trade zone which can fulfill the needs of a good part of those seeking employment in Madagascar, the development of PME/PMI [small and medium enterprises/small and medium industries] through the new Investment Code is also a solution. Mr Rakotomavo indicates that since the promulgation of the Investment Code there have been about 50 agreements involving some 3,000 jobs. The minister added that at present 2 or 3 draft agreements exist that concern creation of large enterprises which could bring 2,000 to 3,000 new jobs into the country.

In this press conference Mr Rakotomavo wanted primarily to sketch out a new economic horizon for the country without glossing over the fact that the road to be traveled will not be an easy one. He is all in favor of clear-sightedness, hard work, and courage—three words that would sit well over the front entrance to his farm at Ambohitsimeloka.

13028/06662

Finance Minister Discusses Economic Liberalization Policy

34190074b Antananarivo MADAGASCAR MATIN in French 12 Mar 88 pp 1, 8

[Article by Franck Raharison]

[Excerpts] "If all our ministers would adopt a practice like this, communications in this country would take a great leap forward and there would certainly be better understanding between those who govern and those who are governed."

Pascal Rakotomavo was a perfect illustration of that general principle yesterday at Ambohitsimeloka in the course of an open-air press conference which lasted more than 3 hours.

The minister of finance and economy, whose department is concerned with a large part of the national welfare, money being the "sinews of war," first spoke about the results of the recent meeting of the Consultative Group of the World Bank in Paris which granted \$700 million to Madagascar for a 3-year period. The minister easily handled this technical exposition given his thorough knowledge of the material.

However, Mr Rakotomavo did not escape a barrage of questions concerning public opinion on a range of economic and financial matters, and indeed in monetary matters as well: the liberalization; the privatization of certain state companies; an eventual O.P.A (Public Offering) from the private sector; the restructuring of the banking system; the fall in purchasing power; the SILI [not further identified]; and free trade zones, etc., etc...sorry there isn't more!

Although some of the questions may have been a little embarrassing, the minister never lost his olympian calm, a fact which did not exclude some lively responses, notably such attention-grabbers as: "Cohabitation between the state and the private sector may well be feasible in such and such an area or in this or that enterprise."

Clearly, this press conference is going to be our staple fare for some time to come. We are presenting here below our first resume and comments on it.

The Consultative Group, liberalization, free trade zones, new financial institutions, failing state enterprises—such were the items on the menu during the "garden party press conference" held yesterday by the minister of finance and economy, Pascal Rakotomavo, at his home in Ambohitsimeloka, for journalists and businessmen of the FIV.MPA.MA [not further identified] and the G.E.M [not further identified].

Those who were expecting revelations as to the names of the state companies to be liquidated or the form which the fourth financial institution would take were somewhat disappointed. However, in the course of this press conference it was possible to get some idea about the (new) current economic policy.

At any rate, without going here into the "epistemological rupture," as one of the participants in the press conference put it, it can be said that economic strategy has taken a path that is more flexible, less tortuous and more intelligible. And in the good sense of the word, we are hopeful.

\$700 Million

Concerning the Consultative Group on Madagascar, what the minister had to say in substance was that it has several virtues capable of providing solutions for the correction and improvement of our economic situation. The goal is to get the attention of our creditors in the "Club of Paris" relative to our public debt. Beyond this, through the \$700 million coming from countries and organizations which participated in This Consultative Group, the state will not be the sole beneficiary, but creative and active citizens who want to found PMI/PMI [small and medium enterprises/small and medium industries] will also benefit.

Certain socio-economic measures were also decided upon in the course of the meeting of the Consultative Group, ranging from protecting mother and child and help for local pharmaceutical plants to the stability of the Malagasy franc, and increases in prices for producers.

The most important item of this press conference was inevitably economic liberalization. At the outset Mr Rakotomavo emphasized that "choice of society" and "economic method" should not be confused, and that there could be liberalization even without a private sector. Replying to the remark of a correspondent who worried about the introduction of a kind of "wild liberalization" in Madagascar, the minister felt obliged to say that a statement like that is just an empty phrase or a slogan without much meaning, and that only reality (economic reality) matters. Aware of the doubtful and negative attitude which liberalization has aroused in some businessmen, the minister asserted that there would be associated provisions, particularly with regard to rice. Relative to this food product, he asked those who denigrate liberalization to compare the price of rice 2 or 3 years ago with the price today.

Since the linkage between liberalization and denationalization is readily and quickly found, Mr Rakotomavo found it necessary to point out that in various areas the state and the private sector can "cohabit" very well; so there is room here for everybody! Does a liberalized economy need to be planned? The minister indicated that that would deserve separate treatment or be even a proper subject for a thesis. For the time being we must

adopt a flexible procedure. Also, regarding the creation of the financial institution under discussion, cohabitation with the private sector is possible too. On the subject of this financial institution, Mr Rakotomavo indicated that the organization plan will be completed before the end of 1988 and that the institution will be able to offer new services to its customers, such as leasing, home mortgages, etc.

On the other hand, the minister was surprised that nobody had had anything to say when the state closed the SNHU (Huilerie de Toliary) [Toliary Oil Refinery], SONACO [National Trading Company] and other state companies, while now people are greatly concerned about the fate of certain companies. He said that the question is not knowing whether this or that state company should be closed down or not; what is important is defining precisely the state's rightful place. There are some sectors where the state must have a monopoly or be present, but there are at times areas where its intervention is not at all necessary.

Concerning free trade zones, Mr Rakotomavo remarked that the reserve noted here and there is not justified. "In a world in which there are 50 free trade zones in some 30 countries, you are not going to tell me that the rights of all the employees who work in them are scoffed at," said the minister. In any event, he added, "we already have a kind of free trade zone through the application of a number of measures supplementing those provided for in the new Investment Code. Be that as it may, he wanted to emphasize that the law in effect on this subject will be enforced.

"Who are the really rich people in Madagascar?"—this rather serious and embarrassing question was put to the minister yesterday. He agreed more or less that some illegal wealth—quickly gained—not to mention tax fraud, undeclared income, etc.

On the whole, the first merit of this meeting with the press is that it could be held at a time when a great change in the economic plan is being laid out. Mr

Rakotomavo succeeded in persuading the press; he still needs to reassure private businessmen who seem distressed by the change the country is undergoing.

Some Statistics That Speak for Themselves: Statistics for 1987

—External debt of Madagascar: 2,400 billion DTS [SDR].

—Debt service: 48.9 percent of exportations after rescheduling.

—Non-traditional exports: increase of 30 percent since devaluation.

—Savings rate: 10.8 percent.

—Coffee: represents 18.3 percent (in volume) of exportations and 30 percent of value.

—Vanilla: 26.5 percent of global export receipts.

—Petroleum products: 7.5 percent of exports—19,078 tons.

Distribution of the \$700 Million (Consultative Group)

—\$165 million: amount gained as result of rescheduling our debts.

—\$434 million: new capital.

—\$106 million.

Tsabo Telo

—Receipts: 750 million Malagasy francs.

—Expenses for production of tickets: 150 million FMG.

—Estimated receipts this year: 1 billion FMG.

13028/06662

President Chissano Addresses OMM on Anniversary Day

34420126a Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
14 Mar 88 p 1

[Text] President Joaquim Chissano defended the need to continue the battle waged for the past 25 years to emancipate women as the only way to transform Mozambican society. The head of state spoke last Saturday at a public rally held in Maputo commemorating the 15th anniversary of the Mozambican Woman's Organization (OMM), which falls on the 16th of this month.

The rally was the culmination of a march involving thousands of participants, mainly women and children, that passed through the main streets of the capital and ended in OMM Square.

Upon arriving at the square, the parade was headed by Secretary-General Salome Moiane and other officials of the organization. A military band enlivened the women's celebration in Maputo with its marches.

The head of state accompanied by his wife, Marcelina Chissano, occupied the seats of honor set up in OMM Square. High national officials and wives of ambassadors serving in our country were also there.

In his impromptu speech, President Joaquim Chissano emphasized the role of women in Mozambique, pointing out that they accounted for 51 percent of our population.

An Inspiration

Recalling critical aspects of the process of liberation and emancipation that emerged during the people's war against Portuguese colonialism, the head of state spoke of the unquestionable importance FRELIMO has always attached to women's participation in the struggle for independence.

Independence was to be the fruit of the efforts and sacrifices of the people, including men and women of all ages.

In referring to the past, he made a point of mentioning the controversy that broke out in FRELIMO over the concept of the fight against colonialism, and more specifically over what the role of the Mozambican woman was to be and how she was to fulfill it in contributing to this struggle.

It was during the armed struggle that FRELIMO created the Women's Detachment, which made it possible for women to participate directly in the armed combat against the colonialist forces.

It was also at this time that women became increasingly involved in various fronts, thus laying the groundwork for the founding of the Mozambican Woman's Organization.

Women fought for independence on equal terms with the men, even sacrificing their own lives, and their participation was made possible by the victories achieved by a just, clear thinking political faction over reactionary, backward forces within FRELIMO.

Two Main Directions

In President Joaquim Chissano's view, it is important, if not essential, that women be involved in the major tasks to be achieved now, just as they were in the past, if the struggle to defend our independence is to be successful in the face of foreign military aggression.

Women must, therefore, participate actively in defending the nation and revitalizing the national economy, the two converging poles of the society we want to build.

Women are a major source of production, which has been demonstrated by their abilities to organize farm work, particularly with the creation of cooperatives, but they must also participate in fighting the armed bandits.

As President Joaquim Chissano explained, waging war is not a task reserved for men alone; if we were to view it that way, it would make the idea of emancipating women seem senseless and empty, and run counter to the traditions of leadership and progress forged by FRELIMO since its inception.

There are countless jobs women can do in defense of their country. Without having to engage enemy forces directly in the battlefield, women can, for instance, provide the administrative, logistic and medical support for our Armed Forces.

This, however, does not in any way imply a narrow role for women in defending the country. If direct confrontation with the enemy forces is required, women should be prepared to engage them in successful combat.

It is, therefore, important for them to participate in the people's militia or vigilante groups to defend their collective farms, factories, schools or villages.

Referring to FRELIMO's traditions, President Joaquim Chissano announced a decision made last year to recruit and include women in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Mozambique.

Still on the matter of defending the nation, President Joaquim Chissano said that women needed to reflect on the following: first, on whether or not they agree that the external aggression and attacks by armed bandits and terrorists constitute a war against all the people; and secondly, on whether they agree that only by waging this war will we be able to put an end to war.

It is important to reflect on these questions because, as President Joaquim Chissano said, people are asking when the war is going to be over. The people's struggle

against the groups of armed bandits and terrorists must be constant and relentless, because the targets of these armed bandits and terrorists are the people themselves.

Participation by All

Another important point had to do with the Mozambican Woman's Organization itself. According to President Chissano, the OMM should be dynamic and aggressive; it should take action to solve the serious problems afflicting society today and get rid of a certain rigid formality that has been introduced into its daily operations.

The organization should be constantly growing and developing, refusing to stagnate. It should comply with the principles and bylaws that define it as a democratic organization of the people that will never become isolated.

The OMM should embrace all women, whether Christian, Muslim or atheist, and whatever their social background. Mozambican women should regard the OMM as a place where they can voice their concerns without fear or prejudices of any kind, and where they can discuss problems and find solutions to current difficulties.

Enhancing the democratic process is therefore critical for the activities of an organization that has deservedly gained an important position in national political life and in building a new society.

But the role of the OMM goes beyond borders. If the struggle being waged by the Mozambican people is increasingly well-known today and if the international community is more aware of the problems caused by apartheid in southern Africa, it is because the OMM has made a decisive contribution to the battle being waged on the diplomatic front, the results of which should never be underrated.

Although not all women are members of the FRELIMO Party or the people's assemblies, women should regard the OMM as their organization which, working together with the OJM [Mozambican Youth Organization], the Labor Organization, or any other democratic organization for the masses or professional groups, plays an important role in performing the major tasks of the day.

9805/9274

Portugal Sends Military Equipment Following Hama Tai's Visit

34420124a Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese
25 Mar 88 p 13

[Text] The visit to Portugal by the chief of the Mozambican Armed Forces, Gen Hama Tai, resulted not only in Portugal's agreement to ship some support materiel to Maputo's Armed Forces (for example, a few dozen Channite vehicles, but only with light machineguns and

not with the 90-mm cannon installed in some which we export to Peru, the Arab Emirates and certain countries of Asia) but also in the Mozambican order to provide its troops with training for irregular and special operations, that is, antiguerrilla warfare, protection of vital bridges and attacks behind enemy lines.

Gen Tai visited various specialized units such as the commando regiment of Lisbon and the Special Operations Center in Lamego and Penude. He was noticeably impressed with the degree of readiness, skill and efficiency of the soldiers in those units. The Mozambican general, who was a "rescue" officer in the Portuguese Army, seemed most interested in the Rangers school. O DIABO has learned that Maputo would like to have a detachment of special operations to give training to Mozambican officers right in the theater of the African war, or, if that is not politically viable, in Lisbon.

The Mozambicans seem to have concluded that the support offered by the Spanish Civil Guard is inadequate and that the special training service furnished by the British has the disadvantage of being unfamiliar with the field conditions (since the campaigns against the Quenia rebels the United Kingdom has had no military experience in Africa).

It is also thought that Hama Tai leads a group of Mozambicans who, unlike the hardliners of the Frelimo party, suspect that military rapprochement with Portugal could turn into a certain "Lusitanization" of many Mozambican officers and soldiers, who do not now have much faith in the solidity of the regime, but are also fearful of anarchy.

Contacts With UNITA

Sources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed us that there have already been informal talks between Portuguese authorities and the leaders of UNITA, including Jonas Savimbi himself. In all the interchanges of opinion, Savimbi was dissuaded from visiting Portugal, at least until this summer, when it is thought that the situation in Angola may be clarified.

Minister Deus Pinheiro himself confirmed, somewhat cryptically, these "unofficial" meetings when he said that Portugal is now speaking "with all the parties" of the Angolan conflict.

13331

Britain Aids Rehabilitation of Cashew Processing Plant

34420124c Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
10 Mar 88 p 3

[Text] The Indocaju cashew processing plant at Sanculo, in the administrative area of Lumbo, on the Island of Mozambique in Nampula, will be rehabilitated during the first quarter of this year with British support.

The engineer-mechanic of the plant, Hert Alan Kumar, said that in the first phase of the rehabilitation project he foresees the installation of a motorized pump in an open pool of the unit and an electrical generator with a Kw/h capacity.

Hert Kumar said that with the installation of the pump and generator, the plant is going to increase its output because the problems of constant electrical energy shut-downs and inadequate water supply will be overcome.

The plant has been inoperative since last 25 December, due to a breakdown that took place in the electrical energy transformer unit. The workers of the Mozambique Electricity Company have already been contacted, but "they still have not solved the problem."

Indocaju has set the goal of 1,500 tons of cashews this year, but the plan will not be fulfilled due to the constant attacks of armed bandits along the access roads of the region, thus preventing the flow of the product.

The 460 works of the plant are undertaking a general cleanup of the installations and maintenance of the machinery.

13331

DPCCN Director Discusses Food Emergency Program in Zambezia

34420126c Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
23 Mar 88 p 8

[Text] Two ships with a total capacity of 80 tons will be operating shortly along the coast of Zambezia Province, transporting food and material aid to the people in Chinde and Pebane districts. These vessels were made available by the World Food Programme (WFP) and by Action-Aid, a British nongovernmental organization, under the Emergency Program.

This information was disclosed by the provincial director of the Natural Disaster Prevention and Control Department, Alvaro Mahumane, who added that the influx of dislocated people, mainly from areas of renewed fighting involving the Mozambican Armed Forces, has further increased the need for food and other support for these people.

Alvaro Mahumane said that food shortages have been aggravated by the lack of rain, since Zambezia Province currently has little food to cope with the situation created by the combined forces of the war and the drought.

Without urgent shipments of food, Zambezia Province, will not have enough food for the more than 751,000 dislocated and needy people to last beyond April.

The number of dislocated people is growing daily, as over 50 persons show up every day in various parts of Zambezia Province.

Current Supplies

The Natural Disaster Prevention and Control Department in Zambezia Province currently has only 2,000 tons of maize, considered skimpy in view of the fact that 5,000 tons of maize are needed every month to supply the dislocated people.

The distribution of goods and equipment in the districts has been irregular as a result of various factors, including the poor condition of the roads and the organization of military columns.

"For the districts around Quelimane, distribution of goods to dislocated persons is of the order of 100 percent," Mahumane said.

The districts of Maganja da Costa and Morrumbala are currently supplied by air using a plane chartered by the Italian Government under the Emergency Program.

Under the same program, the World Food Programme and the British nongovernmental organization Action-Aid are planning to make available to Zambezia Province two ships to bring food and other merchandise to aid the people in Chinde and Pebane districts.

The main problem in Zambezia Province is not a lack of resources but the weak capacity of the various structures to organize support lines to distribute the goods donated. Distribution coverage during the years was only 25 percent.

Seeds were distributed jointly by the DPCCN and the Agriculture Directorate in a project that covered the entire province with the exception of Gurue District.

Clothing Needed

If supplies of factors of production and food are sufficient to cover the dislocated people, the same is not true of clothing, as there is not enough for the number of dislocated people in the province.

Last year some articles of clothing were made from cloth donated by OXFAM. This clothing was only enough for 25,000 families, or about 125,000 people.

This year OXFAM and Action-Aid are going to make joint donations of clothing for 34,000 families. Moreover, the DPCCN has begun to receive ready-made clothing from other countries.

Dislocated To Produce

Since one of the objectives of the Emergency Program is to assist the dislocated people to produce for themselves, 800 tons of various seeds were distributed this crop year.

However, the lack of rain was a major problem for thousands of peasants in some areas.

Meanwhile, in Nicaune and Inhassunge people are beginning to be sent back to their places of origin. This project will be completed by next August.

"We believe that this action will help reduce the centers for dislocated people in the province," our source said.

Zambezia Province has over 190 centers providing shelter for 751,460 people who were dislocated by war and starving.

9805/9274

Implications of Cahora Bassa Rehabilitation Discussed

34420124b Lisbon SEMINARIO in Portuguese
26 Mar 88 p 21

[Text] The negotiations between Mozambique, South Africa and Portugal for rehabilitation of Cahora Bassa may culminate in Lisbon by the end of May, if implementation of the provisions in the Songo communique have been accepted by the three sides by that time. The demise of the "white elephant" would surely be a great relief for the Portuguese Government. But prudence reigns in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Anglo-Portuguese consortium of Lonrho/Entroposto/Somafel, a candidate for distribution of the power supply, will submit its proposals to Johannesburg next month. This consortium is the third entity admitted in the Songo, as a contractor in the relationship between the producer (Hidroelectrica de Cahora Bassa) and the consumer (the South African firm of Eskom).

There are already specific plans to provide security for the energy transport line. A group of antiterrorist warfare experts, some of whom have experience in the struggle against the IRA, will be able to set up the defense system. It is aimed, according to a responsible source, at strengthening the operating capacity of the Mozambican military along the 900 km of the high voltage direct current (HVDC) line that separates the dam from South Africa. About 500 posts on the line were destroyed by Renamo since the signing of the N'Komati accord.

The basic objective is to react quickly to any act of sabotage. The use of helicopters and sophisticated logistical support (probable models are in use in Canada and the United States) is foreseen. It is based on the conviction, expressed by an individual linked to the project,

that "Renamo only will achieve something because the Mozambican Army is profoundly disorganized." The majority of the experts to be contracted are from England.

The HVDC line inside Mozambique (not counting the 500 km from the frontier to the South African Apollo substation) is three times longer than the pipeline that links Beira to Mutare in Zimbabwe. The pipeline has been a priority target of Renamo and was attacked dozens of times in 1987. The fact that the private pipeline company has been able to minimize the damage is encouraging for the current security project for Cahora Bassa.

It is noted that this "internationalization" of security would not be new. Beginning in 1970, the struggle in Mozambique was mostly "the war of the dam." Marcelino dos Santos, then one of the Frelimo triumvirate, stated: "If we do not destroy the dam, the dam will destroy us forever, and white racist Africa will end up winning its gamble." The Portuguese military commands at that time resorted to foreign technicians (as I revealed in "The Americans and Portugal: The Richard Nixon Years). After contacts between Kaulza de Arriaga and Moshe Dayan—the Israeli defense minister—a team of Israeli experts worked on security for the energy transport line.

Rehabilitation of the dam would have substantial implications on the political chess game of southern Africa. The government of Mozambique views the sale of energy to South Africa as a key factor in isolating Renamo. A source who is familiar with official circles in Maputo says: "If Cahora Bassa is reborn, Renamo will die."

The affair will simultaneously be a step forward in the sense of political pragmatism and bring about acknowledgement of the fact that the political model of Frelimo did not bring the Mozambican people to the general happiness that had been claimed for it. Others also see in this the Soviet withdrawal from southern Africa. It is too soon to tell.

The conclusion of the accord on Cahora Bassa would demonstrate the economic complementarity—an inevitable fact—between South Africa and Mozambique. Now, the direction of the government of Joaquim Chissano, the result more of necessity than of ideology, would be contrary to the thesis of the isolation of South Africa sustained by the countries on the front line. Cahora Bassa will thus be able to bring about cleavage in the anti-Botha fraternity, unless Zimbabwe and Zambia were to become tolerant.

The government of South Africa will win a double victory with reactivation of the huge dam. On the political level, it would show that, finally, the hostile regime of Mozambique needs it. This fits into the strategy of creating regional ties of interdependence,

which soften the legitimate aggressiveness against apartheid. At the same time, if Gorbachev promotes his own withdrawal from the area, the ANC will be weakened.

In economic terms, South Africa would profit greatly upon acquiring one of the cheapest energy sources in the world. The owner of Eskom, Ian McRae, recently made clear his effort (in statements to the journal "Inside South Africa") to obtain energy from Cahora Bassa. Why? Besides everything else, because it would be "inexpensive."

And because in the field of energy as well the government of South Africa will have to make a choice soon. Either it makes heavy investments to reinforce its energy production capacity or it accepts relative dependence on Cahora Bassa. The self-sufficiency strategy, made possible by nuclear and coal power plants, does not overcome the fact that millions of South Africans do not have electric energy in their homes.

Thus, Cahora Bassa signifies a savings to the civilian authorities of Pretoria. The 2,075 megawatts that the Zambeze dam can produce represent 8 percent of the overall needs of South Africa (and 12 percent of the total energy of the entire African continent). The dam's generating capacity can be increased up to 3,600 megawatts, with a second power plant (projected for phase 2 of Cahora Bassa).

Resistance inside South Africa to this affair—if it exist—would come from the "fundamentalists" in the Armed Forces: those who believe only in the "Israeli" theory of upcoming chaos and that it is crucial to overwhelm their Marxist neighbors. A Portuguese citizen involved in this rehabilitation says: "The great unknown is not Renamo. It is knowing whether the South African hawks, who already destroyed the N'Komati accord are going to accept this plan." The outlook for weakening of the ANC as a result of the trilateral arrangement will tend to calm down the hawks.

Clearly, Portugal would stop losing the 30 million escudos per day that the dam is costing it. Financing of the rehabilitation project does not include new commitments by the Portuguese Government (to which Hidroelectrica de Cahora Bassa owes 200 billion escudos).

Another conclusion: the English are our rivals in Mozambique today. Will we be able to compete effectively with Margaret Thatcher's laboriously constructed influence on the fearsome "communist" regime of Maputo?

13331

Nampula Province Surpasses 1986-87 Agricultural Production

*34420126b Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
15 Mar 88 p 3*

[Text] Nampula Province surpassed the goals set for the 1986-87 harvest in the farm product marketing campaign, according to what our report was told by the head of the Planning Department of AGRICOM enterprise in Nampula.

Our source pointed out that the target for this marketing campaign was 20,913 tons of various products, and that the actual total was 21,134 tons.

According to our source, some products, such as maize, sorghum, manioc, and peanuts, did not meet their targets, primarily because of the growth of the parallel market. Targets were surpassed for the remaining products, namely rice, beans and sesame.

The source added that the articles used as incentives in the campaign included cloth, soap, sugar, oil, ready-made articles, dried fish, salt and toys. AGRICOM conducted the campaign in coordination with store owners and retailers from the province. Activities were even developed in areas where commercial networks were inoperative; mobile units and permanent stands for marketing the products were organized in various villages throughout the districts.

During the campaign, however, participants encountered various difficulties ranging from an insufficient supply of incentive articles to a shortage of lubricating oil, fuel and spare parts.

For the next marketing campaign the province is planning an overall increase of about 10 percent over the previous one. It is worth mentioning that families are expected to market about 9 percent of the total volume of products.

Our source went on to say that Nampula Province is counting on marketing 30 percent of the country's total volume of farm products this year.

9805/9274

Flooding From Limpopo River Affects 90,000 in Gaza Province

Guija, Limpopo Districts Hardest Hit
*34420125 Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
14 Mar 88 p 3*

[Article by Benjamim Faduco]

[Text] The recent floods that were recorded in the province of Gaza, caused by the rise in the volume of water carried by the Limpopo River, affected in one way or another a population estimated at nearly 90,000

people in the districts of Guija and Limpopo. Included in this number are the families of people who have been displaced by the war. They are being temporarily housed in the Limpopo Valley, and they likewise had their collective farms there. These farms were flooded, and the people who, although they did not have their dwellings in the low-lying areas, saw their crops, which were planted along the banks of the river, destroyed by the force of the flood waters. The floods seriously affected a large part of the crops of the family sector, in a vast area of more than 3,000 hectares, including the districts of Guija and Limpopo, from the Macarretane Dam to the Chiduachine region, close to Xai-Xai.

Our reporters were in the Limpopo region this past week to evaluate close at hand the multiple effects caused by these latest floods.

Initially, we flew over a large part of the Limpopo Valley, from the mouth of the river to Chokwe, passing through Chiduachine, Lionde, Xilembene, Muianga, Chalucuané and Marrembejane, where we were able to verify that a large number of the collective farms of the family sector, mainly those located outside the irrigation system, were covered with water.

In the vast expanse of collective farms lying between the Chiduachine region and the Macarretane Dam, our reporters witnessed the fact that all the dwellings built near the river were inundated, forcing their residents, most of whom are people who have been displaced by the war, to leave for higher ground.

In this immense swath of lands and dwellings on the river's edge, more than 3,000 head of cattle were evacuated to safer areas. Of this total, nearly 1,000 head belong to the cattle growers of the Limpopo district, while 1,840 belong to the people of several areas in the Guija district.

In the general survey of damages, according to data collected from the commission on flooding, the Limpopo district was the one that suffered the greatest impact from the recent floods, while the Guija district suffered more from the destruction of crops. But there were no cases of dwellings being lost as occurred on the right bank of the river.

In neither of these cases was there any loss of human life or of cattle during the recent flooding, as has happened on previous occasions when great floods have been recorded along that river.

Real Dimension of the Floods

A lot of information has already been released regarding the recent floods along the Limpopo Valley in the province of Gaza. And yet, much of this information dealt just with the constant rise and fall in the river's

water volume, but never expressed in any real way the multiple repercussions that are now affecting tens of thousands of people in that region.

Even though the floods may not have claimed any human victims or caused the loss of cattle, such a fact does not mean that there is no serious damage, the indirect influences of which are now being felt in thousands of families that have no source of income other than farming.

In the specific case of the Limpopo district, which is generically known as Chokwe, more than 1,200 hectares of diverse crops were destroyed by the waters. These crops belong to nearly 10,000 families, who had their collective farms in the region of the valley that is now under water.

On first sight, when one speaks of 10,000 families, one thinks of 10,000 people, when in reality this figure represents at least 50,000 people, if we estimate an average of five people per family unit.

In Chokwe, the volume of water in the Limpopo River rose over its banks and flooded more than 4,000 collective farms of the family sector located in the areas of Muianga, Xilembene, Chalucuané, Marrembejane, and even a certain portion of the irrigation system area.

Making this situation even worse is the case of the people who have been displaced by the war, currently estimated at nearly 20,000 people in Chokwe alone.

Just this description gives us the real image of what the latest floods of the Limpopo River have been like. In spite of everything, they have not reached the proportions of the 1981 floods.

The collective farms were inundated by the waters, and, varying according to individual cases, a large portion of the crops there are irretrievably lost. Corn, beans, and sweet potatoes are the main crops that have been destroyed by the floods.

In order for these people to go back to producing crops, they need seeds which have not yet arrived. After planting, a minimum period of 4 months is necessary for the situation to begin to improve. Until then, it is urgent to channel support to them in the way of food, clothing, and medicine.

Concerning the Guija district, the floods have been the cause of the evacuation of 1,200 families, which amounts to a total of 6,425 people, according to data obtained locally by our reporters.

In addition to this number, there are still 6,504 families that have lost their crops. That amounts to a total of more than 32,000 people affected by the recent flooding of the Limpopo River.

Putting together the number of families affected in various ways by the floods, both in the Limpopo and the Guija districts, one easily arrives at the conclusion that nearly 90,000 people at the very least are currently feeling the multiple effects of the floods.

Flooding Without Rains

Contrary to what has happened in other years, in which the floods have always been preceded by intense rains, the latest floods in the Limpopo region were caused by rains that fell in South Africa and in Zimbabwe.

For this reason, the situation created by these floods is particularly serious for the family sector, since it has no food reserves. The districts of Guija and Limpopo, as well as the other regions of Gaza province, have not received regular rainfall for at least the last 5 years.

The families of those who have been displaced by the war are the ones who are the most severely hurt by being uprooted twice, since the great majority of them were surprised just when they were trying to start their lives over again, after having been completely deprived of their possessions by the armed bandits.

These families are once again concentrated in refugee centers, from which they will be dispersed to new settlement areas. Many of those who have been displaced by the war, now affected by a new "displacement" situation, prefer to organize themselves into communal villages rather than return to the valley, only to have their possessions taken away from them later.

Until new lands are distributed to them so that they can start producing again and new plots of land are given to them so that they can start building their dwellings, these families are surviving on the support that is being provided to them by party and state officials in coordination with non-governmental and humanitarian organizations.

In the Limpopo district, the people who have been displaced, both by the recent floods and by the situation of armed banditry, are temporarily being housed in the village of Mandjangue and in the headquarters locality of the Administrative Post of Macarretane. Still others are being housed in the area around the city of Chokwe.

In the Guija district, the families who have been displaced from the Limpopo Valley are dispersed throughout various villages of that district, while the victims of armed banditry are being housed in the "7th of April" village.

Public Health Steps Taken

The recent floods, which affected the Limpopo region in Gaza province, have also brought with them problems of a public health nature. Data collected locally by our reporters indicate that more than 400 cases of various diseases have been treated at the local health units.

The most common diseases have been diarrhea and malaria. It should be pointed out that this latter disease has reached epidemic proportions in the last 2 months.

As the result of coordinated action by health officials, the outbreak of malaria in that region of Gaza province is practically under control. However, aid continues to be necessary in the areas of medical supplies and baby food to combat cases of malnutrition that have been made worse by the recent destruction of the family sector crops, with particularly serious consequences for those who have been displaced by the war.

Life Must Go On

As the waters of the river recede, the people of the Limpopo region are not losing any time in returning to the valley to resume production, taking advantage of the moisture that is now present in the soil.

In all the low-lying areas, where the water has already dried up, the people have begun to prepare the earth, and, in some cases, have plowed and planted in a true struggle for survival for the families that have lost all their crops.

The big problem, which still persists, is the lack of seeds, because, in spite of the fact that local officials have already evaluated the needs, these needs have not as yet been met. The justifications are varied, but they almost always fall back upon the well-known "higher-ups."

In order to recover the 1,200 hectares of corn crop lost in Chokwe, 30 tons of seeds are needed, as they informed us locally.

The late arrival of this seed may jeopardize the production of nearly 1,200 tons of cereals, since the yield per hectare averages one ton in the family sector. Regarding Guija, where 1,840 hectares of diverse crops have been destroyed, it still is not known when the seed will arrive.

In spite of all these problems, the people are not wasting time. They prefer to put the little bit of corn that they have into the ground instead of waiting for the seed to arrive from the "higher-up officials."

Lessons From the Past

The recent floods in the Limpopo region have not reached alarming proportions, much less the level of damages of previous years, particularly those of 1981. The fact that property damage was held to a minimum

and the fact that neither any human lives nor any cattle were lost did not happen by mere chance. It is the result of the two lessons learned in the past.

After the great consecutive floods in 1977 and 1978, the people of the Limpopo region understood that the valley was no place to live, but rather just to have their collective farms. They realized that they should reside in the higher areas. This is the basic reason which led to the fact that this year not a single human life was lost as a direct result of the floods.

The lessons of the past have not been learned just by the people of the riverbank region of the Limpopo, but also by the state officials connected with the agriculture and flood prevention sector. Just as there was no loss of human life in these floods, there were also no agricultural implements or even one motor pump put out of commission by the waters.

There was not one dike destroyed, due to the preventive measures that were taken far enough in advance. All the people were warned in time, and the few who were taken by surprise had chosen to ignore the previously issued warnings.

In spite of the considerable damage caused, especially to the family sector, it is fair to stress the existence of an increasingly clear consciousness, both among the people and among officials, of agriculture when dealing with the question of flooding.

Displaced Persons Forced To Move Anew

34420125 Maputo NOTICIAS in Portuguese
15 Mar 88 p 3

[Text] The people affected by the recent flooding of the Limpopo River in the district of the same name, especially the families of those who have been displaced by the war and were temporarily living along the valley are to be housed in safe areas, namely in the communal village of Mandjangue, near Chokwe, and in the headquarters of the administrative post at Macarretane. In their great majority, these families were evacuated throughout the valley, where they had just begun a new life after having been forced to leave their native villages because of the criminal actions of armed banditry.

Our reporters, who visited the Limpopo region last week, verified that most of the dwellings along the river banks, which were totally inundated, belonged to those people who had been displaced by the war.

Those dwellings, built of flimsy materials, were serving as shelter until those families could reap the first harvest of the crops sown in the valley. Still, that effort was thwarted by the recent floods before it could bear fruit.

On the other hand, included in the total number of families displaced by the recent flooding of the Limpopo River who are going to be resettled in permanent areas, are the other people who have been displaced by the war. Up until now, they have been living in the vicinity of the city of Chokwe.

Data collected locally by our reporters indicate that not all those displaced by the war are going to be resettled in the communal village of Mandjangue, especially those who at this moment are living in the city of Chokwe. This situation can be explained by the fact that some of those people have rejoined their families or are awaiting transportation to other regions of the province where their family members are located.

Official information furnished to our reporters points to nearly 20,000 as being the number of displaced persons currently living, even if only temporarily, in the city of Chokwe. However, this number is variable, since there are always families leaving and other new families arriving in that city.

Solution Is in the Countryside

During the period in which our reporters were in the district of Limpopo and Guija, in Gaza province, it was possible to ascertain that many of the families of the displaced people who are still in the cities of the two districts prefer to be resettled permanently in the countryside. They all really understand that it is in the countryside and not in the cities where the definitive solution to their problems is to be found.

Both in Guija and in Chokwe, our team of reporters verified that there is widespread agreement among the displaced people to be resettled in communal villages, and there to start their lives anew.

Even before being assigned a piece of land on which to build their houses, many families of displaced persons, both from the recent floods of the Limpopo River and from the war situation, are now carving out their collective farms in areas close to the future residential areas.

Concerning the Guija district, the resettling of the people who displaced by the armed banditry situation is practically finished. All the families that are arriving are being housed in the 7th of April communal village, where not only are they building their permanent dwellings, but also land for agricultural production is being distributed to them.

The actions carried out by party and state officials have given rise in the two districts to widespread receptiveness to the relocation program for the displaced peoples in safe, productive areas.

This situation contrasts with what has happened in other regions of the country, especially in the large urban centers, where the displaced people often prefer to remain in the cities, thus exacerbating the multiple problems which those cities face.

Integration Into Education

The process of integrating the displaced people is not limited just to distribution of lands for cultivation and plots of land for the construction of houses. It also includes children of school age. This effort was witnessed by our reporters in the Limpopo district, where the majority of the children whose family members were evacuated from the valley are now integrated into the primary school in the communal village of Mandjangué.

In that rural community, our reporters verified that many children who, under other conditions, might have missed too many classes and, consequently, would have lost the school year, are now studying along with the other children of that village.

While the children are in school, their parents are preparing the land for planting. Life is beginning to take on a normal rhythm, even though the shortages which those families still face weigh heavily upon them.

Support from both party and state officials, coordinated with non-governmental and humanitarian organizations, continues to arrive at the refugee centers for displaced persons. Aware that the support, no matter how great it may be, does not constitute a solution, the displaced people have not sat around with their arms crossed. Taking advantage of the moisture left in the earth by the floods, all the families prefer to put what little corn or beans they can get their hands on into the ground.

Seed Is Priority

On the other hand, the urgent arrival of seeds constitutes the top priority at this moment in terms of support for the displaced people, whether they have been displaced by the war or are from the flooded valley. Our reporters

found out locally that the total amount of seeds needed to recover the lost crops in Chokwe do not surpass 30 tons. This is in reference to seed corn.

Considering the fact that a supply of 30 tons of seed corn can produce 1,200 tons, as the specialists in the field assured us, it is easy to appreciate how urgent is the need to deliver this seed to these destitute people.

This urgency is even greater if we take into account the fact that the planting of corn must be done this month, up until the beginning of next month. If this schedule is not observed, it will be much more difficult to supply the people with finished products than with the seeds that they need now.

The people are determined to open up new collective farms, and they are doing it, because they know the scourge of hunger through personal experience. It is important to support their determination so that, instead of remaining in expectation of donations and other forms of humanitarian aid, it will be the people themselves who will solve the problem by producing the food that they need.

In all the villages that we visited in the districts of Limpopo and Guija, the determination caused by the recent floods and by armed banditry is widely known. No one is waiting around for instructions. Everyone is working because everyone knows the real worth of that work.

In their great majority, the people displaced by the war who are now being housed in various areas of the Limpopo district come from the districts of Magude and Combomune, among other regions, while the displaced people resettled in Guija were forced to leave their native villages in Nalaze and other regions of Upper Changane. The present moment requires arduous work in order for us to face the difficulties that now confront us. This is evident in the Limpopo region. Urgent support is necessary so that this determined effort will not become disheartened and turn into disillusionment.

9895

SWAPO-D Describes Kalangula as 'Treacherous Politician'

34000613b Windhoek THE WINDHOEK
ADVERTISER in English 15 Apr 88 p 1

[Text] In a press release Swapo-D describes the Rev Peter Kalangula of the Owambo "apartheid administration" as a "tortuous and treacherous politician who is hell-bent to perpetuate and promote South Africa's ethnicization of our country through a combination of false pretenses and tricks".

As examples Swapo-D cites Rev Kalangula's support of Proc AG 8 and his visit to the hospital wards after the Oshakati bomb blast together with the AG, Mr Louis Pienaar, "and this in spite of the fact that the CDA had earlier alleged that the bomb blast was the responsibility of the SADF".

Swapo-D also said it had been widely expected that Rev Kalangula would raise the following issues during his meeting with President Botha: his insistence on the implementation of UN Res 435, the immediate withdrawal of SA forces from Owambo as well as his rejection of ethnic elections in Namibia.

However, none of these issues were broached. Instead, Mr Kalangula opted to seek drought relief aid for the people of Owambo.

"As a friendly gesture, PW Bo'tha promised to send maize meal directly to his henchman, Peter Kalangula," the statement went on to say.

/9274

Reaction to Botha's Expansion of Power for Pienaar

Attempt To Diffuse Anger

34000596 Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English
15 Apr 88 p 6

[Article by Gwen Lister: "Botha Clamps Down and Reads the Riot Act While Louis Pienaar Steps Into the Breach to Appease the Anger"]

[Text] A hasty move of appeasement by the Administrator General, Mr Louis Pienaar, last Friday night, probably served to defuse a possible conflict situation between the interim government and the south African Government following strong pronouncements by Mr P.W. Botha, the South African State President, when on a fleeting visit to Windhoek last week.

It was a somewhat sullen and temporarily quieted interim government Cabinet that received the news, last Friday, that the South African State President intended to amend Proclamation R101 (the interim government's empowering Proclamation) in order to give increased powers to the Administrator General.

Mr Botha, whose high-powered delegation included the SA Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Pik Botha, as well as Dr Gerrit Viljoen, Mr Barend du Plessis, and Mr Louis Pienaar, (interestingly enough, General Willie Meyer, head of what is referred to as the "independent" SWATF, was part of the South African delegation) issued a press release after the morning's talks which raised eyebrows all round. In the course of Friday morning he had met with the interim government and certain second tier leaders, and after these discussions he dropped the bombshell which was immediately seen as a snub to the interim government, and a warning of bannings to come against certain political organisations and a section of the media.

Mr Botha and his entourage flew into Windhoek on Thursday evening, where they were greeted at Eros Airport by a crowd of pro-South African demonstrators, holding placards which condemned Swapo.

There was some consternation among members of the interim government when it was learned that on Thursday night, Mr Botha and his delegation had dinner at the home of the Administrator General in SWA House with four 'white' political leaders, namely, Mr Dirk Mudge of the DTA, Mr Jannie de Wet and Mr Kosie Pretorius of the National Party, and Mr Eben van Zijl of Aksie Nasionale Skikking (ANS).

Friday morning saw various meetings between the South African delegation and interim government as well as ethnic leaders. Mr Justus Garoeb, Chairman of the Damara Administration, had stated that he was not prepared to meet with Mr Botha; but Mr Peter Kalangula, Chairman of the Ovambo Administration did so.

Mr Kalangula said after the meeting (in which he had also had a private audience with the State President) that Mr Botha had given assurances of drought aid for the far north. He had also informed Mr Botha of the numerous atrocities by South African security forces in the north, and had once again reiterated his call for withdrawal. Mr Kalangula said Mr Botha had promised to send a top-level delegation to the far north to investigate the atrocities, and this delegation would consist of the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, as well as the Chief of the Army, general Jannie Geldenhuys. Mr Kalangula also said when he called for an SADF withdrawal, that the Administrator General had said that if the SADF withdrew from the far north, then they would "bomb Oshakati as they had bombed Lubanpo".

After discussions with the various interim government and ethnic leaders, Mr Botha held a news conference. Flanked by his delegation, he announced more powers to the Administrator General in order that he be enabled to make "a greater contribution to the constitutional process".

In the future, Mr Botha said, the approval of the Administrator General would be necessary for the disbanding of existing ethnic authorities or a curbing of their powers; the Administrator General and the cabinet would be empowered to send decisions of the SWA Supreme Court regarding queries concerning Proclamation R101 and its applicability to the Bill of Rights, to the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein; that the Administrator General would be given more power to disband an ethnic government at its request with a view to elections; and finally the AG would be empowered to "take steps" against the media in Namibia which, according to Mr Botha, promoted "subversion and terrorism".

Little was said on the question of the implementation of UN Resolution 435; except that according to Mr Botha's words, the SA Government has raised another obstacle to prevent implementation. Not only an agreement on a Cuban withdrawal from Angola would be a prerequisite for the implementation of the settlement plan, but Mr Botha has called upon the United Nations to demonstrate its impartiality before the Plan can be implemented.

Mr Botha also emphasised that there should be effective action against organisations which used violence for the promotion of political ends. He emphasised the necessity for the interim government to further broaden its base, and said that while the SA Government did not want to prescribe to the interim government on constitutional matters or force ethnic elections, that it nevertheless had a say in the future of this country.

There was little initial reaction from the interim government, but the Cabinet met on Tuesday of this week to formulate replies to Mr Botha's statement (see separate story on this page).

Shortly after Mr Botha had spoken on Friday, the Administrator General, Mr Louis Pienaar, quickly reacted in an apparent attempt to defuse the situation. In what appeared to be a policy of appeasement, he assured the interim government that Mr Botha's statements were merely advisory, and that nothing would be finalised and no amendments to R101 promulgated, until such time as more discussions had been held with the interim government.

In the light of this, widespread talk of Cabinet members resigning in protest at South Africa's interference, came to nothing.

Two Parties Back Clampdown

34000596 Windhoek *THE NAMIBIAN* in English
15 Apr 88 p 7

[Article: "Nats and Rehoboth Group Agree with Botha Clampdown"]

[Text] The White National Party and the Rehoboth Liberated Democrats appear to agree wholeheartedly with the proposals last week of the South African State President, Mr P.W. Botha.

In a statement separate from the rest of the interim government Cabinet, the two parties said in a brief statement that in order to ensure the constitutional process took place in an atmosphere of peace, law and order and economic prosperity and eventually be nationally acceptable it was necessary that:

- the greatest possible support of all inhabitants be obtained; and

- political parties participating in the process must register and abjure violence as a method to promote political aims".

Mr Hans Diergaardt was absent from the press conference where Mr Jannie de Wet presented the viewpoint of the two parties.

He said both parties had presented the State President with their viewpoint on his three questions; namely, those concerning the broadening of the base of the interim government; the question of elections and finally, the issue of so-called minority rights.

While the two parties felt that the emphasis should be placed on the Bill of Rights in drawing up an alternative constitutional dispensation, Mr de Wet said there was some controversy about article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The National Party and Liberated Democrats felt that provision should be made for group rights as well as individual rights, and felt that the Bill of Rights should make provision for security legislation, as it did at present.

Referring to the question of more power to Mr Pienaar, he said that both parties accepted that in the interim period, the SA Government wanted to retain a say, and would have a final say in a constitution for the territory.

The two parties felt that the SA Government, the interim government and the second tiers were important components in the negotiating process.

Banning Swapo would be counter-productive, said Mr de Wet in answer to a question. Asked if a system of registration of political parties which would be asked to condemn violence, was not a way of banning Swapo, Mr de Wet said if they refused to abjure violence then they would "ban themselves".

Cabinet Appeased, To Continue

34000596 Windhoek *THE NAMIBIAN* in English
15 Apr 88 p 6

[Article: "Despite 'Red-Alert' the Cabinet is Appeased and Will Continue its Work"]

[Text] The interim government Cabinet will not resign, and are seeking further clarifications from the South African Government following the statement by State President P.W. Botha last week, in which he announced

additional powers to the Administrator General, and in which he recommended action be taken against organisations and the media, which, in his words, promoted subversion and terrorism in Namibia.

While the 'red-alert' was sounded that several members of the interim government could resign following Mr Botha's strongly-worded statement last Friday, the Administrator General quickly stepped into the breach, assuring the Cabinet that Mr Botha had only made 'proposals' which would not be finalised until further discussions with the Cabinet had been held.

The Cabinet met until late on Tuesday night, and again on Wednesday morning, and six of the eight-member Cabinet issued a statement at midday of Wednesday in which it said it had authorised Mr Dirk Mudge to express concern about the implications of Mr Botha's statement against the background of the "clear position of the Cabinet with regard to self-determination, national reconciliation, and the protection of fundamental rights".

The statement, representing the position of the DTA, Swanu-MPC, Swapo-D, and the Labour Party, said that a "unilateral amendment of Proclamation R101...is just as wrong as would be the amendment of other proclamations without consultation".

The four parties said Mr Louis Pienaar had shown understanding for their stance, and they emphasised that the amendments to R101 may not be necessary after all.

They said that Mr Pienaar had said his government was not "married" to AG8 and neither would it merely impose ethnic elections.

The Administrator General had also attended the Cabinet meeting this week, and gave further assurances that further consultation would precede any further action. The Cabinet added that some of the proposals of Mr Botha were in conflict with the Bill of Rights. It concluded by saying it would be "continuing with the execution of its task".

The Cabinet, in its statement, seems to have compromised and has glossed over some of the burning issues which were raised by Mr Botha: they include the question of action against parties and sections of the media which are accused of promoting subversion and terrorism.

Editorial Deplores Press Threat

34000596 *Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English*
15 Apr 88 p 1

[Text] At the conclusion of his short visit to Windhoek last week, the South African State President, P.W. Botha, announced that more powers would be given to his chief representative in Namibia, the Administrator General,

to clamp down on the press. (He also announced increased powers would be transferred to the Administrator General to bolster rickety apartheid structures in Namibia).

Mr Botha's regime has recently been active press-bullying at home. The apartheid regime recently closed down the New Nation and similar moves are threatened against South—both newspapers committed to presenting the reality of the South African situation and representing a voice to the voiceless majority in that troubled country. We deplore the totalitarian steps by the apartheid regime against the SA press.

We deplore in equally strong terms any move to export South African press-bashing to Namibia. As it is, there are numerous harsh and draconian laws limiting press coverage of security force activities and we strongly oppose any further press restrictions in Namibia.

This newspaper will not be deterred in its report of the truth and realities in Namibia.

We shall continue to report security force atrocities in northern Namibia. We are aware that the security forces are showing increasing unease with the reporting of their human rights violations in the far north. This will not stop us from reporting the harsh realities of life for those living in northern Namibia. If the security forces are uncomfortable with our reports of their atrocities, then the answer is straightforward and indeed simple: they can and should stop such actions at once. Then there would be no atrocities to report. Better still, they would end their occupation of Namibia as a forerunner for the implementation of UN Resolution 435.

In any event we would have expected the security forces to welcome reports exposing atrocities and other unlawful or ham-handed conduct by their members so that steps could be taken to discipline the culprits and future misconduct prevented. This should be the security forces' approach if they were sincere about not tolerating atrocities by their members. Recent events however, place a serious question mark over this professed 'sincerity'.

Columnist Scores Interim Government

34000596 *Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English*
15 Apr 88 p 14

[Article by Gwen Lister: "Political Perspective"]

[Text] So the South African State President has come and gone, leaving his mark on Namibian soil—chaos and confusion in the ranks of the interim government who don't fully realise they've been properly snubbed, and once again did not respond in the manner they had threatened; another setback for the United Nations settlement plan with another objection uttered by Mr

Botha; and a virtual reversion to rule by a one-man government who is to be given more extensive powers to take so-called subversive organisations and media to task.

Mr P.W. Botha and his entourage flew into Windhoek, and flew out again the next day after "all-white talks" with the Administrator General, and a strange alliance of Messrs Jannie de Wet, Dirk Mudge, Kosie Pretorius and Eben van Zijl; a lecture to the interim government Cabinet; and apparently somewhat more sympathetic talks with the so-called ethnic leaders who met with the South African delegation.

Shortly before his departure, Mr Botha deemed it appropriate and fit to also make threatened noises towards organisations and sections of the media which he accused of promoting "subversion and terrorism". He also deemed it fit to cloak Mr Louis Pienaar with more powers; once again rebuke the interim government for not having 'broadened its base'; and finally, gave Namibians the news that judgements of the Supreme Court concerning Proclamation R101's applicability to the Bill of Rights, be referred to the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein. (This latter news is quite chilling, and hopefully an own Appeal Court will be established in Namibia in the near future. The interim government Cabinet itself places value in the recent advisory opinion of the Supreme Court concerning Proclamation AG8—an advisory opinion which could well be overturned if referred to the Bloemfontein Appeal Court).

Now the interim government was quite incensed by Mr Botha's promise of more power to Mr Pienaar, and there were rumblings that certain Cabinet members may resign in protest. After all their claims, both here and abroad, of 'independence' and 'autonomy', they were made to look like fools by Mr Botha. We thought that some of them had realised it at the time, and would take the appropriate steps to retrieve what remains of their own credibility.

But the Administrator General quickly interceded, assuring them that before additional powers were promulgated, they would be consulted. This appears to have placated the majority of the Cabinet. The National Party and Rehoboth Liberated Democrats, totally agree with Mr Botha's threats: because of a fear that a banning of the Swapo movement would be 'counterproductive' (in the words of Mr Jannie de Wet) they are instead proposed that Swapo ban itself. By introducing a system of registration of political parties, which must condemn the use of violence for political ends, they will force movements such as Swapo to ban themselves. This will be much easier for the interim government to justify, than an outright ban of the movement.

The more 'liberal' members of the Cabinet—including Messrs Andrew Matjila, Fanuel Kozonguizi, Moses Katjiuongua, Andreas Shipanga and Reggie Diergaardt—were said to be somewhat annoyed by Mr Botha's threats, and wanted to take action accordingly. However,

reports have it that Dirk Mudge said he was not prepared to withdraw the DTA from the government—but then perhaps he received certain assurances from Mr Botha at the "all-white" dinner at SWA House on Thursday night. Now the whole matter has been smoothed over by Mr Pienaar's policy of appeasement and promising "further discussions".

In addition, Mr Botha has now raised another obstacle in the path of Resolution 435: where once the SA Government said the question of the Cuban presence in Angola remained the only obstacle to implementation of the UN Plan, Mr Botha has now added another: the United Nations must indicate its impartiality as well! It is most certainly a case of one step forward and about ten back as far as the self-determination and independence of Namibians is concerned.

Now Mr Botha, who says SA retains a say in Namibia until independence, also claims a veto right over any future constitution (or replacement for AG8) which may be drawn up by the interim government. Why? Because he wants to make damn sure that group rights, minority rights or whatever, are adequately ensured in order to protect "white" interests in Namibia. And on the constitutional front, the interim government only have themselves to blame: after all, they were the ones who wanted to write a constitution before all, they were the ones who wanted to write a constitution before independence (in contradiction to Resolution 435 which provides for the drawing up of a constitution by elected representatives). And in so doing they themselves gave Mr Botha the veto right.

The National Party and Liberated Democrats are, of course, happy that this is the case: in the final analysis, Mr Botha will never allow "white rights" to be sacrificed.

Once again, the interim government have allowed themselves to be dictated to in no uncertain terms by Mr Botha. Once again they have missed the opportunity to regain some form of credibility by coming out in strong opposition to the SA State President. Once again they have failed to stand up for instances in Namibia who face the Botha Boot.

/12223

SWATF Says PLAN Will Concentrate on Car Bombs

34000591c Windhoek *THE NAMIBIAN* in English
15 Apr 88 p 15

[Article: "SWATF Says Plan Will Make Use of Car Bombs"]

[Text] In the first quarter of 1988, traditionally the time for Swapo's rainy season infiltration of Namibian, the SWATF announced that apart from what they referred to as "cowardly" stand-off bombardments, Swapo insurgents had avoided contacts with security forces as much as possible.

In a statement this week the SWATF said that the main reasons for the claimed avoiding of contacts with security forces on the part of Swapo insurgents, was that they feared losing more fighters in contacts with security forces; the incapability on the part of the insurgents to reactivate low-lying areas in the far north; and the unfavourable weather conditions particularly in the central areas of the far north.

The SWATF said that Swapo's military wing would try for the rest of the year to "regain its credibility" as far as the military factor was concerned. In this process, the SWATF claimed, PLAN would concentrate on car bombs, especially in areas where there were many people, the laying of land-mines on all roads in the far north especially in areas where they did not enjoy the support of the population; intimidation with the emphasis on abductions, murders and attacks on traditional leaders in the north; and sabotage of the infrastructure, with the emphasis on targets in the vicinity of Windhoek and Swakopmund.

From January 1, 1988 to March 31, 1988, the SWATF claimed the following PLAN actions: 25 cases of sabotage; eight landmines incidents (21 landmines were defused and most of them had been pointed out to security forces by the civilian population, the SWATF claimed); they also claimed PLAN had murdered three civilians and attempted to murder another six in this period; they also claimed that PLAN had tried to 'abduct' school-children on various occasions.

The SWATF also claimed to have captured weaponry of PLAN, which included 69 AK-47s, 18 RPG-75 rocket launchers, and 9 RPG-7 rocket launchers, and 9 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 50 handgrenades and 169,98 kg of TNT explosives, and 26 kg plastic explosives.

The SWATF claimed they had shot dead 64 insurgents in March, bringing to 153, the total number shot since the start of the year.

The statement concluded by saying that Rifleman S.N. Haindula, 22, of the SWATF had died in a contact with Swapo insurgents on March 25.

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Cabinet Said To Use Tax Money Illegally for Propaganda

34000613a Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English
27 Apr 88 p 7

[Article by Dominique Gilbert]

[Text] Papers filed in the Windhoek Supreme Court claim the interim government's Cabinet and others, including the SWA Broadcasting Corporation, illegally use taxpayer's money from the Central Revenue Fund (CRF) for propaganda purposes.

The action is being brought by the Namibian Council of Churches, the Christian Democratic Action Party, the Damara Council, the Namibia Peace Plan Study and Contact Group (NPP 435) and Swapo member Joshua Heebab.

The claim in papers filed in February that they, as well as all parties and persons not participating in the interim government, have been prejudiced by the propaganda. They are seeking an interim interdict restraining the defendants from spending money from the CRF.

They point out that the Cabinet is an appointive and unelected authority constituted in terms of Proclamation R101, "which enjoys no recognition by a member-state of the international community other than SA and is without status in international law."

The Declaration of Rights as set out in R101, and their rights as taxpayers, form the basis of the application.

The SWABC is allocated funds annually by the Cabinet from the budget. These are withdrawn from the CRF and spent in conflict with provisions, in terms of the Declaration of Rights, of R101, they claim.

The applicants claim the SWABC fails to broadcast lawful statements by spokesmen of majority parties in representative authorities on fundamental issues such as the war and its peaceful resolution, the implementation of UN Resolution 435 and the rejection of the presence of the Defence Force in areas such as Owambo.

Others whom the application claims have acquired money illegally from the CRF in breach of R101 are:

- Transcontinental Consultancy which, the papers claim, has "from time to time" received funds from the Cabinet in breach of the Proclamation. The consultancy's MD is Sean Cleary, a former Foreign Affairs appointed adviser to the Administrator-General of the territory.
- Die Republikein Drukkery, which allegedly prints propaganda on behalf of the Cabinet and is paid from the CRF.

The papers claim the Cabinet publishes magazines and a large number of pamphlets which it distributes locally and overseas free of charge, with all costs defrayed from the CRF.

The defendants have reserved their plea pending further particulars from the plaintiffs. This is due to be filed with the court within the next month.

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Spanish Purchase of Uranium Allegedly Violates UN Decree

34000613c Windhoek *THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER* in English 11 Apr 88 p 3

[Text] Madrid: A Spanish state-owned company has been purchasing uranium mined in Namibia, violating a 1974 United Nations Security Council recommendation against the mining or sale of the Territory's natural resources, a Madrid newspaper reported at the weekend.

The leading daily EL PAIS, citing a report obtained from Swapo, said the state-owned National Uranium Co. (Enusa) had signed a contract in 1983 to purchase 3,275 tons of Namibian uranium ore through 1991 from companies authorised by South Africa to mine in the Territory.

The paper said the Swapo report cited confidential information supplied to the nuclear power industry by the US-based Nuexco Uranium brokerage firm.

The Swapo report accused Spain of violating a 1974 UN decree recommending against the "exploration, extraction, processing, refining, use sale, exportation or distribution" of any of the Territory's natural resources.

Foreign Ministers Francisco Fernandez Ordonez told Spanish National Radio on Friday the government and his ministry opposed any violation of the UN bans involving Namibia and of UN and European Economic Community economic sanctions against South Africa for its policy of racial segregation.

The Swapo report, according to the paper, also accuses Spain of processing Namibian uranium, a step necessary to prepare it for use in nuclear power plants.

EL PAIS said Enusa President Jose Manuel Jimenez Arana said Enusa had bought Namibian uranium since 1983 and uranium mined in South Africa since 1975.

The paper said he said the Spanish government had authorised the purchases from South Africa.

The paper said Jimenez Arana said he himself had negotiated reductions in annual purchases of Namibian uranium.

A spokesman for Enusa who agreed to speak about the matter on condition of anonymity, denied the company had violated the 1974 UN ruling against purchase of Namibian natural resources or any EEC sanctions against South Africa.

He said the original Enusa contract for the purchase of Namibian uranium had been signed in 1974, not 1983, as EL PAIS reported.

A Foreign Ministry statement confirmed the Company's contract to purchase Namibian uranium had been signed in 1974 and said it signed a contract to buy South African uranium in 1976.

The Ministry said Enusa's contract for Namibian uranium ore was to expire in 1989 and its contract for South African uranium ore in 1990.

it said neither contract would be renewed.

The Enusa spokesman added that a 1986 EEC decision to halt further purchases from South Africa included a provision to permit EEC-nation firms with current contracts to meet their obligations.

He declined to identify with which company Enusa had signed the uranium contract.

But EL PAIS cited the Swapo report as saying it was with the London-based company Minserve, a subsidiary of the British firm Rio Tinto Zinc, which in turn owns 40 percent of the Spanish firm, Rio Tinto Minera.

Rossing Uranium Ltd in Namibia does not divulge the identity of its buyers.

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New Labour Party Leader Interviewed on Policy Changes

34000591a Windhoek *THE NAMIBIAN* in English 25 Mar 88 p 3

[Interview with Mr Reggie Diergaardt by Da'oud Vries]

[Text] There've been a number of changes in the leadership of the predominantly-Coloured Labour Party in Namibia. The Party, which is a member of the present interim government, is understood to be making some changes—changes which may affect the attitude of the overwhelmingly conservative Coloured community in this country. In an interview with the leader of the Labour Party and the Chairman of the Coloured Legislative Assembly, Mr Reggie Diergaardt, Da'oud Vries of *The Namibian* posed a number of candid questions. The interview is reproduced here today:

Vries: With new leadership in the Party and you as the Chairman of the Administration, what kind of policy changes can be expected, and how will these changes, if any, affect the Coloured community?

Diergaardt: It should be understood that I am not in a position to make policy changes, I can only do it with the co-operation of the Labour Party Executive. But I intend proposing certain changes should be made.

There have been a few important party policies which the previous leader (Mr Billy Phillips) ignored, in that he did not exploit them to the maximum, such as ethnicity.

The party rejects it in principle and in its totality. Ethnicity only provides a structure/platform for minority rights to be protected. We believe that the smallest minority is the individual and we should rather protect his/her rights. In this regard we will throw our weight behind the Bill of Fundamental Human Rights.

On the question of our constituency, we think that there will be a bit of uncertainty and confusion among the people. We will have to take them through an educational process. They should be made to understand that they belong to one Namibian nation.

Although we recognise the existence of ethnic groups in our country, emphasis should not be placed on differences. We should rather exploit the common things amongst the different ethnic groups so as to build a nation.

It was because of the slackness of the previous leader that the Party did not focus on this.

Vries: Is the Labour Party part of the DTA or any other alliance?

Diergaardt: We are not part of DTA and will not become part of it in the future; neither will we become part of any alliance in which we would lose our identity as a Party. In other words we will not sacrifice our identity.

Vries: It has come to light that your Party has been involved in discussions with Mr Bryan O'Linn. Can you say what these discussions were all about?

Diergaardt: We invited Mr O'Linn to address a seminar of the Party Executive on Resolution 435 last weekend. We invited him because we think he is an expert on the subject. This seminar was convened to inform and update the leadership on 435.

Vries: Did you come up with any plan of action at your Congress and have you taken any decision concerning your (continued) involvement in the transitional government?

Diergaardt: The Labour Party will remain part of the constitutional process in Namibia. We see the interim government as a vehicle we can use to speed up the process of independence. At the same time we think that the transitional period should be as short as possible, because we want to see an end to the bloodshed in our country.

However we do not see the interim government as the final institution. We will not be part of any sort of UDI and that is why we are still part of the present government because we do not see it as an UDI.

Vries: What is your party's stance on the question of military conscription?

Diergaardt: We have already abolished the cadet system, last August, at schools under our jurisdiction. Our position is that students could take part in cadets after school hours, with the consent of their parents.

Vries: In view of the fact that you condemn the cadets system, what is your opinion on the 'confidential' letter from Sector 60, concerning cadet training, sent to some of your schools?

Diergaardt: We regard the tactics used by Sector 60 as unprofessional and unethical because we have already told them that we are not interested in their kind of blikssoldate.

In the past our schools were using army tents whenever the schools had functions. But since the beginning of this year the army has refused to give tents. I believe they are doing this (in retaliation) because we refuse to be part of their cadet system. We won't let them intimidate us, we will improvise.

Vries: The Labour Party has been part of the interim government since its inception. Would you say that the government has achieved anything in the past and what would you say are the specific problems it is faced with now?

Diergaardt: It is very difficult for the government to make any headway with the National party in its ranks. The National Party is not in any way concerned with the independence of this country; it is only there to safeguard so-called minority rights. The National party, with the help of South African government, is only there to delay the independence process.

Vries: What do you think will emanate from the proposed visit of the South African President, Mr P.W. Botha, on April 8?

Diergaardt: I think he is only coming to tell the interim government not to accept or reach any decision which does not allow for the protection of minority rights.

Vries: Would you say that the 'Constitutional Council', which last year completed its work, did a good job?

Diergaardt: I personally think it did good work in the sense that there was a possibility of getting international support for the draft.

Vries: What is your view on Proclamation AG8 (which provides for a system of ethnic governments)?

Diergaardt: My view is that the legislation is totally unacceptable to the people of this country. The legislation in no way satisfies the aspirations of the masses. It has only made the rich richer. AG8 has been introduced to promote apartheid and separatism. We cannot afford for the population to be divided along ethnic lines.

We believe in a democratic society with a strong central government which makes provision for regional councils based on geographic location and not demographic (based on ethnic notions) areas.

We took a resolution at the Congress (last weekend) that AG8 should be abolished. We already took this decision in 1985 and since then we have been reaffirming it.

Vries: The 'Coloured' community is known for its political apathy (or conservatism). Does the Labour Party recognise this and what do you intend doing in this regard?

Diergaardt: I acknowledge the fact that there is a lack of political interest from this section of the community. We are going to mobilise them into realising that they are the masters of their destiny and that they should be involved in the independence process because their future is at stake.

Vries: In your acceptance speech, you earmarked education as a problem area which needs special attention. What do you intend doing to overcome the problems in this area?

Diergaardt: Basically our schools have been open to all races in the past and will continue to be so in the future. We see education as the backbone of any society. Furthermore, we uphold that there should be one non-racial education department for all people in Namibia.

It must be understood that we have problems with facilities, for example sport, classrooms, school halls etc. We will have to fight for funds to create these facilities. I do not want to make empty promises, seeing we have no funds presently.

In the previous session of our Legislative Assembly, I made a plea for alternative education. The content of the present history textbooks is totally irrelevant to our children. I do not think that Jan van Riebeeck and Dirkie Uys should be the heroes of our people as portrayed. Our children should rather be taught about our own (Namibian) historical figures.

While I foresee English to be the sole medium of instruction in the future, it should be approached in a responsible way. For example, we must see to it that we have well equipped personnel to do the job, otherwise it's going to be mere window-dressing.

My Administration is presently busy investigating the possibility of introducing dual medium of instruction at our schools.

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Editorial Calls for Departure of Administrator General

34000591b Windhoek THE NAMIBIAN in English
15 Apr 88 p 15

[Editorial: "Pienaar Must Go"]

[Text] The Administrator General Mr Louis Pienaar's recent remarks in Caprivi are both deplorable and grossly inappropriate. (Readers will recall that Mr Pienaar saw fit to criticise a full bench of the Namibian Supreme Court, comprising five judges, which had given a unanimous advisory opinion that AG8 is in conflict with the Bill of Fundamental Rights. He also declared himself in support of ethnic structures).

We find it both deplorable and inappropriate for the Administrator General to criticise the Supreme Court Bench. Not only do his comments constitute an insult to the Bench, but amount to an attempted interference of the judicial branch by the executive—particularly in view of the fact that legislation is proposed to take the opinion on appeal.

Not even his masters in the South African Cabinet publicly pass comment upon Supreme Court judgments. It is simply inappropriate. Yet Mr Pienaar saw fit to do so. In any event, Mr Pienaar's criticism on legal ground should be seen in context—he is a junior counsel criticising five judges, some of many years standing, all of whom were senior counsel prior to being appointed as judges.

Mr Pienaar's deplorable remarks can be seen as a desperate bid to keep apartheid and discrimination alive in Namibia. AG8 is, in our view, nothing more than a revised form of the evil and unjust system of apartheid. It was imposed on the Namibian people.

It has become increasingly obvious that the overwhelming majority of Namibians are uncompromisingly opposed to AG8. The opposition covers a discernibly wide cross section of the population.

Yet Mr Pienaar, in typical colonial fashion, against the will of the Namibian people, seeks the retention of apartheid in Namibia.

The proposal by President Botha to give Mr Pienaar more powers to service and oil the dogs of apartheid in Namibia is in response to Mr Pienaar's desperation to retain apartheid in Namibia.

The apartheid-minded Mr Pienaar should go back to South Africa now.

/12223

Okongwu Sees Signs of Economic Stagnation in 1988

34000601b Lagos *THIS WEEK* in English
11 Apr 88 p 26

[Article by Sheikh Abutiate]

[Text] At the January 4 breakdown of this year's budget by Finance and Economic Development Minister, Chu Okongwu, Professor Ayo Ogunshye asked to know the economic models underlying the fiscal policy. Chu Okongwu did not give a clear answer. But exactly two months later, he was able to put together factors which he claims have been instrumental to the stagnation of the nation's economic growth.

The forum for the exposition of Okongwu's theoretical thoughts was the budget review session organised by the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria on March 3. Okongwu sought to establish a "nexus" between growth, industrial dynamics and technological change. His position is that persisting troubles such as unemployment, low aggregate demand, rising cost of production, rising stock at a manufacturer's warehouses, raw material and foreign exchange shortages would constrain any in-roads made as a result of SAP, which he said, had received positive response from the industrial sector. "The prospects are that the SAP, by the removal of the distortions in the economy, would at best, arrest the declining trend," Okongwu observed.

From his vantage position as finance minister, Okongwu asserts that Nigeria is still faced with low economic growth or stagnation arising from discouraging and performance in agriculture and manufacturing where growth rates were lower than population growth. Spurred by the urgency for the removal of the economic hurdles, Okongwu underlined his emphasis: "The probability of stagnation and decline is high—and this is not alarmist." This is a message for manufacturers but more important for the attention of government. In the minister's view, only a change in the level of technology and "existing industrial structures" can save the day. Okongwu believes that the whole growth dilemma is tied to over-dependence on the external sector.

It does not seem that the finance minister has any immediate solutions to arrest the danger signals because the factors that stimulate growth in industrial sector and by implication the whole economy are determined outside Nigeria, hence difficult to control. In his own small way, Okongwu does not pretend to have the solutions but he has advanced questions which if answered could lead Nigeria out of the quicksands. These are how industries facing post-SAP high costs of inputs such as motor assembly plants and electronics ventures can survive; how to achieve industrial cost reduction so that inventories can be off-loaded at affordable prices; how to keep industrial wage rates low and

stable; how to increase local sourcing of imported raw materials and how to increase agricultural production and productivity in order to feed the nation and her industries.

Okongwu accepts that government is to blame for a greater extent for inability of Nigeria to achieve the requisite "industrial dynamics and technological change" 28 years after attainment of sovereign status. Said he: "The four national development plans since 1960 are replete with ideas on industrial policy (but) the main problem has been lack of effective implementation." He believes as a chief executive of one of the nation's most important government agencies that the national industrial policy which the present administration hopes to introduce would go a long way in resolving the industrial imperatives which have been overlooked in the past.

Typical of government officials, Okongwu was too overly taken away by the petrochemical industry which is yet to make any meaningful impact on Nigeria's industrial development in spite of the volume of money already pumped into the sector. Examining the dynamics of industrial and technological development in the petroleum sector, Okongwu notes that "a long standing weakness of the industry is the lack of petrochemical industries for cracking the economically useable residues. He thinks that petro-chemical sector through its foreign exchange earnings capacity would become a vibrant contributor in the quest to achieve independence from the external sector.

In Okongwu's expose, the poor performance of the agricultural sector has been the result of price distribution owing mainly to the total dependence on rain-fed cultivation, and crop diseases which is aggravated by the low level of technology in the sector. As a result, the technological consideration was given elaborate attention in his examination of the problem of growth. A survey carried out by the National Office of Industrial Property on technological application in manufacturing was Okongwu's reference. The survey discovered that the bulk of imported technology is embodied in designs and fabrication and with agreements and patent rights in transfer of technology, little room is left for adaptation or innovation to suit local conditions. This hardly allows for acquisition of know-how by local users. As a result, there is loss of the multiplier effects which would have boosted growth.

Okongwu states that having realised that enterprises, especially those owned by government have failed to meet the objectives for which they were established, the administration is bent on correcting the short-sightedness of the past. This is to be achieved through the proposed privatisation and commercialisation exercise. "The objective of the exercise is reorganisation of the (government) enterprises for effective management and for the generation of optimum output in line with the structural change in the industrial sector." This, he

hopes, would contribute to growth and technological change. To effect the change, Okongwu suggests acquisition of technology from possibly Indian, Korea and Taiwan because theirs have operational characteristics that suit the Nigerian environment.

But to Okongwu, of most importance to Nigeria's economic growth, industrial development and technological change, is the need for a shift by industry from "production of consumer goods to acquisition of technological capacity for the design of machinery and the fabrication of spare parts (to) achieve greater industrial linkages."

/9274

IFC Decreased Investment in Private Sector in 1987

34000602b Lagos *BUSINESS TIMES* in English
18 Apr 88 p 24

[Article by Babs Akerele]

[Text] The International Financial Corporation invested a total of \$20.0 million in Nigeria for the promotion of economic growth of the private sector in 1987.

This showed a decrease of \$0.24 million or 1.2 per cent, when compared with \$20.24 million disbursed as loans and equity investments in 1986.

According to IFC 1987 Annual Report, the total of \$130.6 million was granted to finance 23 ventures in Africa. Out of this, \$120 million was in loans, while \$10.6 million represents equity investment. Thus, the loans and equity investments granted to Nigeria represents 15.3 percent of the total grant for Africa in 1987.

The annual report stated that the IFC loans and 3 equity investment was 25 per cent of the total cost of the projects.

However, the IFC raised substantial funds of \$31.80 million in order to finance these projects.

The 1987 investments in Africa over the year under review, spread to about 32 countries and covered a wide-range of projects both large and small, such as agri-business, chemicals, mining, manufacturing, natural resources exploration, pipeline transport, hotels, hospitals, transport storage.

These projects hold realistic prospects of profit and benefit to the economy of the host country.

In 1987, the IFC Investment and Equity in Nigeria gave \$12.5 million to Dunlop and \$7.50 million to Food Specialties.

These covered substantial part of the Foreign Exchange cost of the major expensive projects to increase production capacity and alleviate the shortage of tyres in Nigeria and to implement a strategy of backward integration towards increasing the use of local agricultural raw-material inputs in its manufactured products respectively.

/9274

Saudis Offer Oil Discount, Nation Advised To Boost Production

34000611 Lagos *DAILY TIMES* in English
5 Apr 88 pp 1, 12

[Excerpts] The Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) reported in Nicosia, Cyprus yesterday that Saudi Arabia is providing discounts to customers contracting to buy at least 100,000 barrels per day (B/D) of crude oil.

Meanwhile, Nigerian has been advised to produce 1.6 million barrels a day for economic survival instead of the 1.3 million barrels a day quota sanctioned by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The former Petroleum Resources Minister, Prof Tam David-West who said this in the latest edition of News-watch magazine now on sale asked:

"Why should Nigeria suffer as a gentlemen of OPEC when countries that do not need money were over-producing."

"Even the United Arab Emirate whose minister, Mana Otaiba was and still is chairman of OPEC price monitoring committee was over-producing.

"We must accept and we should accept that OPEC will continue to be indisciplined for a long time, if not for ever, to the extent that in fact the very existence of OPEC should be questioned."

"Nigeria should not stay at its quota of 1.3 mbd or whatever it is for I consider our survival better at 1.6 million barrels per day.

At that rate of production, according to Prof West, "we have never ruined the apple-cart. We never did. We need to play the game better than others. We need the money. One hundred million people are looking at us."

The former oil minister, however, suggested "we should call the oil companies and talk with them under the broad headings of sweetness."

"But to expect that oil price will go up from 20 to 40 dollars is wishful thinking. If it has not jumped up now, it will never."

On Nigeria owning refineries abroad, Prof West stood against it. "I still stand by it," he said.

Elaborating, he said that with Nigeria on 1.3 million barrels per day and local consumption at 200,000 mbd, only 1.1 mbd would remain for the country to play around internationally.

"It is not enough for us to go and invest hundreds of millions of dollars in refineries abroad," adding that we are not a big oil producer.

If we invest in refineries in the country it would be controlled by us and at least 98 per cent of Nigerians would be there and we can monitor refurbishing better.

If it is abroad, at least 98 per cent of the staff will be foreigners. We have not got excess expertise to go there to monitor as observers or as participants.

/9274

SAP To Be Replaced by Another Program in Mid-1988

34000602a *Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English*
28 Apr 88 pp 1, 12

[Article by Babs Akerele]

[Text] Nigeria would need another programme to replace SAP when it runs out by the middle of 1988. This would enable the government to consolidate and build up the gains of two years of austerity.

According to a survey carried out by the Euromoney, a London based magazine, the new programme to be worked out would complement the government's efforts to revamp and restructure the economy.

The magazine in an interview with the Governor of Central Bank, Alhaji Abdulkadir Ahmed explained that it would require more than one SAP to sort out the problems that have built up in this country over decades.

Hence, he stated that it was necessary to do some fine tuning of the policies which have been put in place with SAP. This he stressed would support the promotion of internal growth intended by the degree of reflation in the economy.

Alhaji Ahmed recalled that SAP was launched in the belief that there would be a flow of credit from external sector to support the programme.

But unfortunately, he stressed that apart from the World bank trade policy loan of US \$450 million received at the latter part of 1986, no other credit has flowed into the economy.

He pointed out that "we have commitments from ECGD in Britain and Coface France, Exim of US have resumed medium-term cover to Nigeria.

A host of other OECD member countries including Japan he stated have promised bilateral credits. Also, he said that "our rescheduling agreement with London Club of creditors banks became effective on December 7, 1987. Thus he envisaged that some US \$320 million new money would be made available to Nigeria from these sources in 1988.

The Central Bank Governor expressed that "we have also reached in broad terms a borrowing programme with the World Bank for US \$1.6 billion in 1988, a substantial part of which some US \$600-\$700 million is quick disbursing."

Alhaji Ahmed remarked that with these substantial credits flowing into the economy, a degree of reflation is possible.

According to the magazine, Alhaji Ahmed stressed that not all of SAP's provision has worked as swiftly as expected. He enumerated those areas where progress was minimal, such as the restructuring of tariff and privatisation. He stated that tariff rationalisation was an absolute necessity if the country was to mount any successful import substitution let alone the attainment of its non-[word indistinct] export target of US \$1 billion by the year 1990.

/9274

Nation Plans 2 World-Scale Petrochemical Complexes at Eleme

34000601a *Lagos BUSINESS TIMES in English*
4 Apr 88 p 1

[Article by Arize Nwobu]

[Text] To achieve the industrial status of 1980 Brazil by the year 2,000 AD, Nigeria needs two world-scale petrochemicals complexes of the size being planned for the phase II at Eleme, near Port Harcourt, 'NNPC' a biweekly of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation has reported.

The Eleme plant will be an integrated world-scale olefins based complex with its main feed stocks to be derived from the National Gas Liquids which are said to be presently under-utilized.

The first plants are billed to become operational by the end of 1991 while the other process plants would follow suit in stages immediately after.

According to 'NNPC,' the project is regarded to be the heart of petrochemicals development in the country.

Work on the plants have been done to a good extent. "For a project of this magnitude, a lot of ground work is required and substantial progress has been made."

Water resources investigation reportedly has shown that there is enough water to keep the plant running for more than 25 years at an estimated peak consumption of over 2,000 cubic metres per hour.

Also selection of technologies for the polyethylene terephthalate, polyethylene, paraxylene Ethylene Oxide/Ethylene and Olycol and Butene-I process units has been carried out while the evaluation of bids for the first stage plants (polypropylene, olefins, utilities and off-sites) and infrastructures has been completed.

The Nigerian National Petroleum corporation is encouraging equity participation in the plant, in the form of products buy-back, buyers credit, recourse payments, etc. etc.

The project has "attractive return-on-investment" while the payback period of about three years is considered good.

On the completion, the Eleme petrochemical complex will offer a variety of services. One of such will be the establishment of Customer Technical Centre where potential investors will get to know the type of services or help they expect to get from the complex.

Also the complex is making arrangements with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) for the development of plastics for agriculture (Plasticulture) centre for the purposes of grain storage, rain shelters, water management and mulching. Such centres have been in operation in France, India, Egypt, etc.

/9274

Japanese Aid Programs Detailed

Progression of Aid Since 1981 Tracked
34190098 Dakar LE DEVOIR in French
29 Mar-10 Apr 88 p 11

[Article by Cheikh Aidara]

[Text] "Japan firmly believes that democracy, the free-market economy, and free trade are the surest means to development and stability. Senegal is considered one of the freest and most democratic countries in Africa from this point of view. Consequently, it deserves special consideration from Japanese aid programs."

This statement, taken from an official Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) document, is enough in itself to explain the vigorous new development of relations between Dakar and Tokyo. However, what clearly distinguishes Japan from Senegal's other partners is the nature and structure of Japanese-Senegalese cooperation.

Roughly speaking, Japanese bilateral Official Development Aid (ODA) can be divided into three categories: non-repayable financial aid, technical assistance, and loans. ODA is characterized by the predominance of the first category and the almost total absence of the third.

From the allocation on 21 March 1977 of 350 million yen to Senegal for the development of the fishing industry until the present, the only instance in which Japanese aid to Senegal has come in the form of a loan was the 2.5 billion yen Japan made available to Dakar for construction of the Louga-Dahra highway. The loan, granted 25 July 1979, is repayable over 20 years at 3.5 percent per annum, following a 10-year grace period.

In contrast, non-repayable financial aid has skyrocketed and has not dipped below 1 billion yen per year since Japanese fiscal 1981, with peaks in 1983 and 1987.

Past Japanese non-repayable financial aid (3.12 billion yen from April 1976 to March 1981) comes to less than the 3.499 billion yen granted in fiscal 1983 alone. This sudden absolute growth is almost certainly linked to the election of President Diouf, who supports a more liberal economic system than his predecessor Senghor. Since 1986, Senegal has been one of the 10 leading recipients of official Japanese aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, behind Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, Niger and Mozambique and ahead of Ghana, Zaire, and Somalia.

The sectors targeted for Japanese financial assistance clearly indicate Tokyo's determination to help Dakar avoid the social upheavals that could result from both the "recovery" policies and the persistent drought. Table 2 [not reproduced] shows that the most highly funded sectors are rural development and food aid, at 7.02 and 3.68 million yen respectively from March 1977 to 14 January 1988. Note that for rural development, 33

percent (2.55 million yen) was reserved for water supply projects. It will be remembered that when Diouf took office, he immediately placed top priority on rural water when pointing out to his "friends" where he needed their support. And—who would have thought it—the water came from the Orient!

Another aspect of Japanese aid to Senegal is technical assistance. Japan is providing Senegal with Japanese know-how in fields ranging from electronics to farming methods (especially reforestation techniques). Here, the emphasis is on training, with, beginning in 1984, the building, equipping, and staffing of a professional and technical training center (the CFPT-S/J) at a total cost of 2 billion yen in the form of non-repayable aid. Moreover, Japan is loaning its experts for a 5-year period and is training its Senegalese counterparts in Japan so that the jobs can be filled by Senegalese. The goal is to train Senegalese middle management with a solid grounding in five specialties (repair of household and electronic appliances, automatic control, machine-tool repair, and engine maintenance). However, an underlying strategic goal is to gain and consolidate a foothold in the Senegalese (and West African) market by gradually establishing a local network of relatively inexpensive trained maintenance personnel, thereby encouraging consumption of Japanese products. Gaining a market of hundreds of millions of consumers is well worth a commission, after all.

Technical cooperation also extends to fishing, with the CAMP center to help motorize canoes by supplying equipment (outboard motors, refrigerated trucks, replacement parts), for a total outlay of around 408 million yen. A Japanese mechanical engineering expert at this center provides maintenance and trains Senegalese mechanics at the request of CAMP-client fishing cooperatives.

Rural technical assistance comes in the form of experimentation and teaching involving new methods for villagers to reduce the amount of water used in gardening and reforestation (the green promotion project in Diakhao-Thies and Bandia) and new methods of semi-arid farming that increase vegetable-garden and rice yields (the Thiago-giers project).

Another sector targeted is communications, with the creation and fitting out of the Radio and Television Center at a total cost of approximately 2 billion yen. In addition, Japan is hosting Senegalese trainees in radio and T.V. broadcasting techniques. Already, under fiscal 1986 appropriations, six Senegalese are in training in Japan.

Such rare generosity at a time of world economic and financial crisis may conceal other motives. Of course, this aggressive policy of non-repayable financial aid is officially justified by historic and humanitarian arguments. (Japan itself received much assistance during the post World War II period.) However, the fact remains

that Dakar is still the front door for political and economic investment in Western Africa. Is Tokyo preparing the way for imminent invasion? Japanese aid may also be Japan's contribution to the general strategy of containing communism and, consequently, any Soviet influence in this important and fragile part of Africa. In addition, Tokyo perceives a need to at least reduce the gap in the fishing agreements between the two countries, as Abdou Diouf recalled recently in Joal during the election campaign.

Japanese-Senegalese relations also include trade, which shows a positive balance for Senegal, with exports to Japan totaling a little over \$86 million, compared to \$78 million in imports from 1982 to 1986 (absolute figures). Fish products constitute the bulk of Senegalese exports, as shown in Table 3 [not reproduced], while Japanese exports consist mostly of vehicles. However, this positive balance should not conceal the fact that the fish products in question are actually supplied by a Japanese firm in a joint venture between the Taiyo group and the Senegalese government.

Also, Japanese private investment is almost totally absent in this relationship. Up until now, the fishing industry has been the only sector to have experienced any Japanese private investment, with the Taiyo group's 47.17-percent capital investment in Senepesca. Because the Japanese economy is largely private, the spread and direction of its tentacles depend less on government policy than on the laws of profit in the international market.

Certainly, Dakar is making itself increasingly more attractive, especially with its New Industrial Policy (NPI), with an eye to exercising its charms even as far away as the banks of the Shinano. Nonetheless, the clouds of February 1988 threaten to cool the ardor of stability seekers, including Japanese big business. However, one more stone must be laid in preparing the way for relations between Senegal and Japan: university training. There is no doubt that Japan, which has become more than just a simple imitator of the U.S., possesses a body of fundamental knowledge from which Senegal could profit—even if language might be said to pose a serious problem! It remains to be seen whether the two nations go beyond strictly financial aid and invest in the strategic fields of knowledge as well.

Two Billion Granted for Water Projects

34190098 Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 1 Apr 88 p 4

[Article by Pape Sedikh Mbodje]

[Text] The Japanese Government has granted our country 1.7 billion CFA francs to finance a rural water project in the Kaolack, Diourbel, and Tambacounda regions. The agreement, signed yesterday by the secretary of state of the minister of economy and finance, Mr Moussa Toure, and the Japanese ambassador to Senegal, Mr Toshio Oshima, provides funds for construction of

pumping stations, water tanks, and connected facilities on 17 sites, as well as for installation of the equipment needed to manage and maintain them.

The secretary of state for economy and finance stated that, between 1977 and the present, Japan has granted our country nearly 36 billion CFA francs in non-repayable aid. Japanese aid, which has increased greatly since the first grant in 1977, includes other—in Mr Toure's opinion—equally advantageous and important forms: loans, technical assistance from volunteers and experts, study missions, and the training of Senegalese in Japanese institutes. He also pointed out that Japanese aid covers all Senegalese government priority sectors, including health, training and research, communications, and, last but not least, food and water assistance.

Mr Toure emphasized the water sector, in which the Senegalese government has taken concrete action in recent years. He stated that the emergency water program launched in 1981-1982 has proven quite successful, since our country is now nearing the water supply goals set by WHO (35 liters per person per day).

The secretary of state for economy and finance announced that the West African Development Bank has just granted our country a loan for 1.6 billion CFA francs for a water project in the Saint-Louis region. Mr Toure also announced the upcoming signature of two agreements with the Kuwait Development Fund for a total of 3.5 billion CFA francs to be used for the West African Economic Community special emergency grazing-lands and village water program.

Lastly, he praised the Japanese Government on its apartheid-related decisions condemning the assassination in Paris of ANC representative, Mrs Dulcie September.

The Japanese ambassador emphasized that underground water use and well drilling are among the major targets of Japanese aid to Senegal. This grant, he said, followed four previous grants in this field for the realization of the underground water-use project. According to Mr Oshima, these funds have already brought about the development of 28 sites throughout the country. Moreover, these areas have shown a clear improvement in sanitary conditions and a growth of vegetable-garden farming, he stated.

"Encouraged by these positive results and conscious of the life-threatening situation brought about by the severe drought, the Japanese government has decided to pursue its policy in this field by making this fifth grant available to the Senegalese government," Mr Oshima stated. He recalled Japan's constant support of rural water development efforts through the creation of water supply points designed to lessen suffering and improve living conditions. Lastly, Mr Oshima confirmed Japan's determination to continue to aid our country in accordance with President Abdou Diouf's judiciously conducted policies.

13014

Former Minister Reveals Misuse of Italian Funds
34280002 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in
Italian1 Apr 88 p 10

[Article by Pietro Veronese]

[Text] Here is a scandal in two chapters: First, billions in Italian public funds, which were supposed to be used to finance the construction of a fertilizer factory in Somalia, have been diverted into the pockets of the family of the Somali president, Siad Barre. And second, other Italian public funds were then spent to cover the "hole" in the Somali foreign debt due to the first financial operation. Meanwhile, the factory was built and loomed idle on the outskirts of Mogadishu. It has not been in operation even for a single day. The affair, in addition to the Somali regime involves a couple of Italian firms and the management of funds for aid to the Third World by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was reported yesterday by Francesco Rutelli, head of the Radical faction in the Chamber, in an interpellation submitted to the government—"to arrive at the whole truth about this scandal"—and sent to the Public Prosecutor's office in Rome at the same time.

Many elements of the story are already known, even if the picture is still incomplete. Although the Radicals moved very promptly to make a political issue of it, they were not the first to disclose it. The first to do so was a former Somali minister of industry, Ali Khalif Ghalayo, who is living as an exile in the United States today. Ghalayo testified under oath at a session of the lawsuit (being tried in the Milan court) brought by the Somali regime against the EUROPEO reporter Pietro Petrucci for an article of his which is considered defamatory. The reporter's lawyers summoned the former minister Ghalayo to testify, and he told the judges the story of the fertilizer factory when he was asked for an example of the corruption that prevails in Mogadishu.

And so the spotlights are turned again on the alleged crimes in which Italian cooperation in development is involved, that is the sector in charge of managing and distributing the public funds for aid to the Third World, with a budget that now amounts to approximately 5 trillion a year. This new scandal, on which the ministry is not commenting for the time being, comes at a time of particular distress within the development cooperation circles. The technicians and experts, whose task it is to evaluate independently the projects that are to be implemented in the Third World, are up in arms. The new law reorganizing this sensitive and strategic sector of our foreign policy, which was ratified 13 months ago, calls among other things for the institution of a "Central Technical Unit" composed of 120 experts. The law stipulates that competition and hiring should be completed within 3 months, and instead everything is still up in the air. The experts are still temporary and working on a day-to-day basis. And to think that the spirit of the law

is that of entrusting the plans for development cooperation to technical experts as much as possible—by separating them from political considerations—in order to avoid cases like the one the Radicals reported yesterday.

Violent Discussions

Let us try to put together all the elements of the incident of the Somali factory. The story begins in the early 1980's, when SNAM [National Gas Pipeline Company]-Progetti, and ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] company, prepared a feasibility study for a plant to make petroleum-based nitrogenous fertilizers to be built outside of Mogadishu. Ali Khalif Ghalayo was the Somali minister of industry between 1980 and 1982. He was the one who disclosed the heated discussions in the Council of Ministers concerning that project. All the heads of the economic ministries were opposed, considering the undertaking absolutely unprofitable. But President Siad Barre insisted. He wanted that factory. It was Siad himself who, when SNAM-Progetti's offer was rejected, brought up another Italian company, a private one this time, namely Technipetrol. Once again the ministers opposed it, but after some subsequent and very harsh arguments the president imposed his will and the matter was decided.

Between 1982 and 1985, as the Radical deputies wrote in this interpellation to the government, the Italian Government extended huge credits to build the plant, totally ignoring the uncertainty expressed on a high level by the Somalis themselves. It was a matter of \$10.5 million in so-called "aid credits," an "export credit" of \$59.75 million, and finally a gift of \$2.96 billion, for a total of about 100 billion lire in all based on the value of the dollar at the time.)

The plant was built at the end of 1985. It is now April 1988, and the factory still has not produced a single gram of fertilizer. A 1985 report by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs blamed the delay in the factory's entry into operation and the "difficult circumstances" due to the inadequate training of the Somali personnel, although, that report said, some technicians had already been trained in Italy. Hence the gift of about 3 billion, intended for new training courses.

Ali Khalif Ghalayo maintained in his testimony in Milan that the construction of the factory had no industrial or productive purpose. Its sole purpose was to profit by Italian financing. In this interpellation the Radicals added that they were "aware of the statement of the former minister himself, according to which no less than \$9 million provided by the Italian Government were directly expropriated by Siad Barre's family."

The Second Chapter

The second chapter of the affair is about Somalia's debt to Italy. While the "aid credits" have interest and payment terms very favorable to the debtor country, the terms for the "export credits" are more or less the normal market ones, and most of the financing for the fertilizer factory was granted in the form of export credits, making a huge debt well beyond impoverished Somalia's ability to pay. Yet at the end of 1985 Italy granted Siad Barre \$35 million to alleviate Somalia's

indebtedness. Other gifts followed, for the same purpose. And in that way the "hole" was covered that had been created in order to pay for a project that has not yet borne any actual fruit.

At the close of their interpretation the Radicals asked "whether the government finally intends to make a complete review of Italian aid to Somalia." Now the answer is up to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

05186/06662

POLITICAL

AWB Accused of Using CP To Enter Political System

34010046d Johannesburg *BEELD in Afrikaans*
5 Apr 88 p 6

[Editorial: "The Danger"]

[Text] The AWB is increasingly acting as the Conservative Party's electoral agent—and because of the CP's successes, the AWB's demands are getting more brash. First, it wants a television debate, then a Boer state right away, then full implementation of its own policy....

These are irresponsible demands, because the AWB has not yet had the courage to present its own convictions to the voters so that they can decide on them. At present, AWB supporters can only vote CP and hope that they will eventually get Mr Eugene Terre'Blanche as sole leader.

It is very dangerous to allow the undemocratic AWB to participate in the democratic process from behind the democratic earthworks of the CP. To emotionally incited supporters of the CP, this could sound like an extremely theoretical debate. Just what is there to worry about here? But if those supporters believe that there should be a right to democratically replace an NP government, then they must also give their future generations the right to oust a CP or AWB government at the polls.

And as the AWB continues to seep into the CP parliamentary caucus and party infrastructure, this trend attests to an absolute disdain for the democratic process of clarifying and testing policy. What guarantee is there that this kind of group will tolerate other parties (even the CP!)?

Thus, the AWB must be rejected solely on the basis of its tactics—to say nothing of its wild plans. This is why we do not see why the government should have discussions with the AWB which, in typical extremist fashion, only wants to reap the fruit of liberty without accepting any responsibility for looking after the tree.

12271

CP Policies Seen as Dangerous for Country

34010046c Cape Town *DIE BURGER in Afrikaans*
30 Mar 88 p 24

[Editorial: "CP's Escapist Politics"]

[Text] When he was still a Nationalist, Conservative Party leader Dr Andries Treurnicht was accused of keeping his voters on a political starvation diet. Since he broke away from the NP, he has tried to pacify the voting public with escapist politics.

Dr Treurnicht's speech at the conclusion of the CP's campaign in Randburg was another example of the fact that the more the CP's policy is revealed, the more it turns out to be not only unpracticable, but in fact economically and politically dangerous for the country.

What the CP leader served up there the day before yesterday, just as in Schweizer-Reneke, Standerton and elsewhere, is to some people a tempting, freewill policy, but it does not offer answers to the real issues.

The leader of the official opposition is silent about the implications and consequences of his policy as postulated at Randburg. For example, he does not say who should exercise final authority over the "carved out" black residential areas and cities that he proposes. To what homeland a multinational and multicultural area such as Soweto should then be politically "coupled." Who is responsible for law and order in those areas. How one achieves "white majority occupancy" in a country with black and colored majority occupancy in all but a few magisterial districts, aside from through large-scale, forced resettlement.

One of the identified causes of unrest in urban black areas was in fact a stagnant housing policy, coupled with an outdated form of influx control. Now the CP wants to send the country back on the same dangerous path.

The CP leader makes much mention of the idea that "self-activity" among whites must be "heightened." How much of the large volume of work that the thousands of blacks are now doing can the whites take over? And if they could do so, this would have to mean large-scale black unemployment. No member of the "white majority occupancy" will be able to sleep peacefully surrounded by increasing overpopulation, destitution and unemployment.

If these fantasies were mere theories, the CP could perhaps beg for leniency. But the core elements of its policy have already been considered under the practical circumstances of South Africa's hard reality, and they did not pass the test.

12271

Nation's Conservative Church's Divided Over Politics

Zionist Church Split

34000607 Johannesburg *THE WEEKLY MAIL in English* 8-14 Apr 88 pp 8-9

[Article by Edyth Bulbring: "Zionist ministers have been promised jobs in return for their help in the October municipal elections"]

[Text] Zionist church ministers have been promised aid, jobs and church sites in the build-up to the October municipal elections.

In Exchange, they have been asked to encourage their congregations to vote—and to pray for present and future councillor.

The pressure has created a split in the church. A splinter group, the United African Unity Association of Churches (UAUAC), broke away from the main Zionist ministers' association, Zwelonka, in February.

The offers were made to about 60 Zionist ministers by mayor Jimmy Nako and former mayor Tamsanqa Linda at a meeting at Ibhayi City Council offices, according to the UAUAC president, Archbishop Enoch Matyana of the Holy Hearers Zionist Apostolic Church.

The majority of Zionist ministers in Port Elizabeth do not have churches and many work during the day to earn a salary. Matyana is a driver during the day and an archbishop over the weekends.

Matyana said he had attended the meeting at the council offices. He had also attended a braai hosted by Linda where food and drink were provided for a number of Zionist ministers, councillor and their families. Linda had asked them to inform people of the elections and to encourage people to attend pre-election meetings.

In Matyana's case, at least, the request would be honored; he said he would encourage his congregation to vote in the election as people should obey the law of the government.

Comprising about 20 members, the UAUAC seems to have strong links with Bishop Isaac Mokoena, life president of the Reformed Independent Churches Association and rector of the Southern Africa Theological College for Independent Churches. He is also co-president, with Linda, of the United Christian Conciliation Party (UCCP), the only black party which has stated its willingness to take part in the government's proposed national statutory council.

Matyana said members of the new association had met Mokoena, who had promised them theological training.

They were also told that a 21-day course for Zionist ministers was to be held in Port Elizabeth, run by Mokoena or a member from the college, after which the ministers would get degrees and diplomas.

Matyana said he hoped to obtain, through the course, further knowledge of an archbishop's duties, become qualified to hold meeting ceremonies and receive training in how to assist people with their everyday problems.

Matyana, who has a Std 7 education, said Zionist ministers were poorly qualified, and implied there was a fair amount of self-promotion through the ranks. "A minister can present an ox to the people and become and archbishop," he said. With Mokoena's help, he hoped their qualifications would be improved.

Matyana said he used to be a member of the Interdenominational African Ministers Association of South Africa (Idamasa), an association of ministers of African congregations and known locally for its efforts at reconciliation and mediation in conflict.

He had become disillusioned with Idamasa as it had done little to provide assistance to his church and congregation of about 1,000 people, most of them poor and unemployed.

Idamasa field worker, Rev M. Sambu, said 21 Zionist ministers had approached Idamasa for guidance and advice, following the approaches made to them by Linda and Nako.

He said a monitoring committee comprising three Idamasa members and three Zionist ministers had been formed to advise and monitor the situation.

Sambu said it was a pity that Linda saw it necessary to divide the church and lead people away from the body of Christ. He said the allegations that Idamasa was distributing funds improperly was false as there were a number of ministers without jobs and churches.

He said it was clear those campaigning in the October elections were attempting to gain support among the poor and unemployed by making them certain promises.

They were also exploiting the needy situation of many of the Zionist ministers and members of the congregation who might be fooled by promises of assistance.

A Zionist minister on the monitoring committee, who did not want to be named, added that he and the other ministers had decided to contact Idamasa as they did not want to be seen by their congregations to associate with Linda, a man he said had been responsible for a number of detentions in their communities.

"It is a trap because it aims to divide the ministers of God in Port Elizabeth," he said—PEN.

Anti-Tutu Churches Lack Support

34000607 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in
English 8-14 Apr 88 p 9

[Article by Karen Evans]

[Text] Two Christian groups which have slammed such outspoken church leaders as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Dr Allan Boesak and the Reverend Frank Chikane cannot boast large memberships.

But Representatives of the two groups say their organizations are growing as the church/state conflict heats up.

The Gospel Defence League, which claims a membership of close on 10,000, is an interdenominational organization "dedicated to the defence of biblical Christianity and against humanistic influences undermining Christ", says the League's director, Dorothy Scarborough.

She says the Gospel Defence League is "growing fast in the present political climate".

The Tradition, Family and Property Bureau is "one of 15 autonomous kindred organizations" whose aim is to "oppose the threat of socialism and communism and to foster the values of tradition, family and property", according to a pamphlet entitled "What is the TFP?"

A representative of the group, A Torres, says since their organization published a critique of the NEW NATION newspaper in May last year, the TFP has received about 500 new members, bringing its total close to 3,000.

These organizations have come out strongly against mainline church leaders and the stand they have taken against intervention by the state in the churches.

A statement issued by the South African Council of Catholic Laity said, "Many of the church leaders in South Africa have chosen to follow Jesus' example of compassion for the poor and oppressed. This has placed them squarely on the side of all those South Africans who are struggling to bring about justice, democracy and peace in our country."

Reacting to this statement, Scarborough said, "The Bible tells us we must love our neighbor and have compassion. If this is misinterpreted and you start throwing bombs, you are using the Bible as a textbook for revolution. There is deceit in that."

In the League's latest newsletter, she says that "all their (church leaders') indignation had nothing to do with the keeping or breaking of God's moral law".

Although membership of these organizations may be growing in the light of the situation in South Africa, full support for leaders of the Catholic, Anglican and Methodist churches has been expressed by their bishops, clergy and members.

Influence of U.S. Evangelicals

34000607 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 8-14 Apr 88 pp 8-9

[Article by Pippa Green: "Linking hands across the oceans, America's religious far-right and their local counterparts fight a holy war against a common foe, 'Marxist violence' and on behalf of a common ally, Pretoria"]

[Text] With a media blitz encompassing free video offers, programmes on religious television networks and articles in church-run magazines, the American religious far-rightwing is mounting a campaign in support of the South African government.

The campaign is a manifestation of the belief that the role of United States policy is to counter a "global communist threat" wherever it appears.

David Balsiger, editor and publisher of Biblical News Service (BNS) as well as founder of the group Restore a More Benevolent Order Coalition (Ramboc), believes the US "frequently has a tendency to support liberation movements without asking what type of government we are going to get after the revolution.... We should concentrate a little more on reforming governments rather than supporting liberation movements."

The California-based BNS, created in 1984 by the right-wing national lobby Christian Voice, last year distributed free and unsolicited copies of a special South Africa issue of its magazine Family Protection Scoreboard to half-a-million American "opinion-makers".

The federal officials, newspaper editors, religious leaders and local pastors who received the magazine free could read its claims that the United Democratic Front was both anti-Christian and violent and that along with the African National Congress, it posed a far greater threat to stability and democracy than the present-day regime—which, the magazine said, was on the road to reform. The magazine promoted what it called reasonable anti-apartheid alternatives: Inkatha, moderate black town council leaders and Bishop Isaac Mokoena of the Zionist Christian Church.

Scoreboard is a compendium of statistics on South African living standards, the economic position of blacks, the strategic importance of South Africa, and the number of victims on "black-on-black" violence.

It contains articles on the detrimental effects of sanctions, the dismantling of apartheid, Soviet interests in South Africa, the positive effect of the Sullivan Principles, and "Marxist violence in black townships".

One piece is devoted to an attack on "celebrity leaders". Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the Rev Allan Boesak; Archbishop Denis Hurley and Dr Beyers Naude.

A picture shows Hurley conducting a mass in honor of detainees while a priest holds up two petrol bombs. The caption reads: "Two petrol bombs are held aloft by a black priest at a 'mass for peace' that was 'intended to strengthen the people's fight for liberation."

Although the mass was indeed dedicated to peace, and petrol bombs as well as other symbols of violence in South Africa—whips, teargas canisters, rubber bullets—were placed on the altar, Balsinger declined to change his caption when the magazine was reprinted: "This point is going to stand," he said.

Another photograph shows Naude and Boesak in front of the banner of the SA Communist Party at the funeral of murdered Eastern Cape community leader Matthew

Goniwe in 1985. The scenes are interspersed with lengthy interviews with former South African spy Craig Williamson, until recently a major in the South African security police.

The caption says the clerics were the main speakers at a "South African Communist Party-sponsored Cradock funeral". It does not say that afterwards Boesak accused agents provocateurs of unfurling the banner.

Just as the incidents are not identified, neither is Williamson's former position. Culpability for the violence is placed unequivocally at the door of the ANC.

Equally strident pro-apartheid propaganda has emanated from an organization called About My Father's Business, Inc. By June this year, the Kentucky-based group had distributed 10,000 free copies of a videotape entitled *The ANC—A Time for Candor* to people who ordered it through a toll-free number. It comes with several pieces of literature, including an issue of *Clarion Call*, published in Durban by Inkatha.

The video centers on two gruesome scenes filmed by television networks shortly before the South African government banned visual coverage of the escalating conflict in November 1985. One scene shows the burning of a young woman in Duduza.

The booklet accompanying the video urges readers to write to their senators and representatives "insisting that (they) watch ANC—A Time for Candor... and express... outrage over Oliver Tambo's meeting with George Shultz".

Form letters to newspapers editors and members of congress are included in an "action kit" for those who lack the time or imagination to write their own responses.

The video has been screened on several of the more than 1,000 Christian television networks, says Larry Jones, a New York academic who monitors the religious right in the US and South Africa.

At least one organization, the Council on Foreign Affairs, received the video unsolicited—compliments of the South African embassy.

BNS also distributes the video. And although Balsiger says the South African embassy cancelled an early order for 20,000 issues of his magazine, *Satour* placed a full-color double-page advert in *Scoreboard*.

All the same, there appears to be no formal relationship between the South African government and the US religious rightwing.

Still, relations are certainly friendly. Balsiger has made three trips in three years to South Africa, Namibia, and the portion of Angola under Unita control. One of these, he says, one was financed by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

The convention of the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB), the association of evangelical broadcasters and networks, has sported official South African government booths for the past two years. The NRB, with the Full Gospel Business Men's Fellowship International, which provides funding to some religious networks, has also organized tours to South Africa.

Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) was one of the first stations to screen *Who is the ANC*, a video which also features the Duduza and Ciskei killings.

Ronn Haus, president of the California-based Family Christian Broadcasting Network (FCBN) said in an interview in *Covert Action* that the South African government was arranging tours for "supportive US media people". He had declined a trip because "it was at the invitation of and underwritten by the South African government, and I finally decided that I didn't want to be wrongly interpreted as a pawn".

There is a history of connections between rightwing evangelists in South Africa and America, paralleling the anti-apartheid relationship forged between the mainstream churches in both countries. Last year the US anti-apartheid movement, which draws much of its support from mainline churches, played a crucial role in the passage of the first sanctions legislation against South Africa. At the same time, efforts by the religious rightwing to shape US policy on South Africa are reinforced by other organizations, including the Heritage Foundation.

"There is fairly big traffic of evangelicals back and forth between the US and South Africa," says Jones. "American evangelism has had an enormous influence in South Africa and often the patterns of funding are similar—money is 'funneled' through anonymous businessmen, making an exact source difficult to trace."

Not all evangelical churches in South Africa welcome their American counterparts. In a document to the World Council of Churches, entitled *Evangelical Witness in South Africa*, 132 black evangelical ministers unequivocally distanced themselves from their rightwing church bretheren: "The most striking element of these churches," says the document "... is that they are silent about the evils of the South African apartheid regime and its necessary violence to maintain it. They are quiet about the oppression and exploitation of millions of South African blacks and are not moved by the pain, misery and suffering blacks are subjected to ..."

They were, they added, outraged by the sermon given by a "North American evangelist" (Jerry Falwell) and screened on SABC-TV shortly after the national State of Emergency was declared in 1986. The ministers condemned "the arrogance of a foreigner who comes to tell us apartheid is dead when we know that it is alive and well and that it kills".

Some mainstream church leaders in the US think the propaganda was being waged by the religious rightwing may backfire. "At best," says David Mesenbring of Trinity Church on Wall Street, the propaganda will "cause confusion".

"By and large," says Willis Logan, director of the Africa office of the national Council of Churches, "our feedback has been from people who think the material is distorted, so they want to learn more."

07310

Deficiencies of Provincial System Enumerated
34000604a Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL in
English 1 Apr 88 pp 21-22, 26

[Text] The constitutional process grinds on—often, it seems, sideways. While it is obvious that the all-white provincial system is an anachronism, it has been replaced by half-baked mechanisms which will remain unsatisfactory until reform becomes thoroughgoing.

As we all know by now, the implementation of the current constitution was intended to have far-ranging effects on the way SA is governed from top to bottom. What a disaster. As part of the process and notwithstanding warnings of chaos, 1986 saw the abolition of the provincial councils (though not provincial administration as such), to pave the way for further "reforms."

Various standing committees of parliament have—supposedly effectively—taken over both the old legislative and "public scrutiny" functions of the councils. But shortcomings at the second tier of authority (between parliament and local bodies) have become painfully apparent. The situation has been further complicated by the implications of the "horizontal" devolution of power at the first tier from central government to the grotesquely named Own Affairs divisions.

The criteria for distinguishing Own Affairs from General Affairs are reasonable clear.

Matters affecting only one group are Own Affairs, while matters affecting more than one are General. But, in practice, this is generally achieved only at considerable cost or inconvenience. One result has been to enlarge the need for competing and expensive bureaucracies. That's nice for the white Right.

A couple of recent episodes show up the problems, of which the notorious Transvaal Standard 10 history textbook scandal is the best known. How much, one has to ask, has been achieved by the shift in education? While white schooling is now an Own Affairs and, therefore, theoretically under the control of the white Own Affairs ministry at government level, the same old provincial administrative officials—and a hidebound bunch they are—appear to be performing much as before.

Consider Baragwanath Hospital. A manifest lack of facilities for an exploding black urban population is, to all appearances, being handled with 9th century colonial complacency by provincial health officials.

Another ancient grievance which has manifestly not been remedied is the chronic tendency of administrators in the Transvaal to overrule the town planning departments of big cities like Johannesburg and Sandton on rezoning applications (they are always in favor of developers). The clinging to a veto power on town planning issues by the administrators seems at variance with government's avowed intention to devolve those matters that cannot be privatized to the lowest possible level.

The picture of second-tier government at this stage is complex and confusing. The provinces have both gained and lost functions of government, since the process of reform at this level has proceeded parallel to two other movements.

The first is the "horizontal" movement of functions, stripping the provinces of segments of authority over matters like white education and hospitals. Conversely, the complete reshaping of black administration—for example by the abolition of the former administration boards—has given vast authority to the provincial administrations, such as power over black local government and the socio-economic development of black urban areas.

The Regional Services Councils Act lists areas of government which may be devolved to the regional level, so the rearrangement of functions has only begun. As many of these functions—to be assumed by the RSCs—would be taken from the provinces, a long-term intention to have regional rather than provincial administrations as an intermediate tier of government becomes apparent. But this is denied by some sources.

How the concept of Joint Executive Authorities might have to be adapted to a regional rather than provincial system is one of many implications that do not yet appear to have been seriously addressed.

But there are several important points to be made. Some concern the boundary between Own Affairs—run, as already noted, from first-tier level, at least theoretically, by an Own Affairs minister—and those aspects of General Affairs still under the control of the provinces.

It seems that the boundary between Own and General has been unsatisfactorily drawn. If a specialized hospital admits people from more than one ethnic group, then it falls under a province. If the contrary, it falls under an Own Affairs minister (mostly a white Own Affairs minister). And white Own Affairs can become, in practice, Afrikaner Own Affairs. Some observers claim that English-speaking Natal now has far less control over white education than under the old system.

Secondly, what is happening on the ground often seems much less significant than the theoretical position. In the case of white hospitals, for example, the ministry merely enjoys a veto over appointments like hospital supervisors, while the old provincial department continues in effective control.

The most fundamental criticism of the current arrangements concerns the replacement of the provincial councils by the standing committees. There has been some gain in that coloreds and Indians now have some representation at provincial level through membership of the committees; and blacks, too, are represented at provincial executive committee level. It is a sign of change that a black (John Mavusa), admittedly appointed, now plays a part in the affairs of the Transvaal.

Nevertheless, there is something of an emerging consensus (which includes prominent Nationalists) that all is not well at the second tier. The outgoing administrator of the Transvaal, Willem Cruywagen, and the administrator of the Cape, Eugene Louw, have both gone on record as saying it was a mistake to abolish the provincial councils.

What is to come? We have been repeatedly told (most recently by Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning Chris Heunis at the Cape National Party Congress last year) that further installments of constitutional "reform" are in the pipeline.

Heunis assured the congress that plans for further development were far advanced, including the division of the Transvaal into two units and the Cape into three—suggesting that the ultimate intention is regionalization.

But informed sources now suggest that nothing will see the light of day during 1988 at least. The FM also believes on good authority that there is nothing like a master plan. Rather, government believes in an open-ended process of negotiation with interested political groupings; and these, because of political sensitivity, have to be conducted in secret.

Considering the growing strength of the Right, which is rapidly gaining the influence to block major reforms, we may be stuck with the present cumbersome arrangements almost indefinitely.

It is significant that Heunis—in concluding the debate on his 1987 Budget votes—told the assembly that he personally had nothing against the reintroduction of provincial legislatures "where a need for such development has been established." Fair enough—but, for proper reform, the issue of black representation should be negotiated first. All-white provincial councils are rightly a thing of the past.

Meanwhile, improved accountability and control at second-tier level should be practical. There are hints of a plan to have the standing committees convene regularly in the provincial capitals. If the parliamentary session were split up (to avoid a conflict of commitments by committee members), it could become possible to have, perhaps, a six-week session during which all changes to ordinances and provincial budgets could be debated, just as by the old provincial councils. FM sources suggest that this decision has already been taken, at least in principle, so far as provincial budgetary processes are concerned.

In the broader sphere, it is clear that second-tier constitutional arrangements—current and prospective—suffer from the same fundamental defects as the constitution itself. Those defects comprise too much reliance on co-opted or appointed blacks, coloreds and Indians and too much deference to rightwing sentiments through Own Affairs mechanisms.

But until SA is ready to cope with the implications of remedying those deficiencies, they will persist at all levels of government. That and incompetence.

07310

MILITARY

Three Companies Reveal Production, Development of Hi-Tech Ordnance

34000603a Johannesburg ARMED FORCES in English
Mar 88 pp 17-19

[Text] A series of fuzes for use with pre-fragmented, cluster or high explosive bombs, employing a building block concept to maximize effectiveness while standardizing fuze variations, has been introduced by Asema Manufacturing, a Reutech company.

The Proteus is a series of micro-processor-controlled, multi-role bomb fuzes developed as a modular concept to optimize logistics and maximize applications.

The fuze itself comprises three sets of basic body-building blocks:

— The main body unit housing the micro-processor, power source and all mechanical safe and arm devices.

— The back end of the fuze (the interface portion) which connects into the various types of detonic chain requirements. These could be simple boosters, electronic triggers or detcord connections.

— The fuze's front end, which takes different trigger modules to suit applications.

Examples are the ultra-quick (UQ), UQ-retard, proximity and timer fuses.

The UQ attachment is used with general purpose and pre-fragmented bombs in excess of 250kg. It detonates in less than 20 microseconds and ensures that the full blast wave potential of the bomb is applied to the target with little or no cratering.

The UQ attachment is dome-shaped to provide low-angle impact where a bomb is released at low altitude. The fuze will detonate with graze angles of 15° for low-drag bombs and 22° for wide-body bombs.

The proximity device triggers a fuze 2-10m above the ground.

It is used on general purpose conventional or pre-fragmented bombs in the anti-personnel role. Its accuracy is achieved by electronic circuitry operating in the UHF range (frequency agile doppler). Advanced technology ensures a consistent burst height and provides high immunity against enemy jamming.

The timer module is factory programmable to trigger the fuze two seconds or more after leaving the aircraft. It is used for submunition distribution and canister opening at the desired altitudes.

The fuze's main body comprises a detonic safe and arming unit, a power supply module, a stepper motor drive and arming module, and an air pressure switch.

The detonic safe and arming unit consists of a primary detonator and a transfer detonator held out of line within a rotor before arming.

The power supply module comprises three 3V lithium batteries in a pack, secured into the fuze at the factory. The batteries have a 10-year shelf life.

The stepper motor drive and release module comprises a stepper motor attached to the motor drive lock. The lock connects the primary detonator to the anti-static leak circuit in the safe position. The assembly also interfaces with the motor release. A stop shaft locks the motor drive before the start of the arming cycle.

The electronic module consists of the microprocessor-controller with memory and a control substrate incorporating the firing gate, voltage multiplier charging circuit and stepper motor control interface.

Interface and ignition modules available are:

— A standard interface for nose ignition of the explosives via the detonic chain.

— An electronic connection to submunitions or cutting charges for canister-type bombs.

Built into the main body are important safety features achieved only with a micro-processor. They include decisions to arm or disarm after waiting for a secondary event—such as the absence of the minimum safe air-flow—and, if that does not occur within the prescribed time, to return the fuze to the totally safe position. This could happen at any stage of the arming sequence and is a protection against mishandling or similar abuse.

The arming sequence is started when the bomb leaves the aircraft and the arming wire is pulled out of the pressure switch to the air pressure which determines that the bomb is travelling at a sufficient speed for the sequence to start.

The fuze fits all standard NATO bomb configurations, can be adapted to Warsaw Pact configurations and accepts No 10 arming wire.

The fuzes will operate within the normal flight envelopes of high performance aircraft.

The fuze conforms to Mil Standards 331 and 810.

A new air-to-ground 250kg practice bomb has been developed by Aserma Manufacturing, a Reutech company.

High-technology manufacturing techniques and materials involving glass reinforced plastic fibre winding, epoxies and polyurethane foam have been used in producing this highly effective practice bomb.

The prototype was produced by Aserma ready for testing within six weeks from the date of initial go-ahead. This is believed to be a record considering the complexity of design and manufacture.

Carrying conventional bombs as practice rounds by fighter planes has become very costly, just when an all-out effort is being made to reduce defence expenditure.

Smaller practice bombs that simulate bomb flight paths are good for target practice but cannot simulate the effects on aircraft reaction to close formation flying and low altitude release of bombs.

Another problem in using conventional practice bombs is that practice areas are becoming saturated with steel fragments. This increases the possibility of practice rounds ricocheting towards the jet fighter when training for low altitude bombing.

The newly-developed bomb disintegrates into harmless fragments and is bio-degradable.

Aserma engineers set out to develop a design using different types of materials lending themselves to low cost production, yet providing a bomb with the same mass, size and aerodynamic features as the conventional one.

Engineers had to manufacture a bomb that met all flight envelope specifications of the standard bomb. Constraints to be overcome were ambient operating temperatures varying between -55°C and +60°C and conditions of stress caused by the vibration of a bomb underneath a fighter plane wing.

The body of the bomb consists of two tubes constructed from glass reinforced plastics (GRP) fibre wound on highly sophisticated computer operated equipment. The core tubes are moulded in by polyurethane foam and the centre cavity is filled with low-cost ballast material.

This simulates exactly the profile, centre of gravity and weight of the ordinary bomb. Conventional mechanisms may be fitted to detonate pyrotechnics in the bomb on impact for improved visual "hit" confirmation.

Aserma Manufacturing, A Reutech company, has developed a new aircraft—delivered 120kg shrapnel bomb with a battle-proven design, producing nearly three times more effective fragments over a six times larger lethal area than a standard steel shrapnel bomb of double its size (NATO Mk 82 GP).

The result of many years' research and development the 120kg pre-fragmented (PF) bomb uses steel balls within a double-skinned glass fibre casing to achieve its remarkable anti-personnel effectiveness.

A shrapnel bomb's efficiency is determined by the number and size of fragments produced, their velocity and shrapnel distribution pattern.

A conventional steel bomb delivers random-sized fragments of varying number and distribution pattern. This seriously affects the density and range of fragments and the bomb's lethality in the target area.

In contrast, Aserma's PF bomb carries 19,000 steel balls of uniform size, giving a far more consistent shrapnel distribution pattern with greater density over a much larger area.

As standard, the 120kg PF bomb is manufactured with 8,75mm diameter balls weighing 42 grains (2,72g). Aserma has established that this size is the optimum "fragment" for use against personnel and soft-skinned vehicles. Larger balls can be used for employment against thick-skinned vehicles and around installations.

With this shrapnel concept the characteristics of the bomb casing are no longer significant except as a ballistic container for the explosive, shrapnel and fuze system. The PF bomb's body is of a high strength, low weight glass fibre requiring less explosive thereby contributing to an increase in the available shrapnel.

It is identical in mass profile and centre of gravity to standard Mk 81 bombs and therefore fully interchangeable with the existing auxiliary aircraft fittings.

Firstly, an inner shell is made from glass fibre and two or three suspension rings positioned and secured according to aircraft configuration eg. NATO or Warsaw Pact.

Secondly, the 19,000 steel balls are placed in the mould and epoxy resin poured in and allowed to set. When the bomb explodes this resin is pulverized, leaving the balls free.

Finally, another layer of glass fibre forms the outer casing and this is machined to accurate dimensions.

The explosive used is a 60:40 mixture of RDX/TNT with a 1 percent wax (the America "Composition B") and the PF bomb holds 27kg of this.

Tests were conducted by Aserma to compare the PF bomb's performance against both the Mk 81 GP and Mk 82 GP.

Although tests have shown a fragment total for the 250kg Mk 82 GP of 22,000, this includes fragment sizes with no lethality potential. Aserma in its tests considered as "effective" only fragments of 38 grains and larger.

For the shrapnel distribution pattern tests the subject bombs were surrounded by 3mm thick plates at 5,18m radius. Only fragments weighing 38 grains or more with sufficient energy to penetrate the plates were counted.

These tests produced a count of 19,017 or 2,79 times more effective fragments for the PF bomb against a Mk 82 GP count of only 6,800.

In a test to establish fragment density and the lethality area the optimum delivery angle, velocity and burst height were used to maximize the lethal area. It was decided that two fragments per square meter was the minimum desired density.

On this basis, the Mk 82 GP lethality area was 70m x 20m, or 1,400m², compared to the PF bombs 220 x 40 m or 8,800m². This gives it a lethality area 6,3 times larger than the standard Mk 82 GP.

Tests on the Mk 82 GP bomb gave a density of one fragment per square metre at 35m radius, where the PF bomb delivered seven fragments per square metre.

From a test in which 1,6mm steel plates represented personnel and 3mm plates soft-skinned vehicles, Aserma concluded the PF bomb's standard steel balls are lethal at 110m for personnel and pierce soft-skinned vehicles at 76m.

With its 99kg of explosive the Mk 82 GP has a greater blast effect, but this is not considered an important criterion in shrapnel bomb design—in an anti-personnel role.

Designed for delivery by jet aircraft, the PF bomb has a low drag co-efficient and can be supplied to suit NATO and Warsaw Pact suspension configurations for aircraft certified for Mk 80 series bombs. No aircraft adjustment, clearance or qualification is necessary as the bomb is battle-proven. It meets the same environmental and safety specifications as a conventional Mk 82 GP steel bomb.

To maximize the effect of the bomb, Aserma designed a new generation doppler-effect proximity fuze with a burst height of 2-10m.

The fuze and bomb makes an anti-personnel weapon system with considerably improved performance compared to existing systems.

The performance figures indicate it would be necessary to deliver six times more 250kg Mk 82 GP—and even more 120kg Mk 81 GP—bombs than a single PF bomb to achieve a similar effect. The direct cost saving is obvious.

The PF bomb's outstanding lethality/weight factor also enables users to multiply strike capability at greatly reduced cost and with fewer aircraft at risk.

Low performance aircraft can be given the same strike power as high performance jets.

For own-troops, an air strike with PF bombs means more reliable, more efficient target obliteration and greatly reduced casualties when the ground attack goes in.

The design concept of the PG shrapnel bomb has removed the guesswork from bomb design and performance. It is undoubtedly one of the most economical and efficient weapons of modern warfare.

CAPTIONS

For of nine variations of the Proteus aircraft bomb fuze family. From left to right: the ultra-quick impact nose fuze; the cluster bomb timer fuze; the proximity fuze; the and the ultra-quick, high-drag arming-time-selectable fuze.

The 250kg aircraft practice bomb is manufactured in South Africa by Aserma using materials involving glass reinforced plastic fibre winding, epoxies and polyurethane foam. The newly-developed bomb disintegrates into harmless fragments, is bio-degradable and offers a cost-effective method of jet fighter combat training.

The inner shell of the prefragmented bomb is made from high-strength, light-weight glass fibre. The 19,000 steel balls are placed in the mould and epoxy resin is poured in and allowed to set. When the bomb explodes this resin is pulverized, leaving the balls free. Another layer of glass fibre forms the outer casing, machined to accurate dimensions. The shrapnel bomb is equipped with a new generation doppler-effect proximity fuze with a burst height of 2-10m.

07310

Proven Versatility of Two Samil Range Vehicles 34000603b Johannesburg ARMED FORCES in English Mar 88 p 23

[Text] One of the classes of vehicles in the SAMIL range is the SAMIL 20 and included in this class are the Rhino and Bulldog. These two variants complete the family of high mobility vehicles produced by Truck-makers (Pty) Ltd in this class.

Both the Bulldog and Rhino variants use the same major components as the battle proven SAMIL 20 high mobility general purpose vehicle which in its original form was designed to fill the roles of communications vehicle, mobile workshop and ambulance. This practice of commonality of parts greatly improves and reduces the logistical support requirements.

The 6 cylinder air-cooled 4-stroke diesel engine with direct injection system provides a maximum power of 79 kW at 2,650 rpm. The drive is through a 5 speed synchromesh gearbox and two speed transfer box to two portal axles providing an outstanding performance under the most arduous conditions. Like other vehicles in the SAMIL 20 range both the Bulldog and the Rhino incorporate the mine-resistant characteristics of the range.

In addition to being in service with the South African Defence Force several of the Rhino variant have entered service with non-military organizations.

Technical Specifications SAMIL 20 (2 tonne 4 x 4)

Dimensions

Wheelbase	2,900mm
Length	5,340mm
Width	2,300mm
Ground clearance	460mm
Track - Front	1,852mm
Track - Rear	1,852mm

Performance

Maximum Guideability	80%
Maximum Road Speed	89 km/h

Engine

6-Cylinder air-cooled 4-stroke diesel with direct injection

Maximum power 79 kW at 2,650 rpm
Maximum torque 327 Nm/1,600 rpm
(at 2,000m above sea level and 30°C (DIN 70020))

(Bulldog)

Mass

Tare (Chassis/cab)	4,580 kg
GVM	7,700 kg
GCM	14,000 kg
Front Axle	3,700 kg
Rear Axle	4,000 kg

Caption

The Rhino variant, which is available as a troop carrier in 4, 6, and 9 man configuration.

The Bulldog variant is a 10 man troop carrier.

07310

Slingshot Mark II Bullet Machine Developed 34000603c Johannesburg ARMED FORCES in English Mar 88 pp 27-28

[Text] The search continues for the development and creation of effective and non-lethal weapons that can be used in situations of unrest. The recently released Slingshot Mark II bullet machine developed by TFM (Pty) Ltd in conjunction with the South African Police and the CSIR, which is already in service, fills a gap that existed in the catalogue of minimum force weapons.

The Slingshot system which is operated by a hydraulic pump driven by the vehicle's engine is mounted on the cab.

The power settings, aiming and loading of the Slingshot is controlled by operator from the co-driver's seat. The single fire control system, using a trigger enables the operator to select either single shot or automatic fire. While aiming of the weapon is by line of sight.

Velocity of the missile is controlled on requirement by adjusting the hydraulic controls in the cab to supply the power to the rotating discs that produce the kinetic energy to the rubber bullets.

The "bullets" each weighing 100 grams are supplied in belts of 200 and are fed into the Slingshot by the operator from inside the cab. By adjusting the controls in the cab the range of the 37mm by 40mm projectile can be increased to 150 meters with a potential secondary bounce of a further 20 meters. With a forward velocity of up to 80 meters per second, on fully automatic fire the cyclic rate of up to 80 meters per second, on fully automatic fire the cyclic rate of fire of the Slingshot is 170 rounds per minute. In either single round or automatic firing the Slingshot has a field of fire of 180° with an elevation of from +24° to 10°. The depression available to the system discourages close approach to the vehicle as it makes it extremely difficult to approach below its arch of fire.

TFM has a strict company doctrine based on systems engineering and in the case of the development of the Slingshot extensive operational testing was undertaken during the 6 months development programme before the Mar II was released. While a simple training programme has been designed to teach operators of the equipment it is backed-up by a comprehensive operational manual. In line with the policy of TFM the Slingshot is supported by easily available logistical support and a complete parts schedule.

Captions

The Slingshot is controlled from within the cab of the vehicle and only requires one man operation. Simple press button firing control and line of sight aiming require very little operator training and both driver and operator are well protected.

The cyclic rate of fire is 170 rounds per minute on fully automatic fire. Single shot firing mode can be used and the field of fire is 180° with elevation/depression from +24° to - 10°.

The Slingshot mounted in position on the cab of a Caspar security vehicle. This combination has been used successfully on a number of occasions during recent unrest situations.

Power delivered to the weapon varies with engine power—the range can be varied from 60 m to 150 m. The power is drawn from the vehicle engine and hydraulically transferred to the bullet machine so that the projectile energy can be adjusted to suit conditions.

Mounted on the cab of a security vehicle the range of the Slingshot is 150 meters with a secondary bounce potential to 170 meters. Power is adjustable where required.

07310

ECONOMIC

Industrial Potential of Various Homelands, Regions Noted

Kwazulu

34000608 Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY in English*
11 Apr 88 p 16

[Text] Kwazulu's Isithebe industrial township, 100km north of Durban, is one of the more successful decentralized growth points in SA. At the end of February, 147 companies were established there, or 18 more than the previous year.

Together with Ezakheni near Ladysmith (56 factories, established since 1983), Madadeni near Newcastle (14), and 12 ad hoc companies, Kwazulu's industrial development points (IDP's) have attracted 229 companies as at end February. But more are in the offing.

"Another 16 projects are now in the process of implementation, which will take the total up to 245. About half of these will go to Isithebe, with the rest going to Ezakheni and a few to Madadeni. But with a further ten applications still in the pipeline, there is an ongoing flow of industrial investment in Kwazulu," says a Kwazulu Finance and Investment corporation (KFC) spokesman.

Incentive levels are good, with a 50% transport rebate, 95% of salary/wage bill up to R105/worker a month, training grant and relocation allowance, 70% interest and/or rental concession, a 50% housing subsidy for key personnel and a 10% price preference for State tenders.

KFC's investments in buildings and factories at the three IDP's already amounted to R205,5m as at the end of February, or 25% up on last year's R164,4m. Total employment showed a smaller increase—up 6.1% to 36,130, from 34,050 the year before. Total investment per worker is a low R6,721.

But while KFC's total investments to date in the Kwazulu economy is some R280m, the private sector has invested an additional R360m, adding up to a total of R640m invested to date in the area.

While Isithebe remains the major industrial township (20,850 jobs have been created in this township), Ezakheni has shown "phenomenal" growth since 1983. One of the reasons for this growth is its situation—some 200 km from Durban on the main rail and road route, and about 360 km from the PWV area.

Ladysmith itself has also benefited handsomely from the investment thrust. Approved building plans have more than doubled over last year, while a regular influx of people is increasing the town's population. Town clerk Pieter Hurter says in spite of the recent recession Ladysmith has shown a constant 4% average growth rate over the past 5-6 years.

As is the case with most industrial growth points, an intensive marketing campaign has been launched in the Far East, with Taiwan a prime target. Currently a further six investments from Taiwan are being considered, with six new factories being planned for Madadeni. Some 35 ha is being developed here, with upgraded facilities.

With the Joint Executive Authority (JEA) of Natal/Kwazulu in full swing, the marketing of the Tugela basin as an alternative future potential industrial hub for SA is being done jointly by the Natal and Kwazulu authorities. Labour, water, transport and other infrastructure being a joint concern, the development of the basin's ample resources is seen as "natural."

And the signs are there that the marketing efforts are successful.

"While Transvaal's relative share in SA's industrial sector decreased over the past few years, that for Natal has increased. We are growing faster than both the Cape and Transvaal," says the KFC spokesman.

Richards Bay

34000608 Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY in English*
11 Apr 88 p 16

[Text] Although coal exports through Richards Bay (RB) are now feeling the pinch, alternative bulk exports are still streaming through the harbour's multipurpose bulk handling facilities and its coal terminal.

"This year compared with last is like chalk and cheese. Most factories are running at capacity, while the harbour has never been as busy as it is now. Sales of residential erven have increased dramatically while several large industrial erven have been sold. The tempo is picking up," says RB town clerk Theo Tolmay.

Richards Bay (RB) township and its deep water harbour are the products of a R5.5bn joint public and private sector development that has generated export earnings of more than R3bn a year.

Employment opportunities for more than 27,000 people have been created in SA's newest coastal city (development of the town only commenced in 1972) which now has a population of some 21,500, of whom 16,000 are white.

An interesting feature is the strong inflow of Indian people, with some 3,500 already resident. A major township development involving some 400 houses for the Indian community is in the offing, which should strongly boost economic growth and the availability of (semi-)skilled labour.

RB is an industrial development point and qualifies for the following incentives: a 50% transport rebate, an 80% salary and wage bill incentive to a maximum of R80/worker a month for seven years, training grant and relocation incentive, a 45% interest and/or rental concession, a 50% housing subsidy and a 5% price preference on State tenders.

Over 110 industries and businesses have already been located in RB's Alton Industrial area, which has 154 general industrial lots. Of these, 95% have been sold and more than 60% are developed.

Hampered

Major industries established include Alusaf's aluminum reduction plant, Indian Ocean Fertilizer (ex-Triomf), Richards Bay Minerals (RBM), the Central Timber Cooperative and Mondi's massive pulp mill project. Other industries include Bell Equipment Company, Sun-crush, Fondarge, Genrec, Hulett's Metals, Clover Dairies, RB Milling, Grinaker Construction, Empangeni Transport, Vianini, Murray and Roberts, Frankipile and Dorbyl.

The past two years have been relatively quiet, with the town's development hampered by the combination of a savage local recession and major international political problems. While few local industrialists expressed an interest in moving to RB, this is changing for the better, says town engineer Frik Bosman.

But on the international front, marketing of RB's advantages in Europe have been stymied by the political situation. Until this improves, a major marketing drive seems unlikely.

Apart from its favourable location, excellent bulk export facilities and good industrial incentives, RB has other major advantages for industrialists.

"We have a virtually unlimited store of good, cheap water resources, while electrical power is in plentiful supply. An important additional feature is the modern sea outfall pipeline for effluent disposal, which can be utilized by textile, chemical and timber concerns," says Bosman.

A vast reserve—1,500 ha—of land suitable for industrial development, a huge pool of unskilled labour in three townships in adjoining Kwazulu, the increasing availability of skilled and semi-skilled Indian labour, good road, rail and air links, a secure supply of electricity, well established supporting private and public services, pleasant living conditions in attractive natural surroundings and an amenable climate add to the package.

Gazankulu

34000608 Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English
11 Apr 88 p 16

[Text] The self-governing homeland of Gazankulu, divided into four major areas lying in the lowveld regions of the north-eastern Transvaal, may be off the beaten track, but nevertheless offers attractions to industrialists.

Its major industrial development point (IDP), Nkowankowa, is just 15 km by road from one of the loveliest towns in the northern Transvaal, Tzaneen, and can therefore offer residential accommodation in an area that is renowned for its natural beauties.

Apart from the 80,000-odd people who live within a close radius to Tzaneen and Nkowankowa, the two centres serve a population of some 600,000 in the wider region.

Service industries can therefore make use of the attractive incentives package that is applicable to Nkowankowa and the other IDP's at Giyani (the capital) and Mikhunhlu, near Hazyview in the south. Existing incentives include a 50% transport rebate, 95% of the salary and wage bill (up to a maximum of R110 per worker a month) for seven years, a training grant, a 70% interest or rental concession for ten years, a 50% housing subsidy, a R500,000 relocation allowance and a 10% price preference on State tenders.

"We are mainly looking for light, labour-intensive industries to provide jobs, income and skills for the large poor of labour in the area. Plastics, timber, furniture, leather and shoes, food and other agro-industries, fruit juices, farm implements and service industries are all welcome," says Gazankulu Development Corporation (GDC) senior manager, industrial development, Alwyn van der Merwe.

To date, some 45 industries have established at Nkowankowa, employing some 4,300 people. A further 20 ha is being developed, providing an additional 30 stands with infrastructure, some with railway sidings. Five factory units are now being built, with a further four in the planning stage. In the past year, eight new industrialists established there, while another eight spent some R1.6m on expanding existing operations.

As Gazankulu lies well off the country's major transport arteries, it is not a "natural" development area, although the local market and the raw materials provided by forestry and agriculture create a limited impetus for industrial growth. But to attract more industries, GDC has launched an intensive marketing campaign.

Apart from the pleasant surroundings and good incentive packages available, the local Shangaan/Tsonga people are renowned for being a stable, peaceable labour force.

With 109 ha already developed into 97 stands at Nkawkowa and an additional 160 ha available, there is no shortage of land. Additional railway sidings are also being planned. At Giyani, 32 ha has been developed, while at Mikhuhlu 35 ha has been provided with industrial infrastructural services.

Companies already established in Gazankulu include Dorbyl Automotive Products (Busaf), Koen Furniture, Multifarm, Monate Foods/Gazankulu Achar (a R10m a year company providing 68% of the local mango achar market), NCS Packaging, Regal Lighting, Simo Fruit Processors and Transfeather.

Total capital investment amounts to some R80m, with some 6,000 jobs created.

Ciskei

34000608 Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English
11 Apr 88 p 15

[Text] The economic growth of Ciskei since its independence on December 4, 1981 has been described by experts as nothing short of phenomenal. The number of industries established in the space of six short years has surpassed the wildest dreams of most of the architects of the country's unique—and successful—economic structure.

One of the fundamental reasons for the country's success lies in the bold and innovative tax reforms adopted just three years ago. All indicators pointed to the need for a positive approach within the free market system based on private ownership and private gain for everyone, irrespective of colour or origin.

And in its final form, its approach proved positive indeed—no company tax, not even on income sourced outside the Republic of Ciskei.

In line with most countries, however, Ciskei does impose a withholding tax of only 15% on dividends, royalties and interest paid to nonresidents.

If a company is to take advantage of such a system, an incentive must also be made available to its employees. Who can argue with the attractiveness of a flat rate of 15% tax for individuals on income in excess of R8,000 a year.

Ciskei, after careful evaluation, boldly implemented its tax exempt system just three years ago on March 1, 1985.

The result is that today Ciskei boasts of 160 industries established in its prime development areas of Dimbaza, Fort Jackson, Mdantsane, Sada and other growth points in the region. More than 26,350 Ciskeians have been gainfully employed and trained to greater levels of competence.

Exactly a year after the introduction of its tax reforms, private investment exceeded that of government for the first time. To date, private investment exceeds government funding by R19,8m, without taking into account the additional R14,1m spent to upgrade the infrastructure.

Broad Spectrum

For the current year 53 new industries have already been approved for establishment at a total investment of R70,8m. More than 2,500 new job opportunities will be created as a result.

Theoretically, lower tax encourages re-investment of profits. Ciskei has indisputable proof of this.

An encouraging number of companies in the Ciskei have expanded their factories and activities within the first year of establishment. During the past year, 18 factories and activities within the first year of establishment. During the past year, 18 factories have undertaken expansion programs resulting in the creation of 1,414 new jobs.

But taxes alone, or rather the lack thereof—as is the case in Ciskei—are not enough to encourage industrialists to set up modern, sophisticated and expensive operations in a country. The total requirements of a potential investor cover a broad spectrum of needs.

An effective and workable infra-structure, in the first place, is essential. No industrialist can develop his operation without effective road, rail, sea and air links, and in this regard, Ciskei has a unique advantage over others.

In the southern African context, Ciskei is virtually equidistant from the major commercial centres of Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. In addition, it is served by a highly efficient sea port, able to handle all types of cargo, a mere 50 km or less from its major industrial growth points.

The quality of labour—both skilled and unskilled—and the availability of potential managerial material is another major concern. Ciskei is recognized as the country with the highest literacy rate, per capita, in southern Africa. Furthermore, due to a historic association with the British empire, the average Ciskeian is far more

fluent in English than their counterparts anywhere else in Africa. These factors have earned Ciskeians the reputation of being a highly trainable, productive and reliable work force.

Venda

34000608 Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English 11 Apr 88 p 15

[Text] Venda is no joke, neither is it a figment of anyone's imagination. It straddles the eastern Soutpansberg range in the northern Transvaal, stretches eastwards to the borders of the Kruger National Park (KNP) and north to Zimbabwe.

The Venda people are related to Zimbabwe's Shonas and have a distinct culture and language. Sacred lake Fundudzi and its surrounding forest, the famous "python dance" and beautiful wooden sculptures made from indigenous teak, ironwood and red ivory trees are some of the distinguishing features of the country and its people.

The tropical scenery and vegetation have a definite "African" flavour. Capital city Thohoyandou ("the head of the elephant") has the inevitable Sun International hotel and casino which also attracts citizens from Louis Trichardt, some 70km to the west.

The tarred road between the two towns crosses attractive countryside, with beautiful indigenous trees and plantations of bananas, mangoes, litchis and paw-paws adding to the tropical flavour.

But scenery and farming alone cannot provide a livelihood. Thohoyandou has been allocated maximum incentives in terms of the joint regional industrial development policy of the SA-TBVC countries to provide more jobs.

Industrialists locating their factories here receive a 60% transport rebate, a 95% salary/wage bill incentive for seven years (up to a maximum of R110/worker a month), a training grant, an 80% interest and/or rental concession for ten years, a 60% housing subsidy for key personnel, a relocation allowance, and a 10% price preference on all State tenders.

Spurred on by these attractive magnets, some 44 industrialists have already made the move to Venda, representing a major investment in the fledgling economy. Jobs created to date total some 8,000, which gives a dependency figure of some 48,000 people being supported.

One of the major drawcards for PWV industrialists is the relative labour peace and stability in the area, while the "best" incentives package available in SA obviously adds to the country's attraction.

"Based on the agricultural infrastructure including sub-tropical fruit production and cattle farming, a number of very successful food industries have already established here. These include a huge achaar factory, fruit juice processing, while a number of concerns benefit from the plentiful timber that comes from the forests and plantations," says VDC spokesman Kobus Louw.

Knock-down furniture, wooden trays and pallets and school furniture are made here, while teak imported from Zimbabwe is also used. Three large shoe industries manufacture for the local and export markets and a large knitwear operation, a wire plant, meat processing, paint manufacture, Wetmate (making small face-towels) and a huge crockery operation are also active in Venda.

A major advantage is that industrialists can buy—and sell—their factories, with full land ownership available.

VDC is negotiating with two major concerns to invest some R20m, while a further 21 factory units are now being built. With some 22 applications in the pipeline, the country "has no need to advertise," says Louw.

Some 250-300 local small industrialists and commercial concerns have opened, aided and financed by the Venda Development Corporation (VDC).

Venda has set itself the target of becoming a major tea producer, as the Mukumbani tea estate (a joint venture between Sapekoc, with 74%, and Agriven) comes into full production within the decade. Some R30m will be invested and the present labour complement of 1,000 should grow to 3,000.

Some 3.5-million plants have been put in the ground on an area of 330 ha. A large new tea factory will produce some 120,000 kg of green leaf a year under irrigation. Southern Africa's "premier tea estate" is being created.

Maritzburg

34000608 Johannesburg *BUSINESS DAY* in English 11 Apr 88 p 15

[Text] Maritzburg (PMB) calls itself "the sophisticated alternative"—and well it may.

Situated in the "education belt," it hosts a university, a training college, a technical college, an agricultural college and three of SA's best-known private schools: Hilton, Michaelhouse and Maritzburg College.

Apart from this high level of education, the quality of life is good.

Also, PMB has been declared a deconcentration point in terms of the official regional industrial development policy, and it is clear why many industrialists have made the move.

A 20% transport rebate to other areas than Durban/Pinetown, an 80% salary/wage concession of up to R70/worker a month, a training grant, relocation allowance, 40% interest and/or rental concession for ten years and housing subsidy, and 4% price preference on State tenders complete the package.

To date, some 230 factories have established in PMB, of which 93—or 40%—moved in over the past six years since the incentives became available, adding some 6,500 jobs. Currently, six new factories and extensions by another five are in the pipeline, adding up to some R60m in new investment.

On the commercial side, the town is also alive, with developments involving some R55m in the planning and implementation stages. About 2,200 commercial businesses now operate in PMB. Meanwhile, the Urban Foundation is actively involved in black urban upliftment projects to the value of some R20m.

Industrial promotions manager Rob Findlay says there is active interest in the city's industrial sector. In the past two weeks, two sites were sold, while seven out of a further fourteen sites being developed have also been sold at about R25,000 a piece.

"We are developing these new 1,000 sq m sites with a bulk factor of only 750 sq m. Industrialist can start small and then expand," he adds.

07310

Joint Venture To Develop Computer Controlled Detonators Signed

34000605c Johannesburg *SUNDAY TIMES* in English
20 Mar 88 p 1

[Text] AECI Explosives & Chemicals has signed an agreement for a joint venture with Detonix to develop computer-controlled detonators.

A new company, Expert Explosives, will make the electronic initiating devices for AECI, which will market the systems.

This concept is set to revolutionize the mining industry, says AECI, the world's largest manufacturer of explosives and mining accessories.

The system is based on self-powered detonators which include low-power very large scale integration (VLSI) microchips for sequencing and blast control.

It was invented by Vivian Patz of Detonix and Stafford Smithies of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research's National Electrical Engineering Research Institute.

The detonator requires less than 1% of the electrical energy used by conventional ones.

A computer programmes different delay times to each detonator and verifies the value of the delay and the correct functioning of each detonator.

For the first time, blasts can be coordinated throughout a mine with milli-second precision from a single computer. It will improve productivity.

07310

Platinum Deal With Lebowa Government To Boost Development

34000605a Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN* in English
31 Mar 88 p 25

[Text] The agreement which was signed by Rustenburg Platinum, Lebowa Platinum (Leplat) and the Lebowa Government yesterday will further boost the development of massive reserves of good ore and low depth in Lebowa, says Rusplat chairman Pat Retief.

Mr Retief who was announcing the agreement yesterday said that he was optimistic about the future of the platinum market and that there was increasing demand for platinum in the autocatalyst and jewellery industries as well as an investment medium.

Explaining the agreement which also involves the Lebowa Development Corporation, Mr Retief said that in terms of the agreement mining lease rights on six additional farms in the vicinity of Maandagshoek would become available to Rusplat. Leplat would be granted mining leases over three farms in the Atok area by RPM which has also allowed Potgietersrus Platinum (PP) the exclusive right to apply for mining leases on six additional farms in the Potgietersrus area.

In addition the agreement provides for the ceding to Potgietersrus Plat, the wholly-owned subsidiary of Rusplat, of prospecting rights to a 9,250 ha area.

Rusplat, Leplat and Potgietersrus Plat expect that the development of a mine of at least 50,000 tons a month in the Potgietersrus area will start within 5 years.

Within two years of Atok's production reaching a mill throughout of 50,000 tons a month, Lebowa Plat will expand production to 70,000 tons a month.

Negotiations are being conducted with a view to Rusplat mining Maandagshoek under a tributing arrangement. If successful, a mining operation will be established at Maandagshoek at a production rate of 100,000 tons a month.

The agreement also provides for payment by Rusplat of R1,9 million to the Lebowa Government and R3,1 million to the Lebowa Development Corporation. An amount of 8 million Leplat shares will also be provided to the Lebowa Government for no cash consideration.

Rusplat will transfer equity representing 50 percent of voting and profit participation rights of Potgietersrus Platinum to Leplat for R100, while Leplat will issue 25,8 million shares to Rusplat, for no cash consideration.

Leplat's net asset value a share will increase from 139c a share to 178c share as a result of the deal and Rusplat's shares' net asset value will increase from 833c to 889c.

07310

SBDC Now Fully Self-Supporting

34000605b Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN* in English
14 Apr 88 p 13

[Text] The Small Business Development Corporation has now moved smoothly into top gear, initial teething problems now history. And it is now not only fully self-supporting but is daily bringing business dreams within reach of more would-be businessmen, according to a senior SBDC official.

He said in Pretoria yesterday: "We have outgrown our baby booties and from now on it's full steam ahead with an exciting approach that will live out the free enterprise concept to the hilt."

Started five years ago with a handful of staff and successfully seeking private enterprise, governmental and other financial backing to help smaller businesses get going, the SBDC now had a staff of about 600 and was divided into five active regional, autonomous divisions.

Last year, he said, the number of loans granted by the SBDC was almost doubled—and actual amount involved massively up—on the 1986 activity rate.

In 1987, 6,997 direct loans were granted, totalling R177,2 million—increases respectively of 93,7 and 73,9 percent on 1986.

In addition, the SBDC's Small Builders' Bridging Fund had enabled 2,346 small buildings to get going, financed to the tune of R49,6 million to provide housing in neglected areas at an average cost per job opportunity of R1,625.

The spokesman stressed that the organization's activities were "absolutely non-racial". The pattern of loans granted proved an ever-increasing involvement of the Black community particularly in entrepreneurial activities.

Four main fields of activity were involved in the SBDC's programme—the provision of financing to set up businesses; of affordable business premises; of development services and dedication to the removal of legal and administrative barriers for its clients.

The SBDC was having considerable success with its programme of mini-loans of up to R5,000 for very small developing businesses.

07310

Professors Express Concern Over Decreasing Trade With US

34010046b Johannesburg *DIE VADERLAND* in Afrikaans 9 Mar 88 p 3

[Article by Herman Snyman: "Experts Warn of General Trade Embargo: SA Cannot Provoke the World Like That"]

[Text] Johannesburg—South Africa's relations with the United States are heading for an unprecedented low point. Political and economic experts who spoke with *DIE VADERLAND* even foresee a general trade embargo.

At the same time, figures released this week by the U.S. Department of Commerce indicate an alarming decline in relations. South African trade with that country has dropped 44 percent in only 9 months.

Prof Hennie Kotze, a professor of political science at the University of Stellenbosch, told *DIE VADERLAND* that things look even worse in the future. Exports will be hurt even further, boycotts will be much more strictly enforced, and disinvestment will be further hastened.

He is particularly concerned about South Africa's provocative attitude, as reflected last week in the United Nations.

"We cannot exist without international interdependence," he said. "Our attitude is wrong."

He said that provoking the United States is dangerous. "The world wants to hurt us—and it can."

Prof Mike Hough, professor of strategic studies at the University of Pretoria, said that relations with the United States are rapidly deteriorating. Pressure will increase, and he even foresees a general trade embargo.

Pressure is also being applied to South Africa's other major trade partners—especially Japan—to introduce a general trade embargo.

Prof Kotze and Prof Hough agree that South Africa will not profit from a new Republican administration in the United States.

Pressure from leftist support groups is simply too great for that. At the same time, there is a possibility that a Democrat will be elected president. "One would rather not think about that," Prof Kotze said.

Both feel that South Africa's provocative attitude is of no advantage to the country, domestically as well. It could further weaken the little existing confidence in politics.

Prof Hough said that additional restrictions, such as those 2 weeks ago on trade union organizations, give new momentum to sanctions and boycotts.

—Among the stronger legislation that is being considered in the United States to isolate South Africa in the area of international trade is a stipulation that would require all Americans to sell their shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

—Mr Wim Holtes, executive director of the South African Foreign Trade Organizations (SAFTO), feels that relations with the United States will only worsen in the future.

"Reasoning or talking are no longer any help. They have decided once and for all that South Africa must be forced to its knees. Nothing will dissuade them," he said.

He feels that the United States will apply increasing pressure on other trading partners with South Africa to follow its example, but said that South Africa should look for other markets—in countries where the United States has no leverage and cannot exert pressure.

12271

SOCIAL

RSA-Mozambican Youth Groups Exchange Talks

Details of Jeugkrags 16 December Maputo Visit
34000606 Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in
English 22-28 Apr 88 p 3

[Article by Karen Evans]

[Text] Details have emerged of an extraordinary meeting in Maputo between a Frelimo youth brigade and an Afrikaner youth group—intended, it is claimed, to facilitate talks between Jeugkrags and the African National Congress.

Jeugkrags (Youth for South Africa) leaders announced this week that in response to an invitation from the Organizacao da Juventude Mocambicana (OJM), an official state youth brigade, a delegation travelled to Maputo on December 16 last year for three days of talks, ceremonies and videos.

Jeugkrags is a youth political organization formed in 1986 in response to the constitutional stipulation that the Afrikaanse Studentebond (ASB) eschew politics. It is regarded as a "pro-reformist" grouping within white politics in South Africa and has had sporadic contact with the Inkatha Youth Brigade.

At a press conference in Johannesburg, Jeugkrags chairman Marthinus van Schalkwyk said the group had achieved its two main aims: "We conveyed our standpoints about fundamental issues—the Nkomati Accord, destabilization and their role in achieving peace in Southern Africa—and we built better relations with the youth of a neighboring country."

However, Jeugkrags flatly rejected the OJM's proposal to arrange talks between them and the ANC.

Cedric de Coning, Jeugkrags's director of fund-raising, said it was clear the OJM supported the ANC "because they believe the ANC will be the next government. (Therefore) it would be strategically wrong for them not to support the organization. They have no choice."

Attempts to contact the OJM for its interpretation of the visit and its impressions of the Jeugkrags delegation were unsuccessful. However, the Jeugkrags delegation claimed the OJM had difficulty in understanding "how they could be against apartheid and not support the ANC".

In a "hi-tech" exchange, the South Africans showed their hosts two American video programmes "on the ANC and the cruelty of necklace murders". They claimed the recordings "opened the eyes" of members of the OJM to "another side of the ANC".

For its part, the OJM showed a video documentary about South Africa's "continued support for Renamo (the rebel Mozambique National Resistance) and its responsibility for destabilization in Mozambique".

The Jeugkrags delegation said it accepted that the South African government "helped Renamo and operated a training camp in the Kruger National Park" but greeted claims of continued support with skepticism.

The video, they said, depicted bridges being blown up and battles being fought, but "there were no prisoners of war, no eye-witness accounts", said executive member Debbie Marchard.

The highlight of the visit to Maputo, according to the Jeugkrags executive, were the formal discussions held in the City Hall. During these talks they were given a detailed perception of their hosts' opinions on South Africa—much of which they disagreed with.

The groups also disagreed on destabilization, which the OJM insists is a result of apartheid policies. Marchard said: "Mozambique inherited a healthy infrastructure at independence—now the face of Maputo tells a sad tale. Primarily bad management, and not apartheid, is to blame."

Frelimo Youth Group To Visit

34000606 Johannesburg *THE CITIZEN in English*
19 Apr 88 p 1

[Text] A delegation from the Frelimo Youth Movement of Mozambique will be visiting South Africa within the next month at the invitation of the organization. Youth for South Africa.

This was announced last night at a meeting held in Johannesburg by Youth for South Africa (YSA) to report back on their visit to Mozambique in December last year at the invitation of the Frelimo Youth Movement (OJM).

Discussions held between the two organizations in Maputo involved a wide range of issues, including destabilization in South Africa, Soviet influence in region, South Africa's internal situation and its effect on regional stability, and the role of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo).

The national Chairman of YSA, Mr Marthinus van Schalkwyk, said a delegation of between 10 to 15 Mozambicans were expected to tour South Africa "hopefully before May". He said the visitors would be taken all over South Africa, would meet politicians and would also be taken into the townships to meet locals.

Another member of the executive of YSA, Miss Debbie Machard, said the visit had resulted in bridges of friendships being built between two organizations of different viewpoints and people of different cultures.

07310

RAPPORT Poll on NP Support, Other Issues

34010046a Johannesburg *RAPPORT in Afrikaans*
6 Mar 88 p 10

[Report on findings of RAPPORT opinion poll by Sakie Perold: "NP Regains Lost Support"; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Nationwide opinion polls on matters of current interest are conducted regularly for RAPPORT by Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Limited. Approximately two thousand whites participate in the scientific test samples. The composition of the test sample corresponds to that of the total adult white population of South Africa in all important regards, such as language, sex, age, income and province. The polls are thus able to provide a national picture of the average support that the various parties enjoy, but are not intended to reflect a swing in a particular direction.

After the Conservative Party's gains in this week's two by-elections, the question now is: How do things stand nationwide? According to the latest RAPPORT poll, the Standerton swing is not a nationwide phenomenon.

Indeed, the nationwide poll conducted for RAPPORT at the end of January/beginning of February by Market and Opinion Surveys show that the National Party was at that point beginning to regain lost support.

At the time, the CP was falling off after the peak that it achieved around last year's general election.

The NP, which last year suffered a setback when its support shrunk from 49.4 percent in February to 44.1 percent in August, has since that time moved back to 46.9 percent.

At the same time, the CP has been unable to maintain its advance from 16.2 to 22.1 percent, and has fallen back to 19.8 percent.

Despite the schism between Dr Denis Worrall and Mr Wynand Malan, the Independents continue to enjoy significant support—especially the Worrall group at 8.1 percent, compared to the Malan group's 3.2 percent. Combined this is only slightly lower than the surprise 11.9 percent showing by the Independents in August.

This time, the surprise is that the Worrall group, which has yet to form a party, is already on the heels of the PFP. Progressive Federal Party support fell sharply from 19.4 percent in February of last year to 10.4 percent in August; since then it has declined slightly, to 9.6 percent.

The NRP is barely hanging on with a scant 1.6 percent, but the HNP is in a downhill slide. Its 2.8 percent of last year has shrunk to 0.8 percent.

Abstaining voters increased to 10 percent.

The question in the series of scientific surveys is always this: How would you vote if a general election were held right now and all parties ran a candidate in your electoral district?

Among Afrikaners, the sharp swing to the right recorded between last year's February and August polls was transformed into a swing back to the NP: Its share of the Afrikaner vote grew from 52 percent in August to 55 percent in January.

At the same time, the CP's share fell from 31.6 to 27.9 percent, while the HNP's share languished from 2.9 to 1.0 percent.

The NP also advanced among English-speaking voters during those 5 months, from 31.2 to 34.1 percent (at the expense of the Independents).

	Jan. 1988 %	Aug. 1987 %	Feb. 1987 %
National Party	46.9	44.1	49.4
Conservative Party	19.8	22.1	16.2
Independent (Worrall) 8.1 (Malan) 3.2			
Progressive Federal Party	11.3	11.9	3.7
New Republic Party	9.6	10.4	19.4
Reconstituted National Party	1.6	1.4	2.9
Would not vote	0.8	2.2	2.8
	10.0	7.9	6.6

Fluctuations in party support in the three RAPPORT polls conducted over the course of the last year.

It is significant that the National Party advanced most strongly among young people. In the 18 to 24 age group, 52 percent now vote for the NP, 20 percent for the CP and only 4 percent for the PFP, which was dealt a serious blow in this group by the 11.4 percent of the Independents. (This figure is divided into 9.9 percent for Worrall and 1.5 percent for Malan.)

What Whites Think About Opening up Areas

Nearly half of all white voters support changing the Group Areas Act to permit the opening up of certain areas. Less than one-quarter want to completely scrap the law. More than one-quarter say that the law should remain unchanged and be strictly enforced.

According to the latest RAPPORT poll, this is the situation in early 1988, while ever-stronger demands are being heard, especially from coloreds, that the Group Areas Act must go.

These nationwide polls, which are conducted on a regular basis by Market and Opinion Surveys, reveal a significant trend: the tougher the insistence by the outside world that this and other apartheid laws be repealed, the stronger the group that clings to them.

Whites who want to preserve the Group Areas Act unchanged and want it strictly enforced dropped sharply from 34.7 percent in 1982 to only 24.4 percent in 1986; however, this figure then began to rise again, to 26.8 percent in February 1987 and 29.8 percent in January 1988.

Among Afrikaners, the swing was even more illuminating: Those who insist on preserving the Group Areas Act fell from 52 percent in 1982 to 37.2 percent in 1986, but then began to rise again, to 39.8 percent in 1987 and 44.8 percent in 1988.

It thus appears that foreign pressure, such as sanctions and disinvestment—which have sharply increased over the last couple of years—is counterproductive in terms of the Afrikaner and change, just as political observers have noted repeatedly.

A similar swing is in evidence with respect to what whites feel about mixed schools (report below).

In the latest poll, the nationwide test sample had the following to say about the Group Areas Act:

—The law should remain unchanged and be strictly enforced, according to 29.8 percent.

—The law should be completely scrapped, according to 22.9 percent.


—While retaining the broad principle of group areas, the law should be modified to make provisions for the establishment of "open" areas in certain cases, according to 46.9 percent.

Unsure: 0.4 percent.

(The results cannot be compared with those of previous polls in every regard, since the wording of the questions has differed—but the first statement about preserving the law was generally the same, so that the reaction of the conservative group over the last 6 years can be compared.)

Only one in ten Afrikaans-speaker, compared to 40 percent of the English-speakers, wants to completely scrap the Group Areas Act, the latest poll shows.

In terms of the future, it is of interest that advocates of total repeal are most heavily represented in the youngest group (under 24).



Breakdown of how white voters would vote in January of this year if all parties ran candidates in all electoral districts.

In order to get closer to home, participants in the nationwide test sample were also questioned on the opening up of their own neighborhood. This question has been repeated in three polls since 1982, as follows: "Suppose that a referendum were held among the residents of your neighborhood to determine how they feel about opening up your neighborhood to coloreds/Indians/blacks. How would you personally vote in such a referendum?"

Here, the same pattern is in evidence: From 1982 to 1986, there was a sharp decrease in the percentage that was opposed to opening up, but since then there has been an increase.

The percentage of whites who refuse to open up their own neighborhood to coloreds fluctuated as follows: 63.6 percent in 1982, 52 percent in 1986 and 60.7 percent in 1988.

With respect to opening up to Indians, the 62.1 percent who said no in 1982 dropped to 51.5 percent in 1986, which has now risen back to 59 percent.

Opposition to opening up to blacks declined from 71.6 percent in 1982 to 61 percent in 1986, and is now back at 66.7 percent.

Here again, young people are more inclined to open up: A full 43 percent of the 16 to 24 age group is in favor of opening up their own neighborhood to Indians.

With respect to coloreds, it is interesting that Cape Province, where most coloreds live, is also the province that gives the highest percentage in favor of opening up: 37 percent of the Cape's whites say yes to opening up their own neighborhood (this was 46 percent in 1986).

Worrallists Want To Vote

Scarcely one-quarter of all white voters want to wait until 1992 for the next general election. The rest cannot decide in which year it should take place.

Because there was talk of an early election after troubles between President P.W. Botha and Rev Allan Hendrickse, the latest RAPPORT poll sounded out voter feelings on that matter as well.

Participants in the nationwide test sample were asked straight out: In what year would you like for the next general election to be held?

This year was the response of 18.2 percent, while 24.9 percent selected next year. Only 23.9 percent want to wait until 1992, when the usual five-year term expires. A full 33 percent is unsure.

Those who said 1992 are primarily National Party supporters—39 percent of them—but nonetheless, 27.7 percent of the NP supporters see a chance for an early election (8.3 percent say 1988 and 19.4 percent say 1989).

Oddly enough, the group that most strongly supports an early election is the Worrall people, who have yet to even form a party! A total of 70.4 percent of them favor an early election (in 1989, most say), compared to 70.1 percent of CP supporters and 61.2 percent of PFP supporters, who also want to vote again in 1988 or 1989.

Young People Are for Open Schools

Nearly 40 percent of white young people in the 16 to 24 age group are in favor of opening up schools to all population groups. And another 25 percent support opening up certain white schools.

As far as open schools are concerned, white young people are much more liberal than the old guard.

On the whole, however, the white population remains conservative on this question: 40.6 percent say that no schools in white areas should be opened up, 30.7 percent think that white schools should be opened up to other population groups in certain cases, and 28 percent want to open up all schools.

Just as in the question of group areas, the reaction of the nationwide test sample here is more conservative than in 1986—but still more liberal than in 1982.

The group that does not want to open up any schools shrunk from 48 percent in 1982 to 34.5 percent in 1986, but is now back at 40.6 percent.

Whites who want to open up all schools advanced over the course of 6 years from 18 to 28 percent.

The Orange Free State is by far the most conservative province on this question—nearly 53 percent do not want to open up any schools.

12271

UNHCR Official Outlines Refugee Situation
34000563a Dar es Salaam TANZANIA DAILY NEWS
in English 26 Mar 88 p 1

[Article by Mkumbwa Ally]

[Text] The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has started resettling identified Mozambican refugees crossing into southern Tanzania to escape harassment by the South African-backed bandits of the so-called Mozambique National Resistance (MNR).

The UNHCR Representative in Tanzania, Mr. Emanuel Owusu, said in Dar es Salaam yesterday that an estimated 15,000 asylum seekers had been resettled at Likuyo-Sekamanganga, a camp built by his agency in Ruvuma Region.

UNHCR was, meanwhile, cooperating with government authorities to determine the actual number of Mozambicans in Ruvuma, Mtwara and Lindi regions meriting refugee status under a census to be completed this June.

Mr. Owusu said the census was particularly important in identifying the aliens in Mtwara and Lindi regions where all newcomers had been integrated with relatives and sympathizers in the villages.

Another camp will be built for the refugees in Mtwara and Lindi after the census. Mr. Owusu said the UNHCR branch office in Tanzania had estimated to spend about 194m/- (2.1 million US dollars) on the resettlement.

An estimated 72,000 Mozambicans are believed to have fled to southern Tanzania from Nyassa and Cabo Delgado provinces. Government figures show that 42,000 of these are in Ruvuma Region, 20,000 in Mtwara and 10,000 in Lindi.

UNHCR Representative said joint mission of the agency and government personnel was able to identify about 15,000 grouped refugees in Muhukuru Ward and 4,000 others in Tunduru District in Ruvuma but it was not possible to ascertain the refugee presence in Mtwara and Lindi regions where the indigenous population has close linguistic and tribal ties with the Mozambicans.

The UNHCR spent 6.6m/- (72,000 US dollars) on emergency supplies to the identified refugees in Ruvuma between last September and January, this year, according to Mr. Owusu.

The asylum seekers who trekked for 15 to 20 days from Mozambique's Nyassa Province to reach Tanzania fled without any belongings and were found in destitute condition by the joint mission.

A nutritional survey showed that 20 percent of children among the new comers were malnourished, five percent of them severely.

The UNHCR Representative said the camp in Ruvuma was at a rudimentary stage but would be built on permanent basis. "It will be a normal village settlement with permanent buildings, schools, dispensaries and other amenities", he explained.

He said the asylum seekers would be free to return home when the security situation improved in Mozambique.

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GDR Trains 800 Zambians

34000592b Lusaka ZAMBIA DAILY MAIL in English
7 Mar 88 p 5

[Article: "GDR Trains 800 Zambians"]

[Text] About 800 Zambians have completed free professional training in various fields in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) between 1982/88, that country's Ambassador to Zambia Guenther Donath, has said.

Since 1982 GDR had granted Zambia 10 free scholarships annually in various fields in the economic sector at undergraduate and graduate levels.

Mr Donath said his country would continue to support Zambia's contribution towards peace, social progress and understanding among nations.

GDR would also continue to stand firm with the oppressed people of South Africa and Namibia in their just struggle for independence.

Earlier, Central Province Member of Central Committee Zeniah Ndhlovu, who was guest of honour at the ceremony, said the launching of the Zambia/GDR Friendship Society opened a new chapter of friendship between the two sister countries.

Cde Ndhlovu, said the Party and its government hoped that the society would give a new impetus to relations between people of the two countries.

She added that the proposal by GDR, Head of State Erich Honecker to convene an international conference on disarmament in Berlin was proof of his genuine desire for a peaceful world.

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Number of Refugees Increasing

34000592a Johannesburg THE STAR in English
28 Mar 88 p 13

[Article: "Refugees to Zambia Increasing"]

[Text] Lusaka—The number of refugees in Zambia has swelled from 16,500 in 1971 to over 155,000 at the close of 1987, Zambian Home Affairs Minister Mr Paul Malukutula has disclosed.

He said the largest group of refugees in the country were Angolans who numbered 94,000 and Mozambicans whose total is 28,000.

"These are not political refugees running away from their government," he said and added:

Flee for Lives

"They are forced to flee for their lives as a result of the activities of the MNR and Unita bandit movements which are fighting legitimate government in Mozambique and Angola respectively."

Mr Malukutula said the guerillas in those countries were laying land mines along escape routes killing people who were trying to flee.

"The refugee problem will be with us for some time to come unless the international community acts fast to bring pressure to bear on South Africa to stop giving material and logistical support to the rebels," he said.

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